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SYNOPSIS
Barbuda, a flat island twenty-five miles north of Antigua, 
had few inhabitants before the late seventeenth century. 
From 1684 to 1870 it was leased from the Crown by members 
of the Codrington family who administered it as part of 
their West Indian estates, by 1738 concentrated in Antigua. 
Barbuda's thin soil and susceptibility to drought made it 
unsuitable for sugar-growing, but it was developed by the 
Codringtons as a stock-rearing island which supplied their 
sugar estates and the market with meat and draught animals. 
This was usually the most profitable part of the economy, 
but the proprietor also received salvage awards from ships 
wrecked off the island's dangerous coasts. In addition, 
the Codringtons encouraged crop-growing and a miscellaneous 
assortment of activities which they hoped would increase 
their returns. The Codringtons for the period of this thesis 
were conscientious and usually effective absentee owners, 
and when there were efficient managers on Barbuda reasonable 
profits were made, though neither Sir William nor Sir 
Bethell Codrington (the two proprietors at this time) felt 
that they received an adequate return on their capital 
invested in slaves and stock.
The slave population on Barbuda is particularly 
interesting because there was a natural growth from 172 in 
1746 to 503 in 1831, because of favourable social conditions. 
Succeeding generations of families therefore grew up on 
Barbuda developing a strong attachment to the island. 
Attempts made by the attorneys to utilize this increase by 
transferring slaves to Antigua met with little success. 
Opposition from the slaves themselves and an unwillingness 
to harm them by the proprietor meant that in the main only 
those who transgressed were transferred. This slave society 
was a relatively happy one, the only serious disturbance 
coming before 1746, with some restlessness after 1820.
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INTRODUCTION
Barbuda is a little known island lying about twenty-five 
miles due north of Antigua. It does not appear likely, at 
first sight, to offer anything of value to the student of 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Caribbean history as it 
was not a sugar island, was not of great strategic import- 
ance, and the population only slightly exceeded five hundred 
in 1831. A study of its history might be thought to have 
only antiquarian value; of interest in itself but not of 
any greater significance.
This, however, is not an accurate assessment. Barbuda 
was in fact part of the Caribbean possessions of the 
Codrington family who owned extensive sugar estates on Antigua. 
It was an integral part of these estates, attorneys in 
Antigua supervising Barbuda as well as the sugar plantations. 
Barbuda provided the Antiguan properties with livestock, 
ground provisions, and estate supplies generally, and received 
clothing, some food and other necessities from Antigua. 
There was frequent communication between the islands and 
some interchange of the slave populations. The link with 
the sugar plantations owned by the Codringtons prevented 
Barbuda from becoming an isolated outpost, untouched by 
general events in the Caribbean.
Even without the close connection with these estates, 
however, Barbuda's history would still have some significance 
The islands that were used for sugar-growing have received 
most attention from historians because their wealth made
VI
them more important politically and internationally, but 
for a true picture of the Caribbean attention must also be 
given to the islands where sugar was not grown. Barbuda 
is a good example of an island of this sort.
The economy was based on the rearing of livestock, 
but crops and crafts of various types were also tried and 
a not inconsiderable sum was made from ships wrecked on 
the dangerous reefs round Barbuda. The fact that a profit 
could be made from such an assortment of economic projects 
indicates some degree of administrative skill on the part 
of the proprietor and his attorneys, particularly as the 
Codringtons at this time were absentees.
Probably the most interesting aspect of Barbudan life 
for the historian, however, is the slave society there. 
Although there were some transfers and purchases of slaves 
for the island these were few in number and, in the main, 
the slaves on Barbuda in 1833 were descended from those on 
the island in 1761 and in some cases before that. This con- 
tinuity, which is unusual in the Caribbean, enables one to 
trace the lives of some individual slaves from birth to 
death, and some families over several generations. In two 
cases, at least, it is possible to give a reasonably detailed 
picture of the life of an individual slave. The slave popu- 
lation of Barbuda, however, is also of special interest 
because it increased naturally, without significant purchases, 
from 172 in 1746 to 503 in 1831, at a time when the owners 
of sugar estates had to buy slaves in large numbers just to 
maintain the population. Barbuda was not the only island 
in the Caribbean to achieve this, but an increase of this sort 
is sufficiently unusual to be worthy of attention.
Vll
The dates chosen for this study require some explanation. 
The year 1833, the last full year before the slaves achieved 
emancipation, is an obvious one for concluding an account of 
an island under slavery: the year 1738 is a less immediately 
clear starting point. In that year, however, Sir William 
Codrington (I) died and his son William (II) inherited the 
estates as a minor. Because of this and as there are few 
records for the period of the first Sir William's adminis- 
tration, the year 1738 is a good place at which to begin.
The student of Barbuda's history is particularly fort- 
unate in the wealth of documents available. About thirty 
years ago, Robson Lowe, the stamp-dealer, bought some of 
the correspondence, which is now available on a micro-film ; 
it contains copies of more than five hundred documents, 
though not all relating to Barbuda. The bulk of the material, 
however, consists of diaries, correspondence, accounts, 
instructions to attorneys and memoranda which were deposited 
at the Gloucester Record Office until October 1980. 
Unfortunately in December 1980 Sir Simon Codrington sold the 
collection by auction, and the new owner's name has still 
not been disclosed (March 1981) . The total information about 
the island is so detailed that Professor Lowenthal and 
Dr. Clarke believe 'the surviving manuscript sources for 
.Barbuda during this period, in proportion to its population, 
may be more voluminous than for any other West Indian 
territory.'
David Lowenthal and Colin G. Clarke, 'Slave-Breeding in 
Barbuda: the Past of a Negro Myth 1 , Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, CCXCII (June 1977), 512.
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Chapter 1
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BARBUDA
I Geographical Background
'It resembles no Island I have seen in the W.I. . . . [It] 
appears to be a dead flat from the Sea it is like a vast 
extended bank of sand covered with bushes. 1 This was how 
Barbuda appeared to a visitor in the 1780s. To those famil- 
iar with other islands, especially those of the volcanic 
inner Leewards, Barbuda must certainly have appeared unusual, 
but it is not, in fact, unique. It is one of the three 
islands of the outer Leewards and has features in common with 
the other two  Antigua and Anguilla  and with the other flat
islands which stretch in an arc from eastern Guadeloupe and
2its dependencies in the south, to Anegada in the north.
The three outer Leeward islands are frequently referred 
to as the 'Limestone Caribees 1 . All three have an annual 
average temperature of 80°F and, like the other islands in 
the Lesser Antilles, feel the effects of the easterly trade 
winds throughout the year. Of the three, Antigua is not only 
the largest (108 square miles, Barbuda 62 square miles and 
Anguilla 35 square miles), but the most fertile, and has 
greater variations in climate than the other two because of 
its mountains and hills.
Barbuda and Anguilla are very similar in appearance.

Both are low-lying and almost entirely flat coral limestone 
islands, such hills as there are rising to not more than 
about two hundred feet. This affects their climate. It 
means that there is less rainfall, little variation of tem- 
perature and virtually no difference between the windward and 
leeward coasts. In general the climate follows the typical 
West Indian pattern of dry months (from January to April) and 
wet (from August to November), the other months being trans- 
itional, with hurricanes possible in July and August. Usually 
about half the annual rainfall occurs in the wet season but 
the pattern is variable in both islands, even to the extent 
of there being in some years more rain in the dry season than
*
in the wet. Both are dry islands, Barbuda having an average 
annual rainfall of about 38 inches and Anguilla about 45 
inches. In both islands the soils are of the same types and 
quality, thin and infertile.
The comparison with Anguilla is useful for showing that 
Barbuda is not unique in appearance or geological composition. 
In one way, however, it is markedly different from other 
islands in that the surrounding coral reefs are exceptionally 
perilous. Some of the nearer reefs are shown on the map 
following page 1. Barbuda has, in fact, developed the
reputation of being the most dangerous island in the West
3 Indies for shipping to approach. The flatness of the island
and its lack of prominent landmarks on three coasts made it 
difficult for navigators, before the invention of radar, to 
locate it. The eastern coast, which has perpendicular cliffs 
marking the edge of Barbuda's higher land, is more easily 
seen, but has its own particular dangers. A coral reef, 
visible above the sea, lies about half to three quarters of a
4 mile off shore, but a greater difficulty is created by the
fact that from the sea it looks as though Barbuda's northern
i 
coast lies along the northern edge of the plateau of higher
land, whereas actually the island's low-lying end and out- 
lying coral reefs extend a further seven miles, much of the 
reef area being submerged. For these reasons the West 
Indies Pilot today advises that sailors should exercise 
caution when passing to the north of Barbuda. It also des- 
cribes the south side of the island as 'very dangerous 1 be- 
cause of the submerged reefs out at sea. These hazards 
caused many wrecks in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.
Although it was so dangerous to approach, there were safe 
landings for those who knew. The safest seem to have been 
on the south coast where a sloop or schooner could sail along 
the shore within the reef in certain places. One visitor 
described the water here as so clear that it was possible to 
see every rock and added, 'it is wonderful how they steer
o
between under a bit of sail 1 . Henry Coleridge (a nephew of 
the poet), however, expressed more concern when he described 
his visit to Barbuda in 1825. 'The coast is beset with shoals 
and reefs under water, and it was a matter of some anxiety to 
see how the vessel insinuated itself, as it were, between
these rocks, a man standing on the bowsprit and giving his
9 directions every minute to the helm.' A landing known as
River Fort, on the south coast, almost due south from the 
village settlement, was the one normally used, but there was 
another   Gravenor's Landing   near Spanish Point. A small 
sloop could also sail into the lagoon from a narrow entry in 
the north coast, and a wharf was built on the east bank near 
the village. 11
Barbuda could not have appeared an attractive proposition 
to early settlers. Dennis Reynolds, manager of Barbuda in the
late eighteenth century, exclaimed in a letter to Sir William
12Codrington 'what a miserable poor place it is 1 . This
accords with the views of settlers a hundred years earlier
13who found it such 'a barren rocke' they left it. 'A barren
rocke 1 it must have seemed to those who tried to farm it as 
it consists entirely of coral limestone with only a thin 
layer of soil.
The interior of the island has three principal physical 
features. The most useful area for settlers was the flat
central plain, which is low-lying, in places no more than
14 five feet above sea-level, flanked to the west by the
lagoon which stretches almost the full length of the island, 
and to the east by a plateau of higher land. Here the ground 
rises, but only to 147 feet. This area, known as 'the 
Highlands', is about five miles in length bordered by flat 
land to the north and south as well as to the west. Its 
eastern edge forms the cliffs which distinguish the east 
coast of Barbuda.
It was on the central plain, near the lagoon, that the 
village, now known as Codrington, developed. Although there
was a marshy area near the lagoon, most of the plain was
17 covered with evergreen trees and thick undergrowth which
had to be cleared before crops could be grown. The soil, 
deeper here than in most other parts of the island, still 
only usually reached a depth of four to five inches and was
not of good quality. In dry weather it cracked and became
18 dusty, while in wet weather it flooded easily. In this,
the best, area the slaves were given their grounds and in the
BA
RB
UD
A 
C1
75
0-1
78
5
"1
Pg
lm
et
o 
Po
ln
Co
ok
's 
Bo
y P
oin
t
GR
EA
T 
GO
AT
 
ISL
A-N
D
G
oo
d/
''la
n 
d
/
X
X
\
 /'
'W
oo
dy
MA
NO
'W
AR
 
Al
SL
AN
D
Th
ree
 
row
s 
of
o 
o 
o 
co
co
a
I H
E 
LA
RG
E 
PO
ND
Sa
nd
 
ba
nn
--R
IV
ER
 
FO
RT Tr
ac
k
I : :
 •• 
• ••_
! P
lan
tat
ion
wa
ter
ing
 p
en
 
^
^
 
Ba
tte
ry 
|nom
°bV
r"of
 gu
ns)
 
Ap
pro
xim
ate
 s
ca
le 
: E
as
t t
o 
W
es
t 
13
mi
les
, 
No
rth
 to
 S
ou
th 
12
mi
les
_
So
urc
e 
• T
wo
 m
ap
s 
of
 B
ar
bu
da
,in
 G
lou
ce
ste
rs
hir
e 
Co
un
ty 
Re
co
rd 
Of
fic
e 
0 1
61
0 
PI
? 
Th
is 
re
-d
ra
wi
ng
 <
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 t
ie
 
pe
nc
il 
an
d 
co
lou
r-w
as
h 
ma
p. 
Ad
di
tio
na
l i
nf
or
m
at
ion
 f
ro
m
 
th
e 
pe
n 
an
d 
ink
 v
ers
ion
 (o
f i
de
nti
ca
l o
ut
lin
e)
 is
 s
ho
wn
 h
er
e 
~
r\ 
br
ac
ke
t*
late eighteenth century land was cleared for crops and pasture. 
On the Highlands, in places where the ground was level,
the soil was no deeper than on the plain, but there were cer-
19 tain depressions in which trees grew better than elsewhere.
In general, however, in the eighteenth century this was
regarded as a poor area described by Reynolds as 'almost
20 
cover'd with large stones, prickle pears, Turks head and bush. 1
The flat area immediately to the north of the Highlands,
described succinctly on an eighteenth century map as 'bad
21land', supported similar plants. To the south of the High- 
lands, towards Spanish Point, much of the ground was of the 
same type, though there were swamps in this area.
Other parts of Barbuda were either rocky (for example, 
Great Goat Island and Little Goat Island) supporting nothing 
but rather poor pasture; or sandy (like much of the area 
along the south coast, and to the west of the lagoon); or 
marshy (such as some land along the east bank of the lagoon, 
and another stretch in the south-east towards Spanish Point). 
Some crops or useful trees could be grown in places, but for 
the most part this type of development was only possible in 
the central area.
Although not of much value for growing crops, Barbuda 
did possess certain advantages which could be turned to 
account. In the early eighteenth century there was some good
timber and saline flashes in some of the marshes provided
22salt. Turtle visited the beaches in the breeding season
23 
and there were fish in the lagoon. Once the island was
inhabited advantage was taken of the wrecks and the 
Codringtons made a considerable sum from salvage awards.
However profitable these undertakings might be, though,
the real advantage of owning Barbuda lay in the possibility 
of its being used for rearing stock. Even in the rocky areas 
in the north there was grazing good enough for sheep and 
goats, and in other parts sufficient pasture for cattle, 
horses and mules. There was usually no shortage of water for 
stock either. In the central plain, hollows in the pastures 
could be used unless the weather was very dry. There were 
also springs, in several of the marshes, which provided 
brackish but drinkable water. In the eighteenth century pens 
were made in various places for catching the wild cattle, and
these were supplied with water from wells which rarely dried
24 
up. There was in fact usually no shortage of water for
drinking. It was crop growing that suffered under drought
conditions, so that fodder became very scarce. Provision
25 
could sometimes be made for this but it was often inadequate.
From the late seventeenth century it was obviously recog- 
nized by those living in the Leewards that Barbuda could be 
developed as a pasture island. In 1676, Colonel Warner, writ- 
ing of the advantages Antigua possessed that would be useful 
for a garrison, commented, 'an augmentation to these benefitts 
thar is barbuda and severall other small agasent islands that
are only kept to breed stock which makes it a far more
2 6 
Plentifull place than all the other Caribe Islands. 1 A
hundred years later, Henri de Ponthieu, a botanist acquaint- 
ance of Sir William Codrington, who had lived a long time in 
the West Indies commented: 'Your island of Barbuda is to be 
regarded as a kind of farm producing a great deal of livestock 
and in that light it is undoubtedly of considerable value,
particularly from its situation with respect to this Island
27 (Antigua) which wants every thing of the kind. 1 For the
owner of sugar estates on Antigua   as the Codringtons were 
 there were great advantages to be obtained from owning a 
nearby island which could be used in this way. This was 
expressed vividly by the manager of estates on Barbados in 
1711: 'A Plantation without Stock is no more deem'd entire 
here than a Man without hands and Feet can be said to be whole
for without Cattle we can't make Sugar, for it is produced
2 8 by dung and much labour. 1
The Codringtons were particularly well placed to take 
full advantage of Barbuda. Their sugar estates, centring on 
Betty's Hope, were in the north of Antigua, near to Parham 
harbour which lies due south of Barbuda. So, although the 
journey might have its dangers the island was conveniently 
near. It was this which made it possible for Barbuda to 
become a useful addition to the Codrington estates. Under 
their management Barbuda was developed primarily as a pasture 
estate but they were not satisfied that it should be used 
solely for this purpose. The history of the island reveals 
a constant search for fresh ways of making it profitable.
II The Historical Background of Barbuda 
and the Codrington Family
(a) To 1684
The first people to settle on the Leeward Islands seem to have
been the Arawak Indians, a race which came originally from
29 South America. They established themselves on many islands
in the Caribbean and seem to have occupied Antigua by AD 600. 
It is possible that at some stage there was an Arawak settle- 
ment on Barbuda, but there is no conclusive proof of this.
8The Arawaks lived in small communities making a living through 
agriculture and fishing. They were a pleasant, somewhat 
indolent people and they were easy prey first for the warlike 
Carib Indians and then for the Spanish. By the end of the 
fifteenth century the Caribs had expelled them from the 
Leeward Islands and had established themselves in Dominica, 
St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Tobago.
The Caribs, although of similar stock, and also from 
South America, were very different in nature. They were 
skilled seamen and fishermen, and fierce fighters, with a 
reputation for cannibalism. They specialized in the surprise 
attack. If they were successful they were likely to eat their 
male enemies and take their women into captivity. It is thus 
not surprising that they were feared by all European settlers, 
who tried to avoid the areas where the Caribs were active.
In the early seventeenth century, when the English began 
to found colonies in the Caribbean, they faced opposition from 
the Spanish and the Carib Indians, and competition from other 
European powers. Their successful settlements were on five 
islands in the more northerly part of the Lesser Antilles   
St. Christopher (1624) , Barbados (1627), Nevis (1628), 
Antigua (1632), and Montserrat (1632). These islands had not 
been taken by the Spanish, probably because they were small, 
difficult to clear for agriculture, and had neither precious 
metals nor large quantities of dye-woods. They may also have 
been put off by Carib activity in the area. This was a prob- 
lem which continued to plague European settlers in the 
Leewards until the end of the seventeenth century.
Barbuda was probably uninhabited when English colonists 
began to take an interest in the Leewards. Nevertheless it
was not an easy island to settle and until the late seventeenth 
century their efforts met with little success. It is difficult 
to be sure when the first attempt was made but Barbuda seems 
to have been included in the lands granted to the Earl of 
Carlisle by Charles I in 1627. The next year the earl 
granted Barbuda to Thomas Littleton who tried to establish a 
settlement. Unfortunately Barbuda did not live up to the 
name   Dulcina   which the colonists gave it. Attacks on them
by Carib Indians, and the barren nature of the island made
31 them decide to leave and they went to Nevis.
Between then and 1664 there seems to have been no official 
settlement but there were some inhabitants. They are referred 
to in the preamble to a grant of the island in 1668. According 
to this source, at the outbreak of the 'late war 1 (presumably 
the war with the French 1666-8) Barbuda was partly cut off
by the Caribs and a few weeks later 'was wholly deserted by
32the remainder of the inhabitants and hath ever so continued. 1
A threat that Barbuda might be taken over by the Dutch had 
alerted the British authorities to the need for Barbuda to
be in friendly hands and in 1668 Barbuda was granted to four
33lessees for thirty-two years. Settlers were to be encour- 
aged to live there to defend the island from Carib and other 
attacks. They were not entirely successful in this aim. In 
1681, in revenge for English action against them in Dominica
in 1675, the Caribs attacked Barbuda, then being used as a
34 
stock farm for Nevis. About twenty English people were
living there, some of whom managed to make their escape while 
the Indians were drinking rum.
At the time of that attack, two members of the Codrington 
family, Christopher and John Codrington, had already bought
10
out some of the lessees of Barbuda or their heirs. In 
1684, having acquired (with George Turney and Clement Tudway) 
the remainder of the original lease, for the whole island, 
they surrendered it to the Crown and applied for a new grant. 
This was given to Christopher and John Codrington for fifty
years in 1684, the rent being 'one sufficient able horse 1 to
37 be delivered at Nevis at Christmas. The grant was renewed
00
three times - in 1705, 1800, and 1856 -so that with the
exception of a short period in the eighteenth century, when
39 they sub-let the island, Barbuda was controlled by the
Codrington family or their trustees until 1870, when they
40 
surrendered the lease.
(b) The Codrington Family and the History of Barbuda
from 1684 to 1738
The Codringtons were an old Gloucestershire family owning land 
in the south of the county near Chipping Sodbury. Several 
members seem to have been of an adventurous disposition. One
of the ancestors of the Caribbean Codringtons was with the
41 first settlers in Virginia in 1606. The first to settle
in the West Indies was a second son, Christopher Codrington 
(I) who was one of the early colonists in Barbados. He 
arrived there in 1628 and eventually acquired two fertile 
plantations the larger of which he named after his home in 
Gloucestershire   Didmartons. He married the sister of Sir
James Drax, a wealthy Barbadian planter, and in 1641 was
42 
appointed to the island's council. By the time of his
death in 1656 he had laid the foundations of the family's
43 
wealth in Barbados which made them one of the island elite.
(A genealogical table of the Codringtons mentioned in this 
thesis will be found in Appendix I.)
11
One of his sons, Christopher Codrington (II), born in 
1640, achieved a high position in the Barbados government 
while still in his twenties. He was appointed to the 
Barbados council at twenty-six and three years later he was 
made deputy Governor when the Governor, Lord Willoughby, went 
to England. In 1672, however, Codrington was dismissed. 
Although he had made reforms, the island's finances had been 
overstrained. As he also lost his seat on the Council he 
stood for the Assembly and was elected Speaker nine times 
between 1674 and 1682. The actions of a new Governor, Sir
Richard Button, led Codrington, however, to leave Barbados
44 for the Leeward Islands. It is difficult to be certain
when he acquired the Antiguan estates, but Betty's Hope (the
45 principal plantation) was in his possession before 1696.
In the classification of gentry families in Antigua made by 
Professor Sheridan, the Codringtons are listed as acquiring 
their estates between 1690 and 1706. Of the twelve families 
who obtained land at this time the Codrington-Bethells are 
the second largest landowners. They had 1,734 acres and 799 
slaves. Christopher Codrington (II) was also still a 
wealthy Barbadian planter and his personal fortune stood him
in good stead when he was appointed Governor-General of the
47 Leeward Islands in 1689, a position he held until his death
in 1698.
From 1689 to 1713 (apart from a brief period of peace 
between 1697 and 1702) England was involved in war with 
France, and the English colonies in the Caribbean were vul- 
nerable to French attacks. St. Christopher had surrendered 
to the French in August 1689 and it looked as though other 
islands might follow the same pattern. The situation was
12
improved by a vigorous three week campaign led by Codrington,
when St. Christopher was recaptured by the English. In 1691
48 he attempted to conquer Guadeloupe and in 1693 Martinique.
Both attempts failed, but he has been described as about the
most effective commander in the Caribbean in the seventeenth
49 
century. It has been said, too, that his career in the
Leeward Islands 'places him among the outstanding Englishmen 
of his generation in the New World.'
Even so, it is probably his elder son Christopher 
Codrington (III) who is the most distinguished member of the 
family. Born in Barbados he lived in the West Indies 
until the age of twelve when he was sent to England to be 
educated. At Oxford he became one of a brilliant circle 
known as the 'Christ Church wits' and in 1686 was elected a 
fellow of All Souls'. He was, however, not only a scholar: 
in 1692 he joined a military expedition to the West Indies. 
He returned to Oxford but left in 1694 to fight in Flanders 
with William III. From then until 1700 he not only took an 
active part in the war but joined in the literary life of 
London and returned to Oxford at intervals. In February 1699, 
after his father's death and in recognition of his own milit- 
ary service, he was made Governor-General of the Leeward 
Islands. Before departing for the West Indies he bought 
Dodington, in Gloucestershire, from another member of the 
family. This became the family's principal English estate, 
as it still is today.
When war broke out again in 1702, Christopher Codrington 
(III) led an expedition which succeeded in driving the French 
once more from St. Christopher, but he was less effective 
against them in Guadeloupe. Like his father he attempted to
13
govern vigorously but he made enemies in doing so. In 1703 
he became seriously ill and asked for leave. Although this 
was granted he found himself replaced as Governor in 1704. 
For a few years he remained at Betty's Hope, but in 1707 he 
returned to Barbados where he lived the life of a scholar 
until his death in 1710. In his will he left his Library and 
ten thousand pounds to All Souls' College, Oxford; and his 
two plantations in Barbados and part of Barbuda to the Society 
for the Propagation of the Christian Religion in foreign
parts, for the establishment of a college to train medical
52
missionaries, whom he wanted to be monks.
This will illustrates the unusual attitude which 
Christopher Codrington (III) had towards his slaves. He was 
not opposed to slavery as an institution, but he believed 
that owners should treat their slaves in a better way than 
was customary. He had imbibed this attitude from his father. 
About him, Christopher Codrington (III) wrote: 'My Father 
who had studied ye genius and temper of all kinds of negroes 
forty-five years with a very nice observation, would say, noe 
Man deserv'd a Corramante yt wd not treat Him like a Friend 
rather than a Slave. 1 He commented that his father's 
Corramante slaves regularly visited his father's tomb and 
said that when they had finished working for his son they
would 'come to Him and be his faithful slaves in ye other
53 World.' He himself had hoped to put into effect during
his lifetime the ideas he incorporated in his will. He 
believed that the slaves should be taught Christianity by 
adequately qualified clergymen who would be dedicated to 
their work, and he preferred monks to secular clergy. His 
views were far in advance of his time.
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The first owners of Barbuda were, therefore, men of con- 
siderable standing and substance. After securing the lease 
to themselves alone in 1684, one of the brothers, John, went 
to Barbuda and built a castle on the east bank of the lagoon
and apparently lived on the island until his death about
55 1688. His half of the island then passed to his son,
William, but as he was a minor it was managed for him first 
by his uncle, Christopher Codrington (II) and then by his 
cousin Christopher Codrington (III), until he came of age. 
During this time Barbuda seems to have been used as a stock 
farm, supplying the family's estates in Antigua and Barbados 
with horses and cattle. The island also served as a base
for unfit slaves who were of no further use on the
T 4. 4.- 5 8 plantations.
The heir to the third Christopher Codrington's estates
in Antigua and to part of Barbuda was his cousin William
59 Codrington, a young man then living in the West Indies. His
position in Barbuda was not straightforward. He had, before 
his uncle's death, inherited half the island through his 
father, and he acquired another portion under his uncle's 
will. But Christopher Codrington had given parts of Barbuda 
to other people. During his lifetime he had given one eighth 
to Vavasour Cage and in his will he had left another eighth 
to Colonel Lambert and William Harman (jointly) and the
C -I
remainder to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. 
A further complication was the fact that just before the 
death of Christopher Codrington, a French force attacked
Barbuda. They destroyed the castle and other buildings and
fi o 
carried off most of the inhabitants and their slaves.
William Codrington took decisive action over both problems
15
He rebuilt the castle and restocked the island. In 1719
there were ninety-two slaves on Barbuda (belonging to him)
64 
and twenty white servants. The occupations of the latter
indicate that the island was being used as a pasture estate 
as eight were employed to look after or round up animals } 
and there were two turtlers. Efforts were also made to grow
f- C
crops. Corn, peas and cotton were grown and in 1720 he sug-
6 fi gested that ginger should be tried. The cotton was spun
and woven on the island and made into hammocks and quilts.
By 1717 he was in England, but between then and 1722 he wrote
detailed instructions to his attorneys and the manager of
r O
Barbuda, aimed at making the island profitable.
The other problem, that of sorting out how much of 
Barbuda he owned, and subsequently of establishing himself 
as the sole owner of the island, was not easily solved. He 
was successful in buying the shares which belonged to Vavasour
Cage, Colonel Lambert, and William Harman, but the Society
69 for the Propagation of the Gospel were less easy to persuade.
This was not surprising as Codrington made difficulties over 
the transfer of the estates in Barbados. As far as Barbuda 
was concerned matters were complicated by the parties not at 
first knowing that Christopher Codrington (III) had obtained 
a second grant of Barbuda to himself alone in 1705. However, 
although the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel might 
have felt that they were entitled to compensation for their 
share of Barbuda, William behaved as though he were the 
owner of the entire island. In 1722, in order to pay off 
the debts and to provide portions for his younger children, 
the Antiguan estates and Barbuda were settled on trustees, 
and provision was made for the sale of Barbuda if necessary
16
to discharge debts. This did not happen, but a shortage 
of documents between 1722 and 1738 makes it difficult to 
establish any clear picture of events on Barbuda. Retro- 
spective comments by employees of the Codringtons at a later 
date suggest that it continued to be used for stock with
some crops being grown. Turtle and wrecks provided addit-
, 72 lonal revenue.
The proprietorship of William Codrington marks a tans- 
ition between the earlier members of the family who lived in 
the West Indies and took an active part in affairs there, 
and the later owners who were absentees. William had been 
brought up in the West Indies and his letters reveal a long- 
ing to return. He even expressed a desire to retire to 
Barbuda and he gave instructions as to what he wanted done in 
preparation for this event. 'I beg yt youll have a good 
orrange Orchard planted at Burbuda Sappordillers, grapes of 
all Sorts, plantings, Bonanahs Lime hedges, Lemons, tammarins, 
coccoe nuts for I design to end my days there, next the 
highlands where I designe a house one time or other.' It
is possible that he visited the West Indies again between 1722
74 
and 1738 and he was still a member of the Antiguan council
75 
at the time of his death but he made his home in England,
at Dodington, and he established himself in English public 
affairs. His wife, Elizabeth Bethell, brought more wealth 
into the family, he was made a baronet in 1721 and became a 
member of Parliament for Minehead.
The next two owners of Barbuda (whose period of pro- 
prietorship is the concern of this thesis) were both absentees 
Sir William Codrington (II) inherited the estate in 1738 when 
he was a minor. He had made a clandestine marriage in 1735
17
when he was seventeen and was sent abroad when this was dis- 
covered by his family. He seems not to have returned to
77 England until 1740. During his minority his mother looked
after the estates.
William Codrington (II) became a Member of Parliament
78 for Beverley and later for Tewkesbury; and he never visited
79 the West Indies. This, he fully realized, was a disadvantage
Despite that handicap he was a conscientious landowner who 
took pains to discover all he could about Barbuda. It was in
answer to his many queries that Dennis Reynolds, the manager
80 
of Barbuda in the 1780s, wrote such detailed letters; and
sketchmaps were also provided for the same reason. Unfort- 
unately, his only son, another William, proved a disappoint- 
ment to him. In 1776, Sir William disinherited him after
paying off debts of fifty-five thousand pounds and giving
81 him an annuity of one thousand pounds. When Sir William (II)
died, therefore, in 1792, his heir was his nephew, Christopher 
Codrington,the eldest son of his brother Edward. He was known
as Christopher Bethell Codrington after 1797 when he inherited
82 the Bethell estates through another uncle.
Sir William (II) had made provision in his will that his
heir should reside for six months on the West Indian estates
8 3 
after coming into his inheritance, but this was not enforced
as Christopher (Bethell) Codrington had been sent to Antigua 
by his uncle in 1790-1. This certainly gave him a little 
first hand knowledge which must have been of benefit, but he 
did not return to the West Indies. Like his uncle he was a 
concerned and careful owner, but like him, too, was against 
any movement to end slavery. His main interests were in 
England. He rebuilt Dodington, at great expense, from
18
84 designs by Wyatt, bought more land nearby, and was active
85 also in public life as a Member of Parliament for Tewkesbury.
The West Indian estates of the Codrington family were, 
therefore, built up by three generations of men who lived and 
worked in the Caribbean. Two of these men, the second and 
third Christopher Codringtons, were distinguished in their 
careers and at that time showed an unusually imaginative 
sympathy with their slaves. It is on this account that the 
family name is remembered in the West Indies today. The two 
men who are the subjects of this thesis were the inheritors 
of their efforts: neither of them chose to live in the 
Caribbean and their interests centred on their English 
estates, but they did not neglect their West Indian property. 
Barbuda was always a matter of intelligent concern for both 
of them.
19
Notes to Chapter 1
1 GRO, C13 Henri de Pontheiu to W.C. 1780-(1783).
2 Unless otherwise stated, for general geographical detail
in this chapter, I am indebted to David R. Harris, Plants, 
Animals, and Man in the Outer Leeward Islands, West Indies; 
an Ecological Study of Antigua, Barbuda and Anguilla, 
University of California Publications in Geography, Vol. 
XVIII (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965); Robert C. West and 
John P. Augelli, Middle America; Its Lands and Peoples 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. , 1966); J. Macpherson, Caribbean 
Lands, a Geography of the West Indies (London, 1963) .
Harris, Plants, Animals and Man, p. 21. 4                     
West Indies Pilot, Vol. II, 10th edition (London, 1955),
195. A good map of the whole coast and the coral reefs is 
the Admiralty Chart, No. 1997, Barbuda Island, surveyed by 
Capt. E. Barnett, 1848 (London, Hydrographic Office of the 
Admiralty, 1850: new edition 1861, with corrections to 1974).
5 West Indies Pilot, II, 196.
6 Ibid.
Admiralty Chart No. 1997. Also GRO,D1610 C13 Henri de 
Ponthieu to W.C. under "Remarks'.
8 GRO,D1610 C13.
9 Henry Coleridge, Six Months in the West Indies in 1825
(London, 1826), p. 266.
Map, The Island of Barbuda, surveyed by Capt. Decker, R.N. , 
1813 (PRO, CO 700, MP/8 Antigua X/04800) (above, follows 
p. 1); sketchmap of Barbuda, dated about 1780, GRO, D1610 
PI 7. A copy of this map, with additional information from 
another, was made at the Department of Geography, Liverpool 
University, for Dr. Colin Clarke. I am grateful to Dr. Clarke 
for kindly allowing me to use it. It appears following p. 4. 
At Dodington there was, until the recent sale, another similar 
version with some extra descriptive material.
11 GRO, D1610 Henri de Ponthieu to W.C. 1780-(1783).
GRO, MF375, Dennis Reynolds to W.C., 1 Apr. 1786.
J.A. Williamson, Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary 
Patents (Oxford, 1926) , p. 68 (quoting from John Smith, Works 
(1907) , II, 198-200) .
Preston E. James, Latin America (London, 1941), p. 807.
There is some difference of opinion about the maximum 
height of the plateau. Some geographers give 205 feet, others, 
e.g. Harris, 147 feet. I am using the height given by Harris 
as he has recent specialist information on Barbuda.
16 Admiralty Chart, No. 1997.
Unless otherwise stated, the general information about 
Barbuda in the 18th century comes from two letters to Sir 
William Codrington written by Dennis Reynolds, manager of 
Barbuda at the time. Both are on MF 375, and are dated 
1 Apr. 1786 and 1 Mar. 1787.
20
1 GRO, D1619 C13 Henri de Ponthieu to W.C. 1780-(1783). 
These facts, complained about by those who tried to cultivate 
land on Barbuda in the 18th century, are supported by modern 
research. David Harris (using C.F. Charter's research) 
points out that there are two types of soil on the flat land 
of Barbuda. Both are shallow and quickly become flooded 
after a downpour; but in the dry season 'readily dry out, 
crack and pulverize', Harris, Plants, Animals, and Man, 
p. 19.
19 Harris, loc. cit. His description of these depressions
today must have applied equally to the 18th century.
20
MF375, D. Reynolds to W.C., 1 Mar. 1787.
21 Sketchmap of Barbuda, circa 1786, formerly at Dodington House,
in many respects similar to the one reproduced after p. 4.
22 GRO, D1610 C5 Comments on Barbuda by B. King, 27 Dec. 1740.
23 Coleridge, Six Months in the West Indies, p. 275.
24 GRO, D1610 C13 Henri de Ponthieu to W.C. 1780-(1783).
25 MF375, D. Reynolds to W.C., 1 Mar. 1787.
2 6 Quoted by Vere L. Oliver, History of Antigua, III (London,
.1899) , 252.
27 MF 375, Henri de Ponthieu to W.C., 24 Aug. 1779. 
2 o
Manager Smalridge to Dr. George Smalridge, Barbados,
23 Mar. 1711. Quoted by J. Harry Bennett, Jr., Bondsmen and 
Bishops. Slavery and Apprenticeship on the Codrington 
Plantations of Barbados 1710-1838 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1958) , p. 11.
29 For information on the Arawaks and Caribs, and on the
early settlements in the Leeward Islands I am indebted to: 
Sir Alan Burns, History of the British West Indies (London, 
1954); Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves. The Rise of the 
Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (London, 
1973); Harris, Plants, Animals, and Man; J.H. Parry and 
P.M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies (London, 
1963) .
In 1958, at the foot of the cliffs on the east coast of 
Barbuda, a stone head, 'of probable Arawak workmanship', was 
found. It is of special interest because until this discov- 
ery Arawak stone heads had only been found in the Greater 
Antilles. Harris, Plants, Animals, and Man, p. 72.
Burns, History of the British West Indies, pp. 194-5.
32 GRO, D1610 T9 Patent to Several Persons for Barbuda,
1 Oct. 1668.
Ibid. They were Samuel Winthrop, Joseph Lees, William 
Mildon, and Francis Samson. Three of them were prominent in 
Antiguan affairs. Samuel Winthrop, the youngest son of the 
Governor of Massachusetts, was President of the Antigua 
Council. After the French raid on Antigua in 1666 he had 
only twelve slaves left, but he had built up his estates again 
before his death in 1678: Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 125-6; 
Oliver, History if Antigua, III, 252. Joseph Lee was Secretary 
to the Council in 1664 and signed the capitulation to the 
French in 1666: Oliver, History of Antigua, II, 172. Francis
21
Sam(p)son was Secretary to the Assembly of Antigua in 1668. 
His will was proved in 1668 and his widow, Mary, sold her 
quarter share of Barbuda to Governor Stapleton: Oliver, 
History of Antigua, III, 68.
34 The connection with Nevis may have come through William
Mildon, the fourth person to whom the grant of Barbuda was 
made in 1668. He is not mentioned by Oliver, so he is 
unlikely to have been active in Antiguan affairs. In the 
grant of 1684, however, his assignees are mentioned as being 
residents of Nevis: GRO, D1610 T9 Grant of 1684.
35 C.S.S. Higham, The Leeward Islands 1660-1688 (Cambridge,
1921), p. 136.
Oliver, History of Antigua,III, 253. 
37 GRO, D1610 T9 Grant of the Island of Barbuda 1684.
O Q
Copies of these grants are to be found in GRO, D1610 T9. 
39 This lease was to Colonel Samuel Martin and William Byam,
1746-61: GRO D1610 E16.
40 GRO, D1610 T9.
41 R.H. Codrington, 'Memoir of the Family of Codrington of
Codrington, Didmarton, Frampton-on-Severn, and Dodington 1 , 
Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological 
Society, XXI (1898), 325. This memoir is not entirely 
reliable as the author appears to have thought that Christopher 
Codrington (I) and Christopher Codrington (II) were the same 
man.
42 Vincent T. Harlow, Christopher Codrington 1668-1710
(Oxford, 1928), pp. 6-7; Cyril Hamshere, The British in the
Caribbean (London, 1972), p. 101.
43 R.S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 48, points out that in
1680, 175 planters from 159 families formed the island elite.
Some 62 of these 159 families were property holders in 1638.
Among these 62 early arrivals, 'the charter members of the
Barbados §lite', were the Codringtons.
44 Harlow, Christopher Codrington, pp. 11-15.
45 GRO, Catalogue to Archives Relating to the West Indian
Estates of the Codrington Family, I, iv. His experience as a 
sugar planter in Barbados was particularly useful in Antigua 
where landowners had only started to grow sugar in the 
1660s: Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 122-3; Bryan Edwards, 
The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British West Indies, 
5th edition (London, 1819), I, 474.
46 R.B. Sheridan, 'The Rise of a Colonial Gentry: A Case
Study of Antigua, 1730-1775', Economic History Review, XIII, 
No. 3 (April 1961), 356.
Burns, History of the British West Indies, pp. 273, 375.
48 Ibid., pp. 374-9.
4 9 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 135.
Harlow, Christopher Codrington, pp. 15-16.
This seems, too, to be the offical view of the family, 
expressed in a Guide to Dodington (n.d.), by P.W. Amphlett,
22
p. 30. For subsequent details of Christopher Codrington's 
career I am indebted to Vincent Harlow, Christopher Codrington.52                   
As a result of his will the Codrington Library was built
at All Souls' College, Oxford. The idea of using monks was 
never developed but Codrington College, Barbados, after a 
difficult start, became a boys 1 school and then a Training 
College for young men training to be clergymen or teachers. 
In 1875 it was affiliated to the University of Durham so 
that its students could obtain degrees: Harlow, Christopher 
Codrington, pp. 215-16. 'The College has given to the West 
Indies not only Bishops, Archdeacons, and the bulk of the 
clergy, but Chief Justices, Barristers, Physicians, Mer- 
chants, Planters, and men of leading position in every Colony 
of the Caribbean Seas. Moreover it is the proud distinction 
of Codrington that no difference of race, or colour, or 
Christian denomination has every interfered with the perfect 
amity and equality of all who have the privilege of calling 
her their alma mater,' Handbook of Codrington College 
(Barbados, 1912), quoted by Harlow, Christopher Codrington, 
p. 216. Until 1948, when the University of the West Indies 
was established, Codrington College provided the only 
opportunity for higher education in the British West Indies: 
Burns, History of the British West Indies, p. 726.
Harlow, Christopher Codrington, p. 122.
Ibid., pp. 122-4.
55 Ibid., pp. 15, 190 (and note 2 on each page. These appear
to be contradictory but the statement on p. 190, n. 2, that 
Barbuda was only inhabited by Captain Codrington  and presum- 
ably his slaves   seems to fit in with other evidence. 
Presumably 'Barbados', line 5, n. 2, p. 15, is a misprint for 
Barbuda).
GRO, D1610 T9 Case for a new Grant (undated).
57 GRO, D1610 C5 B. King, writing about Barbuda, 27 Dec.
1740. He noted that he had heard his father (who was often 
at Barbuda) say that 'in young General Codrington's time 1 , 
there were 'upwards of 5,000 head of cattle and 1,000 horses'. 
These numbers were confirmed to him by "a sensible fellow 1 
who was his overseer and who had worked on Barbuda from 
1700 to 1707. Corn and cattle were sent to the Barbados 
estates from Barbuda at this time: Bennett, Bondsmen and 
Bishops, p. 3.
c o
Bennett, Bondsmen and Bishops, p. 28 quoting John Smal- 
ridge to SPG.
59 Oliver, History of Antigua, I, 169.
The actual amount he acquired from his uncle seemed clear 
in 1710. He thought that he owned one half of Barbuda already 
(through his father) and that he inherited from his uncle one 
half of his uncle's share, that is a quarter of the island. 
This would have brought his share to three quarters of the 
whole island. Later it was discovered that another grant, 
made in 1705, gave Barbuda to Christopher Codrington alone. 
Thus the amount he gained from his uncle's will would have 
been half of the whole island, but he would have held none 
in his own right. Obviously the proportions bequeathed to 
the others would have been affected similarly. There is no
23
independent evidence that William Codrington had actually 
inherited his father's share of Barbuda before the grant of 
1705. The family later maintained that he had (GRO, D1610 
T9 Abstract of Title of Sir William Codrington II to 
Barbuda) and he behaved as though this is what happenedj 
but in that case Christopher Codrington (III) behaved some- 
what dishonourably in obtaining another grant to himself 
alone in 1705. This grant was not known to the family in 
1710, and there seems to be some doubt as to when it became 
public knowledge (GRO, D1610 L2 Case about Barbuda 1746).
Christopher Codrington (III)'s will is reproduced in 
Harlow, Christopher Codrington, Appendix A, pp. 217-20. 
GRO, D1610 T9 Case for a new grant. Barbuda. Abstract of 
Title.
6 2
Burns, History of the British West Indies, p. 425.
GRO, D1610 L2 Case about Barbuda.
64 GRO, D1610 C2 A List of what White Servants, Negroes
Cattle Horses etc I have now at Burbuda, 27 July 1719.
6 S GRO, D1610 C2 Directions to be observed by Mr. Timothy
Cleckly, now Commander of Burbuda, 27 June 1715. Also 
C3, Letter book of Sir William Codrington, 1720-1.
66 GRO, D1610 C3WC(I) to Brother, 28 Oct. 1720, 1 Nov. 172O, 
etc.
GRO, D1610 C2 Directions to be observed.
fi ft
GRO, D1610 C2 and C3.
GRO, D1610 T9 Barbuda, Abstract of Title. E15 Indenture 
between the heirs of V. Cage and William Codrington, 6 Feb. 
1716. L2 Case about Barbuda.
70 See above, note 60 for statement of problem. It is clear
that the SPG did not know how much of Barbuda they owned, 
'may be 3/8, 3/16, or 3/32 or none 1 (USPG records at 15 Tufton 
Street, London, Box 1, letter from Dudley Woodbridge to SPG, 
15 Mar 1711/12). Woodbridge suggested that the SPG might 
sell their portion to William Codrington when they knew the 
extent of their share (ibid). An arrangement was made in 
1712 that William Codrington should grant the SPG 'Four full 
equal and undivided 16th Parts' of the island and all that 
was on it, and the SPG would petition the Queen for a further 
grant of the island to William Codrington, but the grant was 
not made. In 1720 a proposal was made to the SPG by 
Codrington's attorneys either to buy out the Society's share 
in Barbuda or to come to some mutually agreeable compromise   
but no further action seems to have been taken about it. The 
difficulties over the Barbados estates went on until 1742 and 
nothing further was done about the Society's share of 
Barbuda. In 1746 the Society noted 'The present Sr Wm 
Codrington Bart. . . . and his Family are, and have been in 
Possion of the Whole of the sd .Isld. ' (GRO, D1610 L2 Case 
about Barbuda).
71 GRO, D1610 Fl, 27 Apr. 1722.
72 GRO, D1610 C5 B. King to W.C., 11 June 1744. He also 
refers to there having been 'many Tenements lett out formerly 
and houses erected on them. 1 The leases were then (1744)
24
vacant and the houses still in good order. He suggested that they should each be inhabited by a servant and three Negroes who would look after 500 sheep and 12 cows. There were five of these vacant houses. Nothing came of this suggestion.
73 GRO, D1610 C3 WC(I) to Bro. 2 Feb. 1720. It is possible that 'where* may be 'when 1 . This was suggested to me by Dr. D. Watters.
74 In 1724 Sir William wrote that he intended returning toAntigua in a year's time: Oliver, History of Antigua , I, 170. (By the time of his death in 1738 he owned three other estates near Betty's Hope: the Cotton, Cotton New Work, and Garden estates, GRO, D1610, Catalogue I, p. iv.)
Oliver, History of Antigua, I, 127. Benjamin King was appointed in Sir William Codrington's place.
R.H. Codrington in TBGAS, p. 336
77 GRO, D1610 F14 Agreement for separation of Sir WilliamCodrington and Lady Anne Codrington.
78 Oliver, History of Antigua, I, 144. Pedigree ofCodrington of Barbados, Antigua, and Dodington.79 GRO, D1610 C14/2 W.C. to J.L. Walrond, 18 Mar. 1790.ft n
GRO D1610 C17 and MF375.
81 Oliver, History of Antigua I, 144-5, 154-5.82 Ibid., pp. 144-5. In order to avoid confusion, ChristopherCodrington will be referred to as Christopher (Bethell) Codrington until he inherited the estates.
83 Ibid., pp. 152-3.
84
Codrington, TBGAS, p. 337.
85 Ibid.
Chapter 2
THE EXTERNAL ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNAL MANAGEMENT
OF BARBUDA 1738-1833
Under the Codringtons Barbuda was developed as a private 
estate linked economically and administratively with their 
sugar plantations on Antigua. Most of this chapter will be 
concerned with the internal management of Barbuda and the 
ways in which it was connected with the other estates, but 
it cannot only be thought of as private property. Barbuda 
was also one of the Leeward Islands, considered to be an 
appendant member of the island of Antigua, and under the 
authority of the Governor of the Leeward Islands. It is 
therefore necessary to see how far the Codringtons had their 
power on Barbuda modified by external authorities.
I The External Administration of Barbuda
Under the terms of the Crown grants there seems to have been 
no intention to separate Barbuda from the other Leeward 
Islands. The first grant of the island in 1668, to Samuel 
Winthrop, Joseph Lee, William Mildon, and Francis Samson, 
expressly stated that Barbuda was one of the Caribbee 
Islands 'and always deemed an Appendant Member of the Island 
of Antigua 1 . The grant to the Codringtons in 1684, although 
it gave them wide powers, expressly stated that it did not
26
exempt them from the authority of the Governor of the Leeward
2Islands, and subsequent grants did not alter this. Moreover
Barbuda was included by name in the list of islands under the
3governor's control. A study of the records during the
period 1738-1833, however, seems to show that Barbuda was 
for most practical purposes completely outside the influ- 
ence of Antigua and the governor. Barbuda was not subject 
to Antiguan laws and did not pay Antiguan taxes; and succes- 
sive governors made little effort to interfere in the 
island's affairs.
Barbuda was thus under the almost complete control of the 
Codrington family who were able to develop it as they wished, 
keep others out and collect what seemed to be easy money 
from the many wrecks off the island. For these privileges
they paid to the Crown annually 'one Fat Sheep (if
4 demanded)'. Not surprisingly there were people who resented
the privileged position which the Codringtons had acquired 
on Barbuda. Other Antiguan landowners objected to the fact 
that they could only visit Barbuda with permission from a 
Codrington attorney, and sometimes those in authority in 
Antigua felt thwarted that Barbuda was effectively, if not 
legally, outside their jurisdiction. For these reasons 
opportunities were taken of challenging the Codrington pos- 
ition there.
In this period the first test of Codrington power came 
somewhat unexpectedly. In 1746 Sir William Codrington 
leased the island for fifteen years to two Antiguan land- 
owners, Colonel Samuel Martin and William Byam. In 1750 
Colonel Martin decided he no longer wanted to rent Barbuda. 
Codrington not being prepared to accept this, Martin decided
27
to stop paying the rent on the grounds that the 1705 grant of 
Barbuda to Christopher Codrington (III) was not valid because 
it had not been registered, and so the lease to him was 
invalid too. It is true that the grant had not been 
registered. There was no register office in Nevis (where the 
grant had been issued) until 1710 and though there was one in 
Antigua it only recorded grants and deeds within Antigua 
'and Barbuda though lying near and contiguous to Antigua yet 
being no part of that Island or subject to the laws of
o
Government of it 1 lay outside the authority of the office. 
Sir William Codrington sought the opinion of R. Wilbrahim of 
Lincoln's Inn who thought that the rent should be paid as 
arranged because queries should have been settled before the 
lease was signed. He also thought that the grant would be
considered to be valid if the matter were to be raised at a
9 higher level. After this Colonel Martin continued with the
lease for the remainder of the fifteen years.
The legality of the grant having once been put in doubt, 
however, it could be queried again. In July 1756 Sir William 
Codrington protested to the Commissioners for Trade and 
Plantations that the Governor of the Leeward Islands had 
threatened to grant a reversionary lease of Barbuda to one 
of his sons unless Sir William paid £3,000 before Christmas 
for a renewal of his grant. Sir William was able to state 
his case to the Commissioners on 20 July 1756 and their 
decision was communicated to Governor Thomas a few days 
later. They thought that the granting of a reversion 
against the present proprietor would be a great hardship. 
'We therefore desire you would make no reversionary Grant 
whatever of this Island without His Majesties directions
28
12 therein.' Governor Thomas was forced in this way to drop
his threats. In both cases justification of the Codrington 
position was that the family had held the island for many 
years and the grant had been made to them in recognition of 
their services to the Crown.
The next threat to their position was more serious as it 
involved another nation. In 1776 a Spanish ship, the Sancta 
Rita, was wrecked on Barbuda and the Codrington attorney
acted so high-handedly that protests were made by Spain to
14 the British government. The Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Lord Germain, wrote to the Governor of the Leeward 
Islands, W.M. Burt, who promised to make a full inquiry. 
The situation on Barbuda worried the governor. He had been 
informed that 'no white Man is allowed to settle in Barbuda, 
but Servants to Sir Wm Codrington, nor is any person permitted 
to go there without Leave first obtain'd from Sir Wm's 
Attorney. 1 He had heard, too, of other ships wrecked on 
Barbuda which had received the same treatment as the Sancta 
Rita, and he gave details of lurid stories he had heard about
events on Barbuda.
18 He eventually visited the island in 1777 and reported
on conditions there in January 1778. On the constitutional 
position he wrote: 'This Island is not annexed or subject 
to the Legislative Jurisdiction of any Part of this
Government. They have not Inhabitants to form or Execute
19 
any System of Police or Government.' He pointed out that
there was no chart of the island either. He suggested that 
one should be made and in the meantime Barbuda should be 
annexed to the legislative and judicial authority of Antigua. 
He added that there were other small islands near Antigua
29
which were also private property and held by Crown grants and
they all came under Antiguan control in the way he was sug-
20 gesting for Barbuda. Lord Germain was grateful for the
suggestions, and promised to think about them 'when the State
21 
of public affairs will afford leisure for such Considerations. 1
Fortunately, perhaps, for the Codringtons this time did not 
come. The American War of Independence and other events 
kept Secretaries of State otherwise occupied. A Collector
of Customs was appointed for Barbuda in 1779, by the
22 governor, but no other attempt was made to limit Codrington
control.
This lack of activity on the part of the Secretary of State 
did not mean that the government was unaware of the problems 
involved in giving such wide powers to a single individual. 
It was simply that Barbuda was not sufficiently important to 
warrant attention unless a wreck, or some other event there, 
caused another nation or prominent individual to protest. 
Even so the undesirability in general of giving grants of 
this kind was certainly appreciated, because when Sir William 
applied for a new grant he found more difficulties in his way 
than he expected.
From 1780 Sir William Codrington urged his attorneys in
23Antigua to negotiate with the governor for a new grant. In
view of the fact that Governor Burt was unlikely to receive 
such an application favourably it seems surprising that Sir 
William wanted the grant made in Antigua rather than in
O A
England. This point was put to him by his attorney in 1780. 
Sir William was, however, reluctant to apply in England. He 
believed he could indeed obtain a new grant in London because 
of his contacts in the government, but he was reluctant to
30
prejudice his independence as a Member of Parliament and
25 preferred to try his luck in Antigua. Hurt, in any case,
was replaced in 1781. As a sitting tenant, prepared to offer 
a reasonable financial inducement to the governor, Codrington
thought there would be no difficulty in obtaining a new and
2 6improved grant. He wanted it this time, too, to be passed
by the Antiguan Council, and under the public seal, and
27 properly registered. The negotiations were unsuccessful
however. There were doubts whether the Council could be
2 8 persuaded to agree and the governor, Sir Thomas Shirley,
proved unco-operative. He seems to have feared displeasing 
the government and he either offered terms which were unac- 
ceptable to Sir William or maintained that he had not the
29 power to make such a grant> and it had not been obtained
by the time of Sir William's death in 1792. The official 
view was perhaps best expressed by Mr. Woodley, a friend of 
Sir William's who was thought likely to succeed Shirley as 
governor. On being approached by Christopher (Bethell) 
Codrington, Woodley said he did not think that if he were 
the governor he would be inclined to renew the grant 'upon 
Peppercorn terms ... he shd make no hesitation of renewing 
it, but . . . thought Barbuda might be made to be of some
use by furnishing . . . provisions of some sort in war time,
30 
or something of that kind 1 .
This was precisely the form in which the grant was eventu- 
ally renewed in 1800 when negotiations were re-started by 
Sir Bethell Codrington. By that time the need for a new 
grant had become urgent as the 1705 lease was due to expire 
in 1804, and he applied for it in England. Under the new 
grant the British government reserved the right to resume
31
such parcels of land as might be necessary for the erecting 
of barracks, government stores, forts, or batteries. In
return the lease was extended for a further fifty years, the
32 
rent being, as before, one fat sheep annually if demanded.
No attempt was made to bring Barbuda under the jurisdiction 
of Antigua and the island was administered as before.
The Codringtons were on the whole anxious to keep the 
Antiguan government out of Barbudan affairs. Sir William 
expressed his views on this plainly in 1789: '. . .if 
there is any doubt of the Jurisdiction of Antigua over 
Barbuda, I wish it to remain a doubt. I do not desire to
make my property in the least more liable to the controul of
33 
our Governors than Necessity compells me. 1 The Codringtons
had no desire to pay Antiguan taxes for their Barbudan prop- 
erty, nor did they want Barbuda to be subject to Antiguan 
laws. On the other hand they were sometimes anxious to make 
use of the Antiguan judicial system and then they were pre- 
pared to argue that Barbuda was an appendant member of the 
island of Antigua. Sir William stated his opinions on this 
equally firmly in 1791:
Whoever has taken upon them to say that Barbuda is 
not an appendage of Antigua, or is not under the 
same Governmt as Antigua is a very knavish fellow  
he can assert it from Wickedness only, not from 
knowledge or even fm belief. It is as much a part 
of the Leeward Island Government as any of the other 
Islands and is named in the Commission as partic- 
ularly as any other.34
The problem which prompted this extremely ambivalent attitude 
was that of trespassers from Antigua who did damage on 
Barbuda. The Codringtons in general discouraged visitors to
the island, even their friends, because work was interrupted
35 
and the slaves diverted from their normal routine. Barbuda,
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however, was attractive to young men from Antigua who wanted 
some sport and, if they were not given permission, they were 
prepared to go illegally. From 1761 to 1790 this was a major 
problem. Groups of young men cut down and removed timber 
and took livestock, turtles, fish, deer and game of various 
sorts. Some parties even pitched their tents on the shore. 
The managers on Barbuda were given strict instructions
not to allow any visitors to land without permission from an
37
attorney, but it was impossible to prevent determined tres- 
passers on an island the size of Barbuda; and it was 
difficult to know how to act effectively against them. Sir 
William was in favour of strong measures, some of which 
would have been difficult to uphold in a court of law. He 
told the manager of Barbuda in the 1780s to cut and destroy 
the nets of people who came to steal turtle, and to damage 
their boats. If they stole wood and fled he should 'wound 
them with shot 1 , and if they were caught they should be held
o o
and taken before a Justice of the Peace in Antigua.
Threats of legal action against Antiguan trespassers on 
Barbuda were, however, of doubtful value. There were no law 
courts on Barbuda and insufficient white people, in any case, 
to form a jury, so no action could be taken therej and it 
was open to question whether a case of this sort could 
actually be tried in Antigua. In 1766 Sir William Codrington 
asked for the opinion of the Antiguan Attorney-General, 
Thomas Warner, in connection with an incident on Barbuda when 
a party of trespassers had been caught cutting wood. Sir 
William wanted to know what action he could take against them, 
Warner pointed out that many offences against Sir William 
would have to go unpunished because a local trial was needed
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and there were no courts of justice on Barbuda. Some cases, 
he felt, might be taken to court in Antigua and these would
on
include the stealing of wood by trespassers. On this 
point, however, a contrary opinion was later given by John 
Burke, the Solicitor-General, in 1771: 'where the Trespass 
is done against the Soil, or anything growing thereon, I 
apprehend no Action of Trespass can be maintained here, for 
as Barbuda is not annexed to Antigua, the Defendant might I 
think Plead to the Jurisdiction of the Court 1 . 40 In 1791 Burke 
told Christopher (Bethell) Codrington that in the same way he 
did not think an indictment for sheep-stealing on Barbuda 
could be heard in Antigua as Barbuda was not an appendage of 
Antigua ('because it pays no taxes'). He went on to say that
if the manager of Barbuda were to kill a white man there, he
41 
would not be brought to trial in Antigua.
The technical question whether a case could actually be 
tried in Antigua was not the only problem, however. On 
matters of trespass and damage on Barbuda by Antiguans it 
was unlikely that an Antiguan jury would be sympathetic to 
the Codringtons. In 1791 when Sir William wanted to bring 
a case against a young man who had visited Barbuda with a 
party of friends and openly killed a sheep he was advised not
to proceed. The jury, he was told, would probably saddle him
42 
with the expenses and only award him the value of the sheep.
Sir William saw the sense of taking the matter no further and
43 
was prepared to accept an apology and the price of the sheep;
but he was very dissatisfied. He could not understand why he 
could not obtain justice in Antigua, which was after all a 
part of the same King's dominions as Barbuda. In that case, 
he maintained, Antiguans would suffer because his agents on
34
Barbuda could not be prosecuted locally for a crime committed
44 
against an Antiguan. His nephew, following the same line of
thought, had already instructed the manager on Barbuda to 
seize the slaves of those found trespassing on Barbuda and 
'let them teach us, what measures can be taken by us, by
showing us what measures they can take to recover such Negroes;
45 if we can get no redress, they can get no redress. 1
It is easy to see why the Codringtons felt frustrated. 
It seemed that they had no protection against determined tres- 
passers who damaged or stole their property. On the other 
hand the unwillingness of Antiguan officials to co-operate 
with them is equally understandable. They were annoyed that 
Barbuda was for all practical purposes outside their juris- 
diction and did not see why they should be called on for
assistance when it suited the Codringtons, but not given any
46 privileges on Barbuda in return. Fortunately the extreme
measures which the Codringtons suggested in 1791 were not 
found to be necessary. The problem of trespassers ceased to 
worry the administration, possibly because the war with 
France made travel between the islands more of a risk. In 
the early nineteenth century the activities of pirates in
the area led Sir Bethell Codrington to ask that the manager
47 
of Barbuda, who was also an attorney, be made a magistrate;
and when he died the same authority was conferred on another
48 
attorney responsible for Barbuda.
Although on questions of trespass the Codringtons did not 
see eye to eye with other Antiguan landowners, there were more 
important matters on which there was agreement. The wars 
fought in the area during the eighteenth century brought 
fundamental problems, and defence of the islands was a subject
35
on which there was a common policy. Barbuda would have been 
of little use to the Codringtons had Antigua fallen to an 
enemy, and Antigua's security would have been threatened in 
some measure if Barbuda had been occupied by a hostile force. 
The Antiguans were therefore prepared to go to the assistance 
of Barbuda if there was any threat of invasion.
Barbuda itself was not entirely without a system of 
defence, though the manager of the island, in 1743, claimed 
that when he arrived there was no means of protection apart
from the castle which he had put in the 'best posture of
49 Defence it will admit of. This building, near the lagoon,
was supposed to offer shelter to the inhabitants in case of 
attack. It had been built originally in the seventeenth cen- 
tury but was destroyed by the French in 1710 and rebuilt by 
the first Sir William Codrington 'at very great expense'. 
It was kept in some sort of repair and occasionally people 
lived there but at the end of the eighteenth century Henri de 
Ponthieu pointed out that against an enemy it was virtually 
useless. It might have served its purpose in the past against 
Indians but certainly not against Europeans and their weapons.
 
In 1813, an officer of the Woolwich which had been wrecked on
52 Barbuda described it as 'an old dilapidated castle' but it
was still standing in 1840 a rectangular building with towers
53 
at the north-east and south-west corners.
What Barbuda needed was some way of preventing an enemy 
landing or damaging her boats. Even though the rocky coast- 
line gave good natural protection round most of the island, 
the south coast and part of the west were vulnerable. In 1743 
a Spanish privateer landed some men on the Sand Bank, probably 
to get provisions, but they retreated to their ship when the 
manager sent thirty armed servants and slaves after them.
36
The next morning, however, they rowed round to the river and 
took away a very fine sloop worth a thousand pounds belonging 
to a Mr. Gravenour who had anchored outside the rocks. The 
manager was able to report the incident the same day to 
Colonel Benjamin King, the Codrington attorney on Antigua, 
who persuaded Captain Purcell in the Pultney Privateer to 
go with him to Barbuda with fourteen soldiers loaned by 
General Mathew, the Governor of the Leeward Islands. On the 
way they encountered the same Spanish ship and they success- 
fully chased her away, though apparently without recovering
the sloop, before going on to Barbuda where they found all
54 
was well. This incident illustrates the casual system of
defence then in existence. Colonel King, in fact, wrote 
that he was 'quite Easey 1 about the security of the island, 
though he feared for the island sloop as she could be cut 
from her anchor while loading. He proposed to build, with 
the advice of some local masters of ships, a tower like those 
on the coast of Spain, and he ordered three twelve-pounders 
from Lady Codrington. Some forts undoubtedly were built 
because they are mentioned in a 'Case for a new grant of
c c
Barbuda 1 
 but no real attention seems to have been paid to 
keeping them ready for use.
An incident in the late eighteenth century suggests that 
there was little change in attitude towards defence. In 1779, 
Richard Clarke, the Codrington attorney, was captured by the 
captain of a Spanish privateer when he was bound for Antigua 
on the Barbuda schooner. The Spaniards commandeered the 
schooner and returned to Barbuda to take the sloop, which had 
been sailing to Antigua with the schooner, though some dist- 
ance away. They anchored off Barbuda and some lengthy
37
negotiations followed, interrupted by the arrival of the 
manager of Barbuda with a party of armed slaves and the brass 
four-pounder with which he proceeded to fire on the privateer. 
The Spanish fortunately decided to leave, taking the schooner 
with them, but Clarke was allowed to remain behind.
After this rather alarming experience Clarke complained 
that if only the previous attorney, Mr. Redhead, had left one 
gun in the spot which had originally been a battery the ves- 
sel would not have been lost. He now gave orders for the 
batteries to be put in order. In the bay to the west of Cocoa 
Point, on the south coast, he established a battery consisting 
of two nines, two sixes, and two four-pounders; and for 
greater security placed a nine-pounder at each Point. Another
battery was put in order at Palmeto Point. This made the
58 island, he felt, tolerably secure. Christopher (Bethell)
Codrington's description, in 1790, of its being 'charmingly
59 fortified 1 does not, however, really suggest efficiency 1.
Actually Barbuda's main defence lay in the fact that it was 
not sufficiently important to warrant invasion in a serious 
way, though there would have been nuisance value for an enemy 
in capturing it. The Codringtons recognized that their 
position in Barbuda would be vulnerable if Antigua fell to 
an enemy and for this reason they made arrangements to ensure 
that Barbuda would be included in any peace treaty made by 
Antigua.
The Codringtons relied on help from the Antiguans, too, 
in suppressing slave rebllions. Where problems of this sort 
arose planters supported each other despite differences of 
opinion on other matters. In 1745 the slaves on Barbuda 
revolted, seized the castle and murdered the manager. The
38
Codrington attorney feared that if the French heard of this 
they might try to take the island, but it was quickly put 
down with a show of force from Antigua. In 1832 there were 
signs of trouble from slaves on Barbuda and the manager asked
for help from Antigua which was quickly supplied. Troops
6 o 
landed on Barbuda but did not even need to fire.
In matters of defence and internal security, therefore, 
the Codringtons could rely on help from the same Antiguan land- 
owners who made difficulties for them in other ways. The 
question whether Barbuda was in fact an appendant member of 
the island of Antigua was a moot point. If it suited both 
Antigua and the Codringtons to think that it was, then they 
behaved as though that were the case, but it sometimes suited 
one or other to insist that this was not so. Normally the 
British government was not concerned either way and did not 
interfere with affairs, but in 1834 when the act to emancip- 
ate the slaves had to be made operative in Barbuda they were 
forced to pay attention to the problem.
II The Internal Management of Barbuda
The management of Barbuda between 1738 and 1833 is a story of 
trial and error. Both Sir William Codrington and his nephew 
were anxious to make the island profitable for which purpose 
an efficient system of management was essential. Not only 
had the island itself to be properly organized but it needed 
integrating into the administration of the other estates: 
the whole having to be entrusted to men on the spot whom the 
Codringtons might never have seen. Not surprisingly there 
were many difficulties before a reasonably successful system
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could be evolved. By the 1780s, however, Sir William had 
achieved this and it was maintained, somewhat precariously 
at times, by Sir Bethell Codrington, from his uncle's death 
in 1792 until 1833. Although there was no actual break in 
the management when Sir William died, the policies of the 
two men will be considered separately.
(a) The Management of Barbuda under Sir William
Codrington (II), 1738-1792
The period from 1738 to 1746 must have been one of the most 
unhappy in Barbuda's history. Sir William being still a 
minor in 1738, the island was administered as before by a 
resident manager who came under the authority of the Codrington 
attorneys on Antigua. At this time those in charge seem to 
have been inefficient and in some cases cruel, and in 1745
6 "3
the slaves revolted and murdered the manager. This event 
must have contributed to Sir William's decision, after he had 
come of age, to sub-let the island. At the time of his 
father's death, however, the estates were burdened with debts 
and a regular income from rent was an attractive prospect,
especially as the net profit from Barbuda for the years
64 1738-46 was only £325. 7s. 8^d.
In 1746, therefore, Sir William leased Barbuda for fif- 
teen years to Samuel Martin and William Byam. During this 
period the island seems to have prospered. The numbers of 
slaves increased and so did all the livestock apart from 
mules, asses, and turkeys. There was, in fact, an increase 
in value of the slaves and livestock of over £18,000 between 
the beginning and end of the lease. Sir William hoped he
might find another suitable tenant but as no-one came forward
fi 7 he resumed control over Barbuda.
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From 1761 to 1783 the manager at Betty's Hope (Sir 
William's principal sugar plantation on Antigua) supervised 
affairs on Barbuda. As the principal attorney he had res- 
ponsibility to some degree for all the sugar plantations
belonging to the family. Until he left to settle in England
6 8 in 1779, this post was held by Samuel Redhead. He had to
appoint a resident manager for Barbuda who would be respon- 
sible for the day-to-day running of the island, for supervis- 
ing the work of the white assistants and all the slaves. He 
was paid a salary of £80 to £120 per year. In addition a 
town agent received the goods sent from Barbuda, despatched 
necessities to the island, and kept accounts, for £100 per 
year. Wharfage and storage facilities sometimes provided 
by the same man cost a further £40 a year. This method of 
managing Barbudan affairs continued until 1783.
One of the main problems in this arrangement was the fact 
that Samuel Redhead, or anyone else in his position, had to 
give more time and energy to the supervision of Betty's Hope 
than to Barbuda. If there had been a competent manager on 
Barbuda this would not have mattered but during the whole of 
this period Samuel Redhead had great difficulty both in
finding people and persuading them to stay. Between 1762 and
71 1763 there were three different managers. One problem must
have been the loneliness of the position, but marriage, which
might have helped that, led to the resignation of two of
72 these managers. Redhead asked Sir William to look out for
a suitable person in England. 'He must be a sober honest 
and active man and if such a one could be got that had served 
his time with an Apothecary and knew something of medicines 
. . . it would be the more for your Interest. 1 Appointing
41
a local man could give rise to a further difficulty because 
the man chosen might want to do favours for friends in 
Antigua   clearly injurious to the Codrington interests. In 
1771, having just dismissed a manager who had only been there 
ten weeks, Redhead asked Sir William to look out for a suit- 
able replacement and promised to 'send him over directly 
before he has contracted any acquaintance in this Island 
[Antigua] 1 . This time he asked for a man over forty and
'if he should have a Wife that is a Motherly good Woman she
74 
may be of service. 1
One reason for the shortness of stay of at least some 
of these people may well have been Samuel Redhead's own 
behaviour. During the early part of his attorneyship Redhead 
seems to have worked conscientiously, but for the last ten 
years or so his life, and the lives of those on Barbuda, was 
complicated by his relationship with a mulatto slave on 
Barbuda called Sarah Bullock. In 1771 he wrote to Sir William 
Codrington asking to purchase her freedom. He explained that 
he did not wish to remove her from Barbuda because she was so 
useful there but he was anxious to secure her peace of mind. 
She was afraid that if he died the other slaves would turn 
against her 'by having constantly discovered the abuses com- 
mited by the people of that Island, which has caused an 
enmity to her'. During these years Sarah in fact seems to 
have more or less ruled Barbuda and to have made life diffic- 
ult for those who opposed her: 'it was impossible anybody 
could stay there any length of time whilst Sally had anything
to do with it as she was to all intents and purposes
76 Governante. In November 1771 Redhead wrote to Sir William
that he thought Barbuda could now be made more useful as he
42
was now able to go and stay there for longer periods himself 
as his son George could take over all the work in Antigua.
He built himself a house on Barbuda and presumably lived
7 8 there with Sally. In 1773 he informed Sir William that he
now had no doubt that the island's affairs were being prop- 
erly conducted, 'without being plagued with worthless
79 
managers'. However, when Redhead departed for England in
1779, taking Sally Bullock with him, Sir William was under 
no illusions about the damage they had both done. He des- 
cribed Redhead as 'an idle Dotard to say the best one can of
80 him' . According to him Sally had raised a fortune through
81 perquisites for herself and her family and to make matters
worse both Samuel Redhead and Sarah Bullock, and Samuel's 
son George, brought actions against Sir William claiming
they had been unpaid for various services they had rendered
. . 82 him.
The period of the Redhead administration of Barbuda 
disappointed Sir William. At the beginning he had hoped that 
the island might be made profitable and in 1761 he wrote to
Redhead asking what his plans were for the general management
83 
of Barbuda and requesting distinct accounts for the island.
A year later, however, he expressed surprise that Redhead
had not even mentioned Barbuda: 'I was in hopes to have had
84 
some good remittances from thence by this time. 1 The
accounts for 1762, however, show only a profit of £1,993.
16s. ll^d: in 1768 it was £2,328. 16s. 4^d. and in 1769
8 ^  £1,199. 3s. 7|d. In reply to a statement of Sir William's
expressing disappointment and commenting that he would have 
done better to have found another tenant at the expiry of 
the lease Redhead defended himself sensibly:
43
I have taken out the Nett Proceeds of every year of 
that Island and the amount is £2142. 11. 8. Currency 
a year which is considerably less than the rent you 
received, but as we have never given Credit to that 
Island for the different supplies your Ests have had 
which have been large (and I think it has been a 
mistake in us not keeping an account of those sup- 
plies) it prevents your having a proper knowledge of 
the benefit you have received from that Island. The 
Cattle, Mules, Building lime, log-wood, Negro house 
timber, cart timber etc, have a great deal more than 
ballanced that Accot in your favor . . , 86
Unfortunately it is not possible to see how far Redhead's 
statement is true because, as he said, no account was kept 
of the amounts sent to the estates, but in the years 1785-90 
a total profit of £22,991. 14s. 0|d. was made by Barbuda and
of this amount just under a half  £10,920. 4s. Id. came
87 from goods sent to the Antiguan estates. There is
therefore likely to have been some justification for 
Redhead's claim.
Although Sir William was dissatisfied with Redhead's 
management of Barbuda there are some points in his favour.
During these years the slave population increased naturally
88 from 196 in 1761 to about 291 in 1779 and there seems to
have been no serious slave unrest despite Sally Bullock's 
unpopularity. There must also have been an increase in
livestock. In the years 1780 and 1782 Barbuda made a profit
8Q 
of £11,566. 4s. 5|d. and £14,901. 5s. ll^d. respectively.
These high figures were caused by the American War of Indep- 
endence which forced plantation owners to buy local rather 
than American stock, but Barbuda could not have taken advan- 
tage of this situation if Redhead had totally neglected the 
island. Redhead must therefore be given some credit for the 
high profits achieved in the early years of his successor. 
Redhead's successor as manager of Betty's Hope and
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attorney in charge of the Antiguan estates and Barbuda was 
Richard Clarke. Clarke's letters to Sir William Codrington 
are full of promises to promote Codrington interests, but he 
soon proved to have been a bad appointment. 'The waste, the 
extravagance, the Negligence and also the peculation and 
the Knavery have been notorious that have been practised to
my Injury 1 wrote Sir William to J.L. Walrond some years
90 later. So 'abominable 1 and 'negligent 1 was his conduct
91 that Sir William could not have borne with him much longer;
but, perhaps fortunately, Clarke died in 1782. The principal 
charge against him was that he traded in stock from Barbuda 
for his own profit. For this purpose he seems to have 
colluded with a Francis Martin in Antigua, and possible also
with the Town Agents, Brinton and Burton, selling them stock
92 from Barbuda at well below the market price. Sir William
pointed this out to R. Oliver, one of his attorneys, in 
January 1783. The accounts for Barbuda sales showed that in 
February 1782 Martin had with Clarke's agreement purchased 
twelve horses for £440 (roughly £36 each). One month later
at an auction in Antigua seven horses went for £420 (£60 each),
93 and another seven for £269 (about £38 each). Even allowing
for some variation in the quality of the horses there does 
seem to be more than a slight discrepancy between the price 
of the twelve and at any rate the first group of seven 
though Sir William's comments do seem a little exaggerated 
('Nothing can be more glaring than the difference of these
Prices or more seemingly confirming of the Collusion between
94 Clarke and Martin 1 ). But it was not only 'knavery' of
this kind that troubled his employer. Clarke had also 
undertaken building schemes without prior consultation, he
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9 5 had jumbled accounts of stores and given long credits.
Some of the blame for this, Sir William felt, must be taken 
by the other attorneys: 'if you [Langford Lovell] and Mr. 
Oliver had been more concerned for meinClarke's time I
should have profited and Clarke would have left a better name
96 behind him.' Unfortunately, yet again, Sir William had to
be prepared to pay what he felt to be unfair debts, and
97 preferred to pay rather than face a lawsuit in Antigua.
The mismanagement of Barbudan affairs under both Samuel
Redhead and Richard Clarke encouraged Sir William to con-
98 
sider a change of administration. In 1779 he had been
advised by Dr. James Athill   whose advice he valued because 
he had lived for so long in Antigua   to separate Barbuda 
from Betty's Hope, though he emphasized that he thought the
manager of Barbuda should still be under the control of the
99 
attorneys in Antigua. This view, endorsed by Richard
Oliver, was put into effect in 1783. Under this new 
arrangement there was to be a manager at Betty's Hope and 
another at Barbuda neither of whom would necessarily be an 
attorney. Both would come under the authority of attorneys
on Antigua, usually three, one being the chief or acting
102 
attorney. Obviously this was sensible. The manager of
Betty's Hope, a large sugar plantation, could hardly be 
expected to give time to the supervision of an island twenty- 
five miles away. By giving the manager of Barbuda a greater 
feeling of responsibility there was a chance that he would 
be more loyal and more conscientious.
The man appointed as manager of Barbuda under the new 
arrangements, Dennis Reynolds, had been in authority there 
as chief overseer under Clarke, since 1779. He was,
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therefore, already familiar with Barbudan problems. He 
stayed until February 1793 and probably did more to 
develop Barbuda than any other single individual, though this 
was not fully appreciated by Sir William. For Reynolds, an 
Irishman of apparently little education (though his letters 
are competently written), the management of an island 
must have been an unexpected advancement only possible 
because of its peculiar situation.
As manager, Reynolds received £175 per year. This 
was not considered an adequate return for a good man but 
no-one concerned really knew what the right amount should 
be. Sir William was not anxious to increase the salary as 
this would mean subsequent managers would have to be paid 
the same amount regardless of their ability. On the other 
hand if an inadequate sum was paid either the manager would 
not stay or he would be likely to make money in other ways, 
by keeping stock, or selling particular commodities and 
pocketing the profits which should have gone to the owner.
Clarke had certainly kept hogs, and Reynolds had been selling
108 the coconuts, a practice which Codrington deplored. In
1785 Reynolds proposed that he should be paid an increase in 
salary in return for giving up perquisites. Sir William
thought this would be a bad precedent, but was prepared to
109 let him have a 'reasonable reward 1 the matter being solved
by giving him an additional £175 for particular services. In 
1785 this sum was given for 'building the "Ann and Eliza" and 
extra trouble attending wrecks', but more usually it was
for 'particular care and attention to the island and the
 negroes .
The manager had considerable responsibility. He was
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expected to supervise the 250-300 slaves and the few white 
overseers, organizing their work over the whole island, and 
maintaining order. The work itself needed a variety of 
skills. He had to know about rearing livestock, and growing 
crops on an island subject to drought and never easy to 
develop. Rescues from wrecks, which might occur at any time, 
also had to be organized. He was not expected to formulate 
policy but to carry out the plans of the owner, often trans- 
mitted through the attorney on Antigua with whom he was 
supposed to keep in contact. He was also required to write 
regularly to Sir William about his work and the conditions 
on Barbuda.
Assisting the manager on Barbuda were two or three other
white men, described usually as overseers,who were paid
112between £40 and £60 per year. Sir William tried to per- 
suade some men with abilities as grooms to go out from 
England to look after the horses and asses, but he did not 
have much success. For all the men living on Barbuda 
loneliness must have been a major problem, and many of them 
only stayed a short time. A few, however, remained for sev- 
eral years, one man, Abraham Webber, settling there and 
founding a family: he was appointed as a turtler in 1765 
and seems to have served in this capacity until his death in 
1786. 114
Under the new arrangements Dennis Reynolds f s work as 
manager was supervised by.one of the Codrington attorneys on 
Antigua. Unlike the manager of Barbuda who was appointed for 
his ability rather than his social standing, the Codrington 
attorneys were usually Antiguan landowners and men of some 
consequence. They worked under the authority of letters
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of attorney sent by the owner and they were usually given the 
power to dismiss the manager of an estate and to appoint 
another. They inspected and signed the accounts and were 
sometimes given power to manumit slaves. In general they 
were expected to see that the proprietor's instructions were 
carried out and to advise him on matters of policy, 'and 
. . . for me and in my name to do and execute all such matters 
and things necessary for the Management and Improvement of 
my said Plantations and Estates as fully and effectually to 
all Intents and purposes as I myself might or could do if 
personally present 1 .
In 1783 Sir William made Langford Lovell (already an attorney) 
specially responsible for Barbuda and expressed satisfaction
that his Barbuda concerns would now be conducted 'with skill
117 
attention and integrity 1 . For these services he received
£175 per year and commission of five per cent on sales of 
Barbuda produce and on the freight of sugar. He was
also the town agent with the same responsibilities and salary
120 
as his predecessors. It was more usual, however, for
these to be separate appointments as there was less opportunity
of money being diverted from the proprietor, as happened when
121 the agent was the owner of a store in St.John's. It was
only too easy for such a trader to buy Barbudan goods cheaply 
and to charge the highest prices for the stores needed on the 
island. One attorney, Richard Oliver, had pointed this out
in 1781 and suggested it would be better not to appoint some-
122 
one who was both a 'buyer for you and a seller to you 1 .
Sir William Codrington was quite well aware of the ways 
in which he could be cheated and took what steps he could to 
avoid it. He insisted on detailed, accurate accounts. These
49
were checked by the attorney before being sent home, where
123 they were examined carefully and comments made on them.
Sir William disliked being cheated by retailers and sent as
many stores as possible from England, insisting that they
124 
should be inspected on arrival and comments made on quality.
If they were unsatisfactory in any way he was prepared to take 
action against the supplier. He also recognized the dangers 
of bad debts and constantly urged the necessity of allowing 
only short credits. 'I desire to pay every Body to whom I 
may be indebted and therefore expect to be paid. 1 Open 
accounts, he said, led to disputes and lawsuits which should 
both be avoided.
Sir William kept in close contact with the attorneys and 
manager and expected detailed information about the work on 
Barbuda. As he never visited the island he wanted to know 
exactly what it looked like and he asked innumerable questions 
about it. Reynolds wrote two very detailed letters in reply
relating the areas he described to a rather inaccurate map
126 
which Sir William had sent out to him. (Possibly the map
following p. 4 is a copy of this.) In addition Sir William
made efforts to see his employees whenever they came to
England, and he inquired about West Indian affairs from anyone
of his acquaintances visiting England from Antigua or any
127 
other island in the Caribbean. In these ways he kept some
sort of control himself over what went on but he recognized 
fully that everything in the end depended on the men on the 
spot.
In Reynolds, even Sir William had to admit that he had
128the best possible manager. Under him Barbuda was devel- 
oped more actively than before and he made improvements in
50
both stock and crops. There was some slave unrest, but no
129large-scale revolt. Some conflicting comments were made
about Reynolds 's attitude to the slaves but in general he 
seems to have been regarded as humane, and his comments 
in letters reveal a genuine understanding of the differences 
between those on Barbuda and on other islands.
Barbuda was thus efficiently organized as a separate 
unit. It was nevertheless also fully linked with the Codring- 
ton property on Antigua and supplied many of their needs.
The profits from Barbuda, for example, were sometimes used
132 to defray the expenses incurred by the estates. The town
agent for Barbuda was also the town agent for the estates so 
he knew the requirements of both and kept both sets of 
accounts. Barbuda was able to provide the plantations with
livestock, timber, lime, some crops, and a variety of other
134 
estates supplies which together usually made up about a
third to a half (though sometimes more) of Barbuda's profits. 
Barbuda was in turn supplied with rum by the estates and
1 o c
stores were despatched as required. Curiously enough, 
Reynolds himself was not supplied with details about the 
profits made by Barbuda, although he knew what was sent from 
the island. That the system at this time ran smoothly must
have been due in no small way to the good relationship estab-
1lished between Reynolds and Lovell.
For any landowner the most important test of good manage- 
ment must be whether a profit is made. From 1785 to 1792, 
full accounts are available and these show that for these 
years Barbuda always made a profit and sometimes a substantial 
one :
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1785-6 £6,495 5s. 6%d.
1786-7 £6,234 8s. O^d.
1787-8 £5,585 11s. 0|d.
1788-9 £3,540 16s. 7d.
1789-90 £3,487 19s. 5d.
1790-1 £2,894 16s. 2d.
1791-2 £3,583 14s. 3^d. 139
Sir William, however, was never satisfied with the returns. 
He could not understand why Barbuda was not more profitable
to him when it was being managed efficiently, as he usually
140 
agreed it was under Reynolds. It must be admitted first
that the figures are somewhat misleading for the accounts 
were given in Antiguan currency and in sterling the profit is
much less: at this period £175 currency was equivalent to
141 £100 in sterling. Secondly there is no doubt that Sir
William was expecting a return of something more in the 
region of £5,250 (£3,000 sterling). In 1792 it was calculated
that the slaves and livestock on Barbuda were worth £30,000
142 
sterling: on a capital outlay of this amount an annual
return of about ten per cent would not be unreasonable. The 
figures show clearly, however, that this amount was not 
attained between 1788 and 1792.
Sir William was in no doubt about the major cause of his 
profits being less than he expected. He complained constantly 
that Barbuda was 'ill-managed 1 and by this he seems princip- 
ally to have meant that he thought more money went to his
143 
employees illicitly than rightly to himself, the proprietor.
He was obsessed with the feeling that all those involved with
Barbuda were taking perquisites and that he suffered from
144 diminished returns in consequence: he described them as
'ruinous to the Probity of the Servant and the Purse of the 
Master 1 . When Christopher (Bethell) Codrington visited 
Barbuda in 1790 Sir William urged him to find out what
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Reynolds's 'perks' (his word) were 'for I question whether 
he has not cleared more from the Island than I have since
his Residence. If you look sharp you may discern other per-
146 quisites that you do not expect. 1 Sir William thought the
slaves were trading in hogs and poultry, which enabled them 
to purchase rum from Reynolds. He believed Reynolds had his
own agent in St. John's through whom he sold hogs, turkeys,
147 turtle shell, and coconuts. He felt sure, too, that
Reynolds allowed visitors to Barbuda and took bribes to
148 
arrange this> and that all these activities were connived
at by Mr. and Mrs. Lovell   especially Mrs. Lovell who he
thought sold butter from Barbuda in Antigua, and received
149 
more than her fair share of prog. Christopher (Bethell)
Codrington had a more realistic view of the situation than 
his uncle. Writing about Reynolds, he said:
I have a very good opinion of Reynolds having no 
one thing to say against him. I concieve [sic ] that 
no man would live upon an Island by himself as he 
does but for want of money, and of course he will 
get it as fast as he can [his underlining]; and 
when you consider his situation there, the little 
controul he is under etc, it is impossible but to 
suppose that whoever lives there will make more 
money of the Proprietor than the Proprietor intends 
he should; for I do not myself concieve it possible 
entirely to put a stop to perquisites. 150
Sir William was critical, too, of the attorneys. Reynolds, 
he felt, should have been controlled more firmly; Langford 
Lovell was too easy-going and the other attorneys were no 
better. Christopher (Bethell) Codrington pointed out when 
he was in Antigua that his uncle was expecting too much. Many 
attorneys, like Lovell, were attorneys of more than one 
estate and might live nine or ten miles from an estate for 
which they were responsible. This distance meant much more 
under West Indian conditions, where the climate did not
53
152 encourage activity, than it would have done in England.
If it was difficult for an attorney to visit an estate on the 
same island, how much harder was it to visit an island twenty- 
five miles away. Further reflections about Lovell, however, 
made Christopher (Bethell) Codrington change his views 
somewhat. He felt he was a man 'of strictest intentional 
integrity, but, does not seem to think, that suffering you 
to be cheated by another man, who is under his controul, is 
the same thing as cheating you himself.' He thought Lovell 
was not a man to be acting attorney as he would overlook any- 
thing for the sake of peace and good humour 'and is as 
intimate with an overseer as with a Gentleman 1 .
Sir William may have been right in asserting that some 
money was being diverted from his account ; Reynolds probably 
was making money in ways unknown to him. Christopher
(Bethell) Codrington noted that Reynolds had slaves of his
154 own at Barbuda; and he probably reared livestock without
paying any rent for their pasture. Nevertheless the amounts 
involved cannot have been very great as they would have been 
reported by others; it was probably worth losing a small 
part of the profits in order to retain the services of a com- 
petent manager who was able to increase the value of the 
island. Even if Lovell turned a blind eye to some of these 
activities, he was unlikely to allow any flagrant abuse as 
this would have cast doubts on his own position.
Unfortunately Sir William never really understood the 
difficulties Barbuda presented, even though he occasionally 
paid lip service to them. He had never visited any of his 
estates in the West Indies so he could not imagine the 
problems faced by those trying to make a living there. Such
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information as he acquired often could not be applied to 
Barbuda. He was misled by men like Colonel King and Colonel 
Martin whose views of Barbuda were far from the truth: 
Colonel King had described Barbuda as though it were 
Paradise; and Colonel Martin claimed, when he rented the
island, that he would make a profit of four times the rent
158 
of £1,500 sterling. It is significant that after four
years he wanted to give up the lease, and surprising that 
Sir William did not take this into account when reviewing 
the work of the men on Barbuda. It was statements of this 
sort, which he accepted as true, that led him to expect more 
from Barbuda than he ever received, and to criticize those 
who were out there when he was disappointed in his 
expectations.
(b) The Management of Barbuda under Sir Christopher 
Bethell Codrington, 1792-1833
The death of Sir William led to some changes in administration
159but in certain respects Christopher Bethell Codrington fol- 
lowed the pattern set by his uncle. He took as keen an 
interest in Barbuda and was just as anxious to make his prop- 
erties pay as Sir William had been. Equally business-like in 
his methods, he repeatedly instructed his agents to insist 
on immediate payment for produce and took the same care as 
Sir William in the scrutinizing of accounts. Most of 
those available from Sir William's day start on 1 July and 
finish on 30 June. One of the first changes of any signif- 
icance Sir Bethell made was to simplify the system of 
accounting by beginning on 1 January.
A more fundamental change, however, was made by the 
re-integration of Barbuda into the administration of the
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Antiguan estates. Langford Lovell was replaced as attorney
responsible for Barbuda by J.L. Walrond who had been the
162 
manager at Betty's Hope since 1783. He disapproved of
1 ft ^ Reynolds's independent attitude (possibly because
Reynolds was not technically a gentleman) and friction between
them may have been the reason for Reynolds leaving Barbuda in
164 1793. When Walrond left for England in 1797 his place was
taken by S. Athill who followed the same policy. Under 
these men the managers of Barbuda had less authority and a
reduced salary. William Collins who replaced Reynolds
166 
received £100 per year, but was summarily dismissed in
1801 because he had been selling some Barbudan produce on 
the side and pocketing the profits. They were not able to 
find a suitable successor until 1804 and by that time Sir 
Bethell was anxious to revert to the system of separating 
Barbuda from the estates.
Athill, however, did not agree with his plans. He
recognized that the returns from Barbuda were not satisfac-
168 tory but thought the profitability of the whole property
would suffer if Barbuda and the estates were separated. He 
maintained that when they were under one management, produce 
from Barbuda was used first to provide the needs of the 
plantations: when they were separated the manager might 
send the goods to the market offering the best prices and 
be more concerned for the island's profits than for the 
general good of the estates as a whole. Then, too, he felt 
it was an advantage for the profits from Barbuda to be used 
to pay the expenses of the estates. This was not only a
benefit to the plantations but saved the high cost of purchas-
169 ing bills of exchange.
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Sir Bethell was not impressed by these arguments. He 
informed Athill that though he had not received any remit- 
tances from Barbuda in recent years, he had not had reduced
invoices from Antigua either, which should have been the
170 
case if Athill 1 s theories were right. He felt, too, that
Barbuda needed a resident manager with more authority espec- 
ially as the French wars had made travel from Antigua to
171 Barbuda a risky undertaking. So, in 1804, Codrington
appointed John James as manager of Barbuda, and in 1805 made
172 him an attorney too. Unlike previous managers James saw
the accounts and was responsible for sending remittances to 
Sir Bethell, though it seems that sometimes they were still 
used to defray the expenses of the estates.
James was paid a salary of £200 and commission on sales
174 
and wrecks of five per cent and later seven per cent.
Codrington hoped that giving him commission would prevent his 
taking perquisites and encourage him to increase the profits. 
By January 1809, however, he was complaining that the profits 
were no higher than before and that the capital sum invested 
in Barbuda did not bring an adequate return. Writing to 
James in 1809 he said: 'When I reflect upon the Size of 
Barbuda 39000 Acres cover'd with stock of all kinds, with 
upwards of 250 Negroes upon it, and then look at the Returns
from such Possessions, I feel that some great Errors must
176 have pervaded the plans hitherto pursued 1 . He felt the
island would benefit from further advice and so when Samuel 
Martin, another absentee proprietor, probably related to 
Colonel Samuel Martin, went out to look at a new estate of
his in Antigua, Codrington not only asked him to visit
177 Barbuda but made him an attorney for the island as well.
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Letters to both James and Martin between 1809 and 1815 
reveal much criticism of James's work. Codrington remon- 
strated with him for selling stock without firm payment, for 
not developing sheep breeding, for not sending money from
turtle-shell, and increasingly, for not remitting bills and
178 
not writing frequently enough. He constantly remarked
that he was not getting an adequate return for the capital
179invested in Barbuda, and there was some truth in his
complaints. England was at war with France from 1793 to 1815
and the presence of the navy in the Leeward Islands gave
1 80 
opportunities for the sale of Barbudan stock and wood.
Even so the average annual profit between 1806 and 1814 was
only £6,759. 6s. 6%d. and the exchange rate halved the
181
amount. Included in these profits, too, were substantial
wreck awards which still further lowered the profit the
182 island had made on its produce.
Sir Bethell was equally worried about the remittances 
from his Antiguan property. In 1809 his invoices had risen 
to £5,000, and his receipts from sugar had decreased by a 
half. 'Till Lately* his average annual returns had reached 
£15,000 sterling but in 1807 he had received only £5,148. 9s. 
6d., and in 1808 £7,129. 2s. 9d.: 'and when I tell you that 
my W. India Property is charged with Annuities exceeding 
£5,000 per annum, you will see that these Estates have not 
latterly been of much value to me.' He assured his attorney 
that he did not mean 'to impute this to any other Causes
TOO
than those arising from the Times'. The concern that Sir 
Bethell felt for the declining profitability of his sugar 
estates shows that the dissatisfaction he expressed to James 
about Barbuda was part of a general worry about the value of 
his overseas possessions.
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At this stage, although Sir Bethell criticized James 
for his lack of attention to certain matters, he still regar- 
ded him as active and competent and particularly praised his
184 
method of keeping accounts. He seems to have felt there
was something wrong with the system rather than with James
1 o c:
personally. From the facts available, too, James does 
seem to have been better at his work than some of Codrington's
remarks might lead one to believe. He defended himself vigor-
1 8 ft 
ously in a long letter in 1809 and in 1813 Codrington
himelf admitted that he might have been unfair to James. 
Writing to another attorney he said:
I have repeatedly complained to Mr. James that the 
returns from Barbuda were not equal to my Expectations 
but in truth I do not know that I ought to have com- 
plained seeing as I now do that in 1810 my Antigua 
Plantations were furnished with no less than 40 head 
of Oxen worth . . . £1600, and that with the addition 
of other articles, Barbuda in that year supplied my 
Plantations in Antigua to the Amount of £3690.17.0. l87
In other ways, too, his criticisms at this time seem to have 
been unfair. If James did not always write as frequently as 
Codrington would have liked, he did over the years send very
detailed accounts of the work on Barbuda and when he did not
188 
write the reason was sometimes ill-health. Accounts might
be delayed because he could not get to Antigua or had dif-
189 ficulty in procuring bills of exhange.
After 1815, however, Codrington certainly had more cause 
for complaint about the way Barbuda was managed. James came
to England in 1815 and when he returned asked permission for
190 his wife and daughters to accompany him. Codrington
later blamed them for the subsequent deterioration in James's 
supervision of affairs on Barbuda. Before their arrival, he 
said, the property managed for him by James was all set to
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bring him a 'handsome annual Income' j but after Mrs. James 
came to live with her husband he felt he would have been bet- 
ter off without the property as he had to be responsible for
191 their debts. The James family was not accumulating bills
through living on Barbuda. In 1822 he and his family made 
their regular home at Clare Hall, another Codrington sugar
estate on Antigua, and there they lived very extravagantly,
192 giving parties and 'handsome assemblies'. James himself
continued as manager and attorney for Barbuda but he cannot 
have given much attention to the island as he only made
occasional visits there. Moreover at this stage his abilities
193 
seem to have been impaired by excessive drinking.
Unfortunately there is no series of accounts available 
for the period 1816-26 so it is impossible to gauge James's 
efforts /by that means } but Codrington, writing to Lord 
Bathurst in 1826, complained that for the past five years he
had received no revenue from Barbuda though he used to receive
194£2,000 sterling annually. Codrington's views do not nec- 
essarily mean that nothing was made from Barbuda. When he 
made such statements he often did not take into account the
value of the produce sent to the estates nor any money made
195 from wrecks. Codrington himself felt that the low profits
were due to the large increase in the slave population on
196 
Barbuda-from 312 in 1805 to 423 in 1824. He did not in
this instance blame the absence of the manager, though some 
years later he said the slaves 'relapsed into a state of
Idleness and insubordination fm the moment Mr. James left
197 the island to reside at Clare Hall.' Even so, at a time
of slave unrest on other islands, the Barbudan population 
remained relatively well-behaved, though becoming increasingly
60
independent in outlook. When James tried to persuade some of
them to work on the Antiguan estates they resolutely refused
198 to goj but even so, only two years before, in 1824,
James could write that he trusted them so completely that he 
would sleep in the woods with them at night> and he was able
to leave his wife and daughters on their own without lock or
, 199 key.
The period after James's death, from 1826 to 1833, was 
more unsettled. One attorney noted that the slaves were in 
a 'state of great insubordination'. Although Codrington 
himself tended to think that views like this were exaggerated 
he did think that 'since there has been no resident Governour
on the Island, they have relapsed from that state of obedi-
201 
ence which was formerly their so well deserved Character 1 .
He felt that this was a reason why there should be a resident
202 
manager who was also an attorney. In 1826 John Winter was
appointed manager with a salary of £200 and five per cent 
commission on sales from Barbuda, but in spite of Sir
Bethell's views he was not then made an attorney and the
203 
manager at Betty's Hope again had control over Barbuda.
Winter seems to have been a man of little initiative and
204 fearful of the slaves who were becoming difficult to handle.
Rumours of emancipation obviously contributed to this, but 
Winter had to re-establish discipline after the slack time 
when there had been no resident manager.
Faults in management contributed not only to some unrest 
but to lack of direction in other ways. When Winter left 
Barbuda for a visit to England in 1829, the attorney at 
Betty's Hope, Robert Jarritt, wrote to Codrington about the 
neglected state of the island: 'The Buildings which he
61
promised me to repair not touched, everything falling to ruin, 
no provisions of any sort on the Island, nor will there be for
3 Months ... I see there has been a want of Industry,
205 Method and economy 1 . In October 1829 he wrote: 'There
has been no Industry, no proper application of labor, since
the time of one Reynolds, many of whose works are still
2 0 fi 
visible, and altho gone to decay, I learn was done by him 1 .
Criticism of the work of one employee by another cannot,
however, be taken too literally. Others spoke highly of
207 Winter and when he returned to Barbuda Codrington made him
the attorney for Barbuda as well as manager, much to Jarritt's
208 
mortification. For the last four years up to emancipation,
therefore, Barbuda was again administered as a separate 
entity, though linked as before to the Antiguan estates.
Unfortunately increased authority does not seem to have 
made Winter a more efficient manager. There were some
achievements   for example Barbuda went on supplying the
209 
estates with provisions  but little effort seems to have
been made to improve the island in other ways. When 
J. Liggins, Codrington's London agent, visited Barbuda in 
1837 he was dismayed by the signs of neglect. Stone walls 
dividing the fields were falling down and gates had dis- 
appeared, the labourers' houses were neglected, the turtle 
crawl, wells, boats and carts were all in need of repair. 
Liggins was shocked. He informed Sir Bethell that if, 
when he was in England, he had been 'put in possession of a 
true and faithful report of things as they are in Barbuda   
I could not have believed it 1. ... I have now seen the 
reality and it distresses me beyond my power of expression 1 . 
He was critical of Codrington's agents in Antigua and Barbuda
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and he felt the only remedy was frequent visits by someone 
from England who would look at affairs 'with the Eye of a
Man of Business and not allow his Vision to be dim'd by the
210 
attractive glare of Pleasure and good Living 1 .
Some of the neglect may have been due to laziness on the 
part of those in authority or to the attraction of other 
pursuits, but changes in the attitude of the slaves must also 
have contributed to the problem. In 1830 there were four
white men on the island in charge of just over five hundred
2ii
slaves. While in the past the Barbudan slaves had been
renowned for their good behaviour, at this time they were
becoming restive. In 1832 troops had to be called in to help
212 to restore order after some unruliness, and in 1834 they
refused to assist at a wreck and then plundered it themselves, 
When the Governor of the Leewards visited Barbuda in that 
year, they complained about Winter's treatment of them (in 
not providing their proper allowances of meat) and a magis- 
trate had to be sent from Antigua to try and settle the
213 dispute. The thought of emancipation undoubtedly was a
contributory cause of this unrest, but so was the fact that 
there were then so many slaves on Barbuda, many of them young 
people for whom there was insufficient work. Fear of pro- 
voking further trouble which might have led to a full scale 
revolt must have affected Winter's behaviour and prevented 
him from exerting his authority to get more work done. It 
cannot be denied that the management was weak in these years, 
but a more efficient system might well have driven the slaves 
to greater lawlessness.
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The management of Barbuda was a matter of vital concern 
to both Sir William and Sir Bethell Codrington. Both apprec- 
iated their vulnerability as absentee landowners, in having
to trust their estates to others. Attorneys were described
214 by one contemporary as 'the locusts of the West Indies',
and John Luffman, writing about 1785, commented that the
215 
adage 'Fat managers and lean employers' could be applied
with truth to attorneys and their landlords. Barbuda was 
certainly a place where any absentee proprietor might expect 
to be cheated. An isolated island twenty-five miles by sea 
from the rest of the family estates would seem to present a 
marvellous opportunity for unscrupulous managers to make 
money at the owner's expense. That this did not happen to 
any great extent is a tribute to the system of management 
and the good sense of those concerned.
Of the two methods of organization that were tried , the 
more successful was the one giving greater responsibility to 
the resident manager. This did not lead to Barbuda being 
developed at the expense of the whole property, as Athill had 
feared, because the estates were still supplied with provis- 
ions and a close link was always maintained with them. The 
advantage was that a manager with some authority actually 
lived on the island and was responsible for what happened 
there.
Both Sir William and Sir Bethell maintained a vigorous 
correspondence with the manager and the attorneys. Instruc- 
tions, suggestions, and criticisms were sent regularly and 
detailed letters were expected in reply. In addition both 
Codringtons kept in close contact with Antiguan landowners 
visiting England. Though they were absentees they nevertheless
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paid scrupulous attention to Barbudan problems and this must 
have had some effect on their employees in the West Indies. 
When one considers the remoteness of Barbuda and the 
irregularity of communications it is surprising that it was 
administered as successfully as it was. Though there were 
periods of considerable inefficiency there were many years 
when Barbuda made a profit and during the whole of the 
period 1761-1833, though there was occasional unrest, there 
were no serious slave rebellions. These achievements seem\
to have been due to the fact that all those involved saw that 
it was in their best interests to conduct the island's affairs 
reasonably, if not very, well. The managers, if they could 
endure the climate, had opportunities which they could not 
have found elsewhere. So while they might cheat their 
employers in minor ways they would not have risked dismissal 
by practising fraud on a larger scale. Similarly some 
attorneys might be prepared to turn a blind eye to small mis- 
demeanours in order to retain a particular manager, but they 
could not have sanctioned too great an abuse of privilege as 
their own position with the Codringtons would have been 
jeopardized.
In keeping order the same delicate balance was maintained. 
The white men were in such a minority, and help was so far 
away, that they had to take care to avoid causing a slave 
rebellion. The slaves, for their part, recognized that the 
comparative freedom they enjoyed on Barbuda would be taken 
away if they behaved badly. In that case they knew they ran
the risk of being transferred to the sugar plantations, a
21 fi punishment they regarded as the worst that could be given.
Life on Barbuda depended on mutual co-operation, and the
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217 Barbudan reputation for being of 'gentle disposition 1 was
not an empty compliment.
In spite of the fact that the organization of the island 
was reasonably successful, however, the Codringtons were never 
satisfied with their profits. They both tended to blame those 
in charge locally for this. Sir William in particular paid 
too much attention to those who spoke of Barbuda as a fertile 
island which was being held back from proper development by 
maladministration. As an absentee, only too well aware of 
the ways in which he could be cheated, his attitude was per- 
haps understandable, but it meant he did not appreciate fully 
the work of a man like Dennis Reynolds. Sir Bethell, for his 
part, was more inclined to blame his managers for inactivity. 
While both were probably right to a limited extent, they seem 
not to have realized fully the difficulties presented by the 
island itself. Poverty of soil and frequent droughts were a 
more genuine cause of reduced profits than was minor fiddling 
on the part of employees. These conditions applied all 
through Barbuda's history. In the 1820s,* however, there were 
additional problems. After the French wars there was general 
economic distress in the British West Indies. Estates which 
had formerly been prosperous became overburdened with debts, 
many owners were unable to recover, and Barbuda was affected 
by this because landowners could not afford to purchase its
products.
These conditions made it difficult for Barbuda to be run
at a profit all the time. More remarkable, however, is the 
fact that despite the inaccessibility of the island and the 
difficulty of maintaining communications with those living 
there, the administration was sufficiently successful for
66
a relatively profitable society to be developed along the 
lines laid down by its absentee owners.
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THE ECONOMY OF BARBUDA
The Barbudan economy is considered in the next three chapters 
first (Chapter 3), stock-rearing, as the most important 
activity; secondly (Chapter 4), some miscellaneous projects 
from which the Codringtons hoped to increase their income 
from the island; and thirdly (Chapter 5), transport, boat- 
building, and salvage operations. The total income and 
profits from Barbuda for certain periods when a series of 
accounts is available is included at the end of Chapter 5. 
This also shows amounts made from livestock and salvage 
awards. In this section 1834 is given as the final date 
rather than 1833 as it is the last year in a consecutive 
series of accounts.
Chapter 3
STOCK-REARING ON BARBUDA
Introduction
Barbuda was principally of value to the Codringtons as a 
stock-rearing island. The poor quality of the soil and its 
lack of depth prevented the cultivation of sugar and although 
experiments were made with a variety of crops none proved 
commercially successful for very long. The island did not 
actually possess obvious advantages for animal husbandry 
either. Evergreen woodland and scrub vegetation covered 
most of Barbuda and although there was usually water avail- 
able for drinking, the low rainfall and frequent droughts 
affected pasture for grazing and often destroyed the fodder 
crops. 'What a miserable poor place it is 1 , commented
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2Dennis Reynolds, manager of Barbuda in the 1780s, and his
opinion was echoed by other managers who had to try to make 
the island pay.-*
Nevertheless, in spite of these major obstacles, 
Barbuda did support large numbers of sheep, goats, cattle, 
horses, and mules, and sales of these animals produced big 
profits throughout the period   larger than from any other 
source with the exception, in some years, of wrecks. Even 
though the stock were not of good quality they served a 
local need. All sugar plantations needed draught animals 
and manure, but few owners had sufficient land to be able 
to rear their own. Any surplus land which could support 
stock, however inadequately, was an asset, and the Codringtons, 
with their large plantations on Antigua, fully recognized the 
advantage of owning a nearby island which could be used for 
this purpose. Oxen, mules, and horses were regularly sent in 
large numbers to the estates from Barbuda for work in the 
plantations, and smaller numbers of sheep, goats, and cattle 
were supplied as food. A greater quantity of stock, however, 
was also sent for sale outside the estates to Antigua, and 
sometimes to St. Kitts and Nevis. Total profits from this 
source usually exceeded the amount made from the Codrington 
estates, and in war-time increased considerably because of 
the demands of the navy and the army hospital on Antigua.
In addition to these assets when pasture was in short supply
4 on Antigua, cattle were sent to Barbuda to graze; and the
estates were supplied with cattle dung from Barbuda.
Both Sir William and Sir Bethell Codrington appreciated 
fully the profits made from the sales of these animals, but 
both felt that even more could be achieved with better
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management. They imagined Barbuda as the supplier of stock 
for most of the other neighbouring islands and they spent 
much time and energy suggesting different methods and urging 
greater attention and care. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to show what was being done on Barbuda, to estimate 
the degree of success that was achieved, and to see to what 
extent the disappointment of the owners was justified.
Some explanation must be given about the information 
available. There is little about stock before 1746, but 
for the period of the lease to Martin and Byam there are 
useful accounts and figures of sales. There is correspond- 
ence for the time when Redhead was responsible for Barbuda 
from 1761 to 1779, but few accounts. After 1779 there is 
a large collection of letters and three good series of 
accounts - from 1785 to 1798, 1806 to 1814, and 1825 to 1834. 
The last set is not as straightforward as the other two 
since they were not always kept on a twelve-month basis. 
They remain useful, however, because they illustrate at least 
the general trend in the last years before emancipation.
Sheep and Goats
Sheep and goats were an obvious choice for anyone intending 
to use Barbuda as a stock-rearing island. By nature they 
are capable of existing on poorer quality pasture than 
cattle or horses and are also better able to survive periods 
of drought. Thus they could be put to graze on those parts 
of the island which would not support much else; like
Little Goat Island in the north, said to be capable of sup-
8 porting only goats, and Great Goat Island (actually a^
peninsula separated from the mainland by a wall) which was
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described as having 'tolerable good Pasture for Sheep and
9 Goats, particularly the latter 1 . Another area on which
they were put to graze was Spanish Point pasture and 
they must also have been reared on the Highlands, as a key 
to a late eighteenth century map describes Castle Hill 
House as the place where all the Highland sheep were 
collected. Sheep certainly do seem to have been reared 
and sold regularly throughout the period, but goats do not 
feature largely in the accounts after 1791.
The actual numbers of both species seem to have fluc- 
tuated considerably according to the estimates made at 
different times. Appraisements were made at the beginning 
and end of the lease to Martin and Byam. In 1746 there were 
said to be 330 sheep and 130 goats. By 1761 numbers had 
increased; there were 1,253 sheep and 1,500 goats. While 
sheep had slightly increased in value, though, goats had 
declined considerably   from 15 shillings each in 1746 to only
8 shillings in 1761. (Sheep were valued at £1 each in 1761
12 
and slightly less than that in 1746.) Figures are short
for Redhead's administration of Barbuda (1761-79), but when 
Dennis Reynolds took over in 1779 he estimated that there 
were only 356 sheep and 15 goats. Four years later he claimed
there were 4,000 sheep and 600 goats and in 1786 he calcu-
14 lated there were 8,000 sheep and 2,000 goats. He maintained
that these increases were possible because the breed had been 
improved and sheep bred twice a year in the West Indies. 
An even more surprising estimate was given in 1813 by one 
of the shipwrecked sailors from the Woolwich who thought 
there were 40,000 sheep roaming wild over the island. Even 
if the figure cannot be accepted as accurate it does indicate
81
that there were a great many sheep at that time on Barbuda.
The accounts, in contrast, give a reliable picture of 
the number of sheep and goats actually sold. Goats never 
supplied a high proportion of the total profits but under 
Dennis Reynolds a useful sum was made from them, the best 
year being 1788-9 when £284. 8s. 3d. was raised from their 
sale. After 1791 goats hardly ever again appear in the 
accounts. Sheep, on the other hand, were sold throughout 
the period. The charts on pp. 162-3 show the numbers that 
were sold at different times between 1746 and 1834, and 
also the proportion of the profits made by sheep in compar- 
ison with the total amount for livestock. From these it 
can be clearly seen that between 1785 and 1798, unlike the 
other periods, sheep provided a large part of the profits, 
varying from about a third to very nearly the whole amount. 
They were never sent in large numbers to the estates. 
Between 1806 and 1814 the number sold dropped but the price 
had risen; even so their contribution in proportion to the 
other stock dropped. At this time the value of cattle sold 
exceeded that of sheep and the same was true between 1825 
and 1834 though at this time the profit made from livestock 
as a whole decreased.
Dennis Reynolds was the manager who best recognized the 
value of sheep and goats. He believed they were the most
profitable stock for Barbuda because they could survive
19 
spells of dry weather better than cattle and horses. So,
in 1780, 181 sheep and 35 goats were bought to help to 
re-stock the island. These were said to be 'very large and
fine 1 , especially some of the rams, for which the attorney,
20 Richard Clarke, had paid £5 per head. In October 1780 it
82
was reported that the sheep had increased surprisingly and
21 
some would be ready for sale in the next year or two. Sir
William Codrington was at first in favour of these develop- 
ments and gave Reynolds advice on breeding methods. The 
improvement of the flock, he wrote in August 1783, depended 
more on the rams than the ewes and therefore care should be
taken that good rams were provided and that their breeding
22
was controlled by keeping flocks apart and moving the rams.
Dennis Reynolds agreed with this and with the idea that good 
rams should be kept in an enclosure and given a proper diet, 
but, as he had earlier pointed out in a letter to the 
attorney, there were certain difficulties to be overcome. 
Strong fences would be necessary, as in the West Indies there
was no special breeding season and it would be impossible
23 
otherwise to restrain the rams. Sir William wanted to send
out rams from England to cross the breed, but was prevented
24 by Act of Parliament. However, in November 1784, he wrote
to say that he was sending out two rams from his own flock 
on a Bristol ship and he gave strict instructions how they 
were to be cared for. On arrival all their wool was to be 
clipped off and they were to be kept shorn close until the 
climate changed their wool to hair. Because of the all-the- 
year-round breeding in the West Indies he recommended that 
the rams should sometimes be separated from the ewes and 
particular care should be taken that they were moved from 
one flock to another. Unfortunately,in a postscript, he had 
to explain that Mr. Span, a Bristol merchant, had decided
he dare not, after all, risk the penalties of evading the
25 Act, so no rams were sent from England.
By 1786, however, Reynolds's sheep-breeding policy was
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proving so successful that Sir William became more worried 
about over-stocking. Reynolds had been in favour of rearing 
sheep because apart from their physical ability to survive
under poor conditions, sheep, he believed, were always in
2 6demand and there was no competition from other suppliers.
On this second point he was not entirely right. The 
neighbouring islands were not such ready markets as had been
hoped, partly because of the customs dues and fees which had
27to be paid, and partly because they seem to have had suf- 
ficient supplies of their own. Sir William wrote wryly to 
Langford Lovell in October 1786, 'it is not to my profit
but tis to the general good to hear the neighbor Islands
28 
are so well stocked with provisions as not to want my sheep.'
The danger of there being too many sheep worried him 
considerably. In the same letter he urged Langford Lovell 
to dispose of the sheep however low the price rather than
that they should overrun the island. In 1787 he advised the
29 
cutting of almost every ram lamb and in 1788, when there
had been a spell of dry weather, he felt that they (the 
sheep) 'had better now be at the bottom of the sea 1 .
Reynolds estimated that there were between six and 
seven thousand sheep in 1792. After 1798 the num- 
ber sold dropped and no further concern seems
to have been shown about the danger of their overrunning 
the island. The tremendous increase seems to have been due 
to the purchase of new stock though he also claimed that a 
major cause was the fact that he had put a stop to the 
Barbudan practice of sheep-stealing. This custom apparently
developed into a regular habit during Sally Bullock's 'rule'
32 
of the island, her own family being particularly guilty.
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The practice can only have been temporarily checked, however, 
because complaints about it continued until emancipation. 
The drop in numbers sold after Reynolds's time may have 
been caused in part by droughts and theft by slaves, but was 
probably due much more to the lack of interest of those in 
charge on Barbuda.
Sir Bethell Codrington would have liked the sales of 
sheep to be kept up. Apparently James, soon after his
appointment to Barbuda in 1805, informed Codrington that
34 Antigua would take 2,000 sheep annually. Remembering this,
and presumably having Reynolds' figures at hand, Codrington 
could not understand why more were not sold. In January 
1809 he wrote that he felt 'much surprised at the small sales 
of sheep, which (as it seems to me) might alone produce a 
return equal to the whole of the present Profits; and when 
I recollect the number on the Island, and that they drop 
twice a year, I am at a loss to fancy what can become of 
them or why the Island is not overrun with them.' He felt 
that if care were taken to undersell other dealers, 'the 
returns from this article alone might be something very 
considerable'. If two thousand sheep could have been sold 
annually then Codrington's estimate of their value would 
have been accurate. Sheep were selling at about £1. 10s. Od. 
per head so that two thousand would have realized about 
£3,000.
Unfortunately the figure given by James in the first 
place was probably over-optimistic, suggested by him before 
he knew much about conditions on Barbuda. Even Dennis 
Reynolds, who must be accounted successful with sheep, only 
exceeded the figure two thousand in one year and usually his
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totals were nearer fifteen hundred. In any case James does 
not seem to have had much knowledge of sheep-rearing in the 
West Indies. In reply to Codrington's criticism James 
maintained mistakenly that the idea of West Indian sheep 
dropping twice a year was erroneous. Drought was, however, 
a genuine difficulty. Many sheep had died in the dry weather 
of 1808 and the attorney Samuel Martin said that they were
'not at all times come-at-able, particularly during a great
37 Drought' (his underlining). Sir -Bethell was justifiably
perplexed by this. He had thought that in times of severe 
drought sheep might be enticed to any spot by cutting down
'bows' and he stressed again the profits he thought might
38 be made from them. Of course drought conditions must have
affected the size of the flocks, but Samuel Martin pointed
39 
out that in fact the breed needed changing.
Sir Bethell had actually already tried to do something 
about this. In January 1808 he wrote that he had hoped to
send two rams 'by this opportunity' but was prevented in the
40 
same way as his uncle had been, by law. In 1810, however,
he thought he might be allowed to send out Spanish rams 
which did not come within the terms of the Act, and as they
would be coming from a warm climate he hoped they would do
41 
well. Unfortunately the first Spanish rams he tried to
export were banned because they had not been entered at the
42 Customs on arrival. He had already suggested that American
rams should be bought to cross the breed and in 1812 James
43 
reported on the condition of some he had purchased. The
next year Codrington at last succeeded in sending out two 
Spanish rams and six ewes. He wished there were some way of 
encouraging the sheep to keep their wool as this would be a
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44 profitable side-line. James did his best to respond to
this suggestion. In 1816 he reported that there were then 
215 American sheep and 13 merinos on Barbuda, but their
fleece was thin and turning to hair on many of the older
45 
ones. A consignment of wool sent to England in 1817,
however, apparently met with Codrington's approval and 
James promised to do everying he could to increase the flock
of 'Woolly sheep 1 . The next year he was able to write that
46 the quality was better than before but despite this
activity interest in wool seems not to have been anything 
more than temporary.
Sir Bethell made a number of suggestions to improve 
the sheep but with little effect. He was unable to find a
suitable English shepherd for Barbuda, as he had hoped, but
47 at least in 1814 two slaves were listed as shepherds.
Efforts seem to have been made throughout the period to tame
some flocks by keeping them enclosed but in general they
48 were allowed to run wild. James tried to improve the breed
by turning some of the rams from the American flock into dif- 
ferent parts of the island, but with disappointing (though 
hardly surprising) results. The rams were not seen again
and only one lamb was found which seemed to bear any resem-
49 blance to them. When these wild sheep were needed for
sale or for some other purpose they were crudely rounded up, 
at least in James's time, in a manner described by Captain 
Greville, of H.M.S. Woolwich which was wrecked off Barbuda 
in 1813: 'At other times it was the practice of Mr. James 
to drive, by means of a long line of slaves, and every tenth 
man a gong, which he kept sounding, vast numbers of sheep, 
into an arm of the sea. They were then enclosed in this
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living palisade, and the rams caught. 1
Even the improvements that were made, however, did not 
lead to a marked increase in sales. James tried to explain 
to his employer what the difficulties were. He said the 
Barbuda sheep were very small, usually not averaging more 
than 26 or 28 pounds and never in their wild state becoming 
fat. 'Good mutton 1 , he said, 'will at Antigua sell readily 
at 2/3 but that is very different from the Barbuda sheep 1 . 
A local butcher, writing to James in 1813, complained that 
he had to pay more for sheep from Barbuda than for Antiguan 
sheep which were heavier and better in quality: 'yours
are wild and fall off very much from being confined here'
52 he said. Codrington's hopes of selling large numbers of
sheep were never realized, though he did try at this time to 
negotiate an arrangement with the Admiralty to enable sheep 
to be sold directly to the Navy and not through a dealer. 
He did not succeed in this apparently, and the numbers of 
sheep sold continued to fall. During the period 18O6 to 1814 
the average number sold was always nearer five hundred than a 
thousand and by the end of the period  
 from 1825 to 1834  the 
number had dropped to well under five hundred. At this time 
changes of manager and unrest caused by talk of emancipation 
prevented any serious improvements.
One can understand Sir Bethell's frustration that so 
little success was achieved. Sheep, as had been proved by 
Dennis Reynolds, could do well on Barbuda and could make a 
handsome profit with only a small outlay. Codrington under- 
stood this well. Writing to Samuel Martin in 1810 he said: 
'I have always thought well of Mr. James, and in truth I 
have but one fault to find with his Management of Barbuda,
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namely, that he will not give his chief attention to those 
articles which I think (perhaps erroneously) would give the
largest and most certain Income with the least attendant
54 troubles or expence; I allude particularly to Sheep. 1
Furthermore though it was possible for neighbouring islands 
to reject Barbudan sheep, the period of James 1 administration 
was one of war in the West Indies when the Navy was a keen 
purchaser of provisions. Even allowing for this additional 
market the numbers of sheep sold were very much below those 
of Dennis Reynolds's time. One factor which may have hin- 
dered sales was Sir Bethell's own insistence that 
long credit should not be given and sales should only be made 
to people who could pay cash or give sound promises; this 
it was difficult to do at a time when there was a shortage 
of specie and bills of exchange. This difficulty applied 
as much to cattle and horses as to sheep, however, and sales 
of these stock remained high. Another problem facing West 
Indian farmers, namely the fact that tropical pasture is not 
as nutritious as that in temperate zones, also applied
c r
equally to all stock.
The trouble really was that unless the man in charge on 
the spot was prepared to back a particular project no results 
could be expected. Dennis Reynolds, and possibly William 
Collins who succeeded him, seem to have been the only men 
working on Barbuda who saw the value of sheep. The others 
thought there was more to be made out of the larger stock   
namely horses, mules, and cattle.
Horses
Horses reared on Barbuda seem to have been regarded as
89
something of a joke. Sir William Codrington himself had no
illusions about them. He had heard from several sources
57 that they were 'small long legd ill shapen 1 . This view
was confirmed by Henry Coleridge when he visited Barbuda in 
1825. He described them as 'macilent and cat-ham 1 d creatures 
which the natives from ignorance suppose to be horses; they 
are ten hands in height and their necks and heads fall from 
the shoulder in an angle of forty five degrees below the
r o
horizon. 1 Their performance was no better than their 
appearance according to some observers. Langford Lovell said 
they were not sure-footed, were unsafe for the saddle, and 
uncomfortable because they were high-trotting; they were 
also too slight to use as draught animals.
Nevertheless, in spite of these disadvantages, horses 
were bred on Barbuda from the late seventeenth century. 
Colonel King, attorney for the Codrington estates, wrote to 
Sir William Codrington in December 1740 expressing surprise 
that there were then only about 300 horses on Barbuda. He 
had heard his father say that in 'young General Codrington's
time there was upwards of 5000 head of cattle and 1000
6 0 horses'. When the island was leased in 1746 there were
said to be 125 horses there (valued at £5 each); at the end 
of the lease the numbers had increased to 371 (most valued 
at more than £25 each). Between 1761 and 1786 the number
must have gone up because sales were so good. In 1786 there
6 2
were said to be 600; but by 1792 there were only 83 tame
horses and between 50 and 60 breeding mares wild in the
woods. In 1813 Captain Greville estimated there were about
64 400 altogether, but this may not be accurate.
The value of horses to the economy of Barbuda seems only
90
to have been high during the American War of Independence 
(1776-83), when the usual source became expensive. American 
horses which had been sold for £16. 10s. Od. to £35 in the 
Leeward Islands before the war, were selling for £30 to £70 
in 1785. This meant that locally reared horses, even though 
of poorer quality, would be an attractive proposition. 
Unfortunately the accounts of Barbuda are incomplete for 
the war years, but the years for which they are available 
show large sales of horses:
May - Dec. 1779 29 horses were sold for £1,250 10s. Od.
1780 66 horses were sold for £1,989 19s. 6d.
1781 49 horses were sold for £1,795 10s. Od. 
(one quarter 
missing)
1782 81 horses were sold for £3,931 18s. 3d. 
On average Barbudan horses were selling for between £28 and 
£59, which made them appreciably cheaper than American horses. 
In 1785-6, 34 were sold, but the price had dropped to 
£579. 3s. Od. and this included four mules. After this date 
sales decreased sharply. In the next two years, 1786-7 and 
1787-8, 18 and 17 horses were sold respectivelyj after that 
date, in the groups of years for which there are consecutive 
accounts, the number was usually under 10 and often none at 
all were sold. Nor were large numbers being sent to the 
Codrington sugar plantations: in fact the largest number 
sent in these years was 9 in 1794.
The attitude of the managers and owners of Barbuda 
towards horse-breeding does not seem to have been consistent. 
Colonel King, who was attorney in 1740, wrote to Sir William 
Codrington, then a young man, advocating the improvement of 
the breed. He noted that it seemed to have decreased in size
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since his father's day and suggested that two coach stallions 
should be sent out each year for this purpose. Their off- 
spring would be good either for the coach or the saddle and 
would make good war-horses which might sell for £20 to £35 
each. Unlike many West Indians, King thought Creole horses 
were better than mules as draught animals,as mules were more 
subject to glanders, a very contagious disease. He held out 
hopes of horses being sold in St. Kitts and other neighbour- 
ing islands for draught, especially if they could be seasoned
fi Q
first in Antigua. His views were obviously not held by 
Martin and Byam. During their lease of Barbuda, horses were 
sold but realized less than all other produce with the 
exception of sheep and goats. From 1762 to 1834, the 
attitude of most of those working on Barbuda was that mules 
would be more profitable to rear than horses. In June 1762, 
Samuel Redhead commented that he thought horses were too 
costly to rear in large numbers and prejudiced the raising 
of mules which he felt were one of the 'best Articles' on 
the island. Sir William, however, and for a time his 
nephew, Christopher, seemed to think that horses would be 
useful if certain improvements were made. The former, in 
particular, seems always to have felt that if horses did 
not do well, it was because insufficient care was being taken 
by the men out there.
Details of Redhead's work on Barbuda are limited, but 
it was obviously unfortunate for Codrington that he was still 
in charge, though .old, when the war broke out with America. 
However, with the appointment of Clarke as attorney and 
Dennis Reynolds as manager, a more active policy was pursued. 
Clarke thought horses could be improved if the breed were
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crossed and asked for two good stallions to be sent out. He 
wanted them to be not 'lofty 1 but about 14 hands, well-limbed, 
with a good barrel, legs not too long, and as short as 
possible in the postern joints. He also bought some mares 
locally and outlined his proposals for improving the breed. 
The big increases in sales of horses obviously encour- 
aged Sir William to think that horses could be profitable 
and from this time he sent out stallions and mares from 
England and bombarded his attorneys and managers with infor- 
mation and instructions. In particular he emphasized that 
the stallions he sent there, at great expense, should not 
be allowed to run wild. They should be kept apart and the 
mares should be covered in hand. In this way, he said, one
stallion would suffice for fifty mares, but if left to run
72wild the same stallion would only produce one colt in ten.
In 1782, he sent out two colts and commented: 'they will 
not be worth a shilling if turn'd loose to run among the 
Mares'. He observed that when they were two years old they 
might have three mares a week for three months. The mares 
they bred from were to be the best on the island and an 
account was to be kept of each stallion, the mares he covered, 
and the foals born.
In November 1783, Codrington sent out more stallions, 
with more instructions. He felt that if they were prop- 
erly managed and not allowed to run wild, 'I should estim- 
ate their value after safe arrival at full a present year's 
income of the island'. He clearly thought that not enough
care was taken of the stallions on Barbuda and he emphas-
74ized how much they cost to send. In 1786, after despatch- 
ing two mares, he suggested they might be larger than American 
mares, but also more expensive. Those from his stable
93
cost 40 guineas plus freight and insurance. Mr. Span, of 
Bristol, charged £28 for freight of the mares. Then there 
was £6 duty, and provisions to be provided on board. He 
saw, too, that English horses were not necessarily right
for West Indian conditions. One horse he had sent out had
76 proved 'slugish 1 . Nevertheless, if the strain was most
likely to be improved by sending English horses, he would 
continue to send them. In this case 'economy would not answer, 
where the difference of cost may procure an increase of good- 
ness of Breed or propriety of Shape 1 .
On the other hand he continued to stress that the stock 
he sent out should not be allowed to run wild, and that proper 
care should be taken of them. Already in August 1783 he had 
written that he was sending out two grooms with the colts in
the hope that they would break 'the barbarous custom of turn- 
To 
ing Stallions loose 1 . Another problem, he felt, was the
great number of inferior horses allowed to roam over the
79 island. In 1787, he told Langford Lovell that he thought
Reynolds would do well to shoot 'the wild spider Legd Stone
80 horses', and he had earlier stated that the old stallions
81 
should be cut and the runted mares removed from the island.
Dennis Reynolds had suggestions of his own to make. He 
recommended that each year two or three good stallions should 
be sent out, 'of the Strong old Breed of Hunters none of the 
mixture of the Arabian Blood they are too slight and not fit 
to Breed from in the West Indies. I would wish for good 
brown Bays with as little white as possible, of good deep 
bright Bays: Those Kind of Horses would mend the present 
Breed very much. I wish to have boney and short Posterned, 
long fore Hands, short Backs, good Gaskins and well let down
94
82 behind. 1 In 1787 he commented that a mare sent out by Sir
William was too big for Barbuda's pastures. Smaller mares
o o
were to be preferred as they did not eat so much.
Reynolds agreed with Sir William that it would be better 
to keep the stallions apart, but for this enclosures would be 
needed in different parts of the island. This was not an 
easy task, however, as there were not enough slaves to make
the strong enclosures that would be necessary to keep the
84 
stallions safely inside, and covering in hand was difficult
when there was insufficient fodder for them. Reynolds 
expressed his feelings on the matter strongly in 1783: 'but 
good sir, if you were only one week in Barbuda you would 
immediately see how impossible it woud be to carry this
O C
work into Execution.' Unable to carry out the practice 
Sir William wanted, Reynolds tried a compromise policy of 
allowing the stallions to run wild for a week and then be 
brought back to the stables for another week. Sir William 
conceded that this was better than the previous policy, but
Q C
not what was really needed.
In these ways Reynolds did try to comply with Sir 
William's instructions. What is more, he did eventually 
achieve the construction of enclosures for the better stock
and for crops. He made them in an area east of the castle
87 
roughly midway between the castle and the Highlands (see
map following p. 4). He described them in 1786 as being 
'in culture and pasture' and already partly enclosed with 
a stone wall which he hoped to complete within three years.
Here he intended keeping thirty to forty of the best brood
88 
mares to be covered in hand. The enclosures were provided
89 
with wells for drinking water but this was not the main
95
problem when there was a drought. Then the real difficulty
90 
was shortage of fodder and it was this which rendered the
enclosures virtually useless for three years after they were 
completed. In 1792 Reynolds wrote that he had had to turn
the stock loose to find their own food as the dry weather
91 meant that there was no grass in the enclosures. In good
92 years he tried to make provision for years of drought but
if the dry weather was prolonged this was bound to be inadequate. 
Reynolds certainly seems to have made efforts to enclose as 
many horses as possible when conditions were favourable but 
almost as many had to be allowed to run wild. In May 1792
a list was made showing the numbers of mares, geldings, and
93 
mules in the woods and all the stock in the parks. It
is interesting to notice that although 76 horses and 42 mules 
were enclosed in some way, there were still 65 breeding mares, 
4 geldings, and 24 mules in the woods.
The problem of trying to find a method to rear horses 
successfully on Barbuda illustrates the difficulties faced 
by those who wanted to make the island profitable. Sir William 
did all he could to improve the breed and in Reynolds he had a 
manager who was prepared to work hard and try to carry out 
his wishes> but the island itself presented insuperable 
problems. There was very little pasture suitable for horses, 
fodder was difficult to provide and sufficiently strong 
enclosures could not be made easily. Moreover, however care- 
fully the manager might try to carry out his instructions, he 
could not protect his work from the severe droughts, not 
infrequent occurrences, which could ruin all his efforts.
Christopher (Bethell) Codrington, who visited the family es- 
tates on Antigua and Barbuda in 1790-1, saw the difficulties at
96
first hand. He thought there were good horses on Barbuda, 
better than those from America too; and he thought that the 
breeding of them was not ill-conducted in the first instance 
(though he confessed that he did not know much about horse- 
breeding himself). What he did feel was wrong was the fact 
that there was no-one on Barbuda who understood about the 
'breaking of Horses'. Potentially good horses were spoilt 
'by being kicked about by a Negroe who knows nothing of 
breaking them 1 . He gave, as an example, his own horse which 
had been thought unmanageable, but having been coaxed and
gently treated by him was now perfectly tame and taken for
94 
an English horse.
Although he saw that Barbudan horses could be tamed and 
made attractive purchases, Christopher (bethell) Codrington was
not in favour of rearing horses: there was little demand
for them and they only fetched £25 currency. Mules, in con-
95 trast, were always easy to sell, and fetched £25 sterling.
Before he died Sir William had obviously come to think, 
with his nephew, that the breeding of horses was a waste of 
effort and money, presumably because of the difficulty of 
finding buyers. Although horses continued to be kept on 
the island little seems to have been done to improve the 
breed after the 1780s. In 1813, when Samuel Martin suggested
that stallions were needed to improve the strain, Codrington
9 6 
made it clear that horse-breeding had been discontinued.
Oddly enough when J. Liggins visited the island in 1837 he 
not only thought that the horses there were less comic in 
appearance than had been suggested, but that they might now 
be bred successfully. 'I am however of opinion that you 
would derive considerable benefit from an infusion of some
97
new Blood among them they would advance in Character, and
soon be preferd to the American Horses, which now take the
97 lead in the Neighbouring Islands. 1
Horses, then, did not contribute significantly to the 
economy of Barbuda except during the period of war with 
America. This fairly detailed study of horse-rearing in the 
1780s is of significance, however, because it illustrates 
the enormous gap between English methods and the possibility 
of carrying them out under West Indian conditions. It also 
shows the extent to which a conscientious absentee landlord 
was prepared to give time and money to a particular project 
on one of his estates. Unfortunately in this case the 
results were not financially rewarding.
Mules
Mule-breeding on Barbuda is of special interest because, even 
more than with the rearing of horses, it illustrates the 
extent to which a keen landowner was prepared to back a 
theory even though the results did not justify his policy. 
In this instance, too, the attorneys and managers of Barbuda 
shared the same view as the landowner. With the one exception
of Colonel King who preferred horses, all were in agreement
98 on the advantages of mules as an article for sale. Mules,
especially those bred in the West Indies, were tougher,
99 
worked harder, and ate less than horses; they also fetched
a higher price. In 1793 mules sent to the Codrington estates 
on Antigua raised £40 (currency) each, in 1797 £55 each, and 
in 1798 £66 each, more than horses and working cattle. 
There was, too, always a ready market for them, unlike sheep 
and horses which were sometimes difficult to sell.
98
Nevertheless, despite these advantages, mules never 
provided more than a small part of the income from Barbuda. 
Between 1746 and 1755, 83 were sold for £2,611. 7s. Od.- 
only about a third of the amount realized, during the same 
time, for cattle. In the other periods under special 
consideration-1785-98, 1806-14, 1825-34-only 31 were sold 
in the first (24 in one year) and none at all in the last 
two. Between 1785 and 1798 a reasonable number were sent
to the Codrington estates on Antigua, but never more than
102 24; very few were sent thereafter. The reason for
this was that mules were difficult to breed. There were 
always sheep and horses of some sort on Barbuda and with 
these species advantage could be taken of shortages in a 
time of emergency, as happened, for example, with horses 
during the American War of Independence. With mules, however, 
it was different. In the period when horses were doing so 
well, 31 mules were sold in 1780, none in 1781, and only 4 
in 1782. This was because there were no mules to sell. 
The prices they raised, however (£200 for the four sold in 
1782), obviously encouraged all those involved to continue 
to try to overcome the difficulties.
The main problem was in providing prolific stallion asses 
large enough to cover a mare. In the 1720s and 1730s they 
had been purchased from the Cape de Verde islands, but Colonel 
King felt these were worthless as they lost their spirit. 
He wondered what Portuguese asses would be like. In 1743 he 
managed to procure ten from the Isle of Salt, an uninhabited
island off the Cape de Verde islands, and he hoped they would
104 do well. Some success must have been realized as mules
were sold throughout the period of the lease to Martin and
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Byam which began three years later. When the lease ended 
in 1761 Sir William Codrington began to think in terms of 
mule-rearing and he bought and sent over two Spanish asses in 
1761; But Samuel Redhead's inefficiencies clearly 
deterred him from spending much on stock for Barbuda and it 
was not until the 1780s that he became really active again. 
When Clarke took over the attorneyship, with Dennis
Reynolds at Barbuda, there seems to have been only one jackass
107 
on the island. Clarke purchased one and commented that
'the Breed are not large, but at present no better can be
108 procured 1 . In November 1780 Richard Oliver recommended
that Sir William should try to purchase one from Gibraltar
109 
or from Portugal. For the rest of his life Sir William
Codrington made tremendous efforts to secure the right kind 
of asses for Barbuda. He felt at first there was no point 
in sending any from England (though he did in fact send some 
later) as he thought a better size could be obtained from 
the Spanish settlements, and cheaper too; but he did all 
he could to find suitable animals in other areas. In 1783 
he was busy negotiating with the consul at Algiers to send 
some from there, not less than 13 hands high. In May
1784 he wrote that he had employed someone from the south
112 
of France to send two and in 1784 he persuaded one
friend to send two from Plymouth and another to look in
Ireland. In July that year, another contact had promised
114 to procure two from Savoy, Piedmont, or southern France;
and in December he wrote that he hoped two asses might be 
sent from Geneva and two from Leghorn. He realized that 
he had applied for so many jackasses from so many quarters 
that he was in danger of having too many   but in September
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1785 he had not actually received any. He hoped that he 
would soon hear that two had been bought for him from the 
King of Sardinia's stud   procured from Spain through 
Gibraltar. A good deal of patience was needed to endure 
delays. On 2 January 1786, Sir William wrote to Langford 
Lovell that two stallion asses bought in Geneva and due to 
be sent from there on 26 November had still not arrived in 
England although the longest time given for the journey from 
Geneva to Calais was twenty days. These two did eventu-
1 -I Q
ally reach Barbuda. There was no guarantee either that 
the asses would be prolific. The English consul at Marseilles 
wrote that he was unable to send any from there as Sir
William had insisted on an assurance to this effect, 'which
119 he [the consul] sais No Man of Character will warrant'.
Sir William clearly felt that it was worth his while 
to exert himself in this way. He told Dennis Reynolds that
'a good Stallion Ass is a much more valuable animal at
120 Barbuda than the finest horse I could send you.' Asses
procured from so far afield were not, however, cheap and 
Sir William particularly emphasized that because so much 
had been spent on procuring them they must be treated 
well in Barbuda. He remembered sending out two fine jack- 
asses in 1761 which cost him about £300 and from which he 
did not receive 300s. in return. They were turned loose,
and in consequence one died by fighting and the other by
121 getting stuck in a bog. The instructions he gave for the
care of these animals resembled those he gave for horses. 
On no account were they to be allowed to run wild. Asses,
he said, were very salacious by temperament and would exhaust
122 themselves if not kept in an enclosure. It was most
101
important that they should cover in hand. He realized that 
shortage of fodder meant that all the stock on Barbuda 
could not be kept tame, but he thought some, namely the
stallions and jackasses, should be restrained even if it
123 
cost twice as much to feed them. The fact that he was
prepared to spend so much money on these purchases, he said, 
indicated that he had confidence in the men on Barbuda> but
he continually repeated the instructions on the way he wished
124 the asses to be handled.
The results of his efforts were not encouraging, however. 
Of the jackasses which actually arrived, some were not prolific,
and if they were, great difficulty was found in persuading
125 them to cover larger mares. Sir William counselled
patience and strict adherence to his rules ; he also gave
some practical advice. He suggested a stage should be made
126for the ass to stand on. If the animal showed great
antipathy to mares it should be shown a she-ass first and
127 then blindfolded. In spite of all these suggestions very
few mules were born. Not only was Barbuda not able to supply 
neighbouring islands with mules but supplies had even to be 
bought for the use of Codrington's own estates. In May 1785 
Sir William noted that Langford Lovell had had to buy sixteen 
Irish mules at £47. 10s. Od. (presumably for each one) for 
the use of the estates: 'tis grievous to think Mules can be
bred here and sent out at 9£ freight and with my adjoining
128 Island I cannot supply the market. 1 In 1787 he said he
thought the failure 'was the most positive and undeniable 
proof of the gross mismanagement of that Island and what
seems extraordinary is the difficulty I have had to establish
129 a different sistem.' It is not surprising he felt like
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this as he believed three large asses (such as were on the 
island in 1791) with proper management and sufficient mares 
would produce a large number of mules. He thought that if 
only his instructions had been followed 'the Island would 
have swarmed with Mules by this time 1 .
Dennis Reynolds, on his part, was not prepared to accept 
the blame for the failure to breed sufficient mules. He 
said that the fault was Sir William's because he had not 
sent out enough stallion asses. He said that he had repeat- 
edly urged the breeding of mules instead of horses and had 
asked for large jackasses to be sent. All those on the 
island, he said, with the exception of two old asses, were 
too small to cover the mares 'in any situation'. The 
difficulties Reynolds faced on Barbuda with regard to horse- 
breeding must have applied equally to mules, but he seems to 
have made some effort to comply with Codrington's 
instructions. He had, for example, arranged for a stallion
ass to be accompanied by two slaves when it was released
132from its stable.
There was some measure of success. In 1792 Dennis 
Reynolds told Sir William Codrington that he had twenty-four 
young mules, then four years old, which he was breaking into 
the cart. In addition there were another twenty-four aged 
one to three years, and eleven others, young and old. He
also thought there were about a hundred mares on Barbuda
133 
most of them then in foal by jackasses. This must have
been something of an exaggeration, or some of the foals must 
have died as only fifty-three mules were sold between 1795 
and 1798. From these records it would seem that the largest 
number of mules sold in any one year was thirty. This
103
occurred in 1795 when twenty-four were sold for £1,184.8s.Od. 
and another six were sent to the Codrington estates: but 
even if thirty had been produced each year it is doubtful 
whether Sir William would have considered his mule-rearing 
policy successful.
Although when Christopher (Bethell) Codrington visited 
Barbuda in 1790-1 he was in favour of breeding mules he 
seems to have done little to continue Sir William's policy 
after inheriting the estates in 1792. In the groups of years 
under special consideration there are no records of mules being 
sold after 1795 and few seem to have been sent to the estates 
after 1808. They are barely mentioned in his correspondence 
although he was as interested as his uncle in making Barbuda 
pay. No explanation is given for the dropping of mule- 
breeding but it can be supposed that the expense was con- 
sidered too great in view of the inadequate returns. The 
difficulty of obtaining good jackasses and then of persuading 
them to breed obviously put an end to the idea of Barbuda 
supplying the neighbouring islands with mules, attractive 
though this idea was. Neither horses nor mules proved to be 
profitable but a study of the policy towards both breeds 
shows that Sir William Codrington was a very energetic 
absentee landowner, willing to expend both money and effort 
on a scheme which he thought might be of value.
Cattle
Cattle were kept in large numbers on Barbuda for the whole 
of this period and, unlike the other varieties of livestock 
discussed in this chapter, there seems to have been no doubt 
at any time of their value to the economy. The accounts
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show that this view was right; of the four types of stock 
considered, cattle were the most consistently profitable. 
This was not due to high quality, for there are indications 
that these animals were an inferior breed and little 
seems to have been done to improve them, but demand for 
cattle in the West Indies usually exceeded supply. They 
were needed for their meat and as draught animals, and the 
market increased during the French wars. The owners of 
Barbuda were fortunate in having a pasture island (even if 
the pasture was inadequate) where large numbers of cattle 
could be maintained.
In 1740 there seem to have been about 2,000 head of 
cattle on Barbuda but Colonel King believed a much larger 
number   nearer 5,000  had been kept on the island at the
beginning of the century. He advised Sir William to send
137 
out six bulls each year to improve the breed. At the
appraisement made in 1746, however, there were said to be
138 
only 584 and in 1761, at the end of the lease, 1,093.
139 
Dennis Reynolds calculated there were 1,000 cattle in 1786
and Captain Greville thought there were about 3,000 in
140 1813. As with sheep though, these estimates are very
rough and ready: most of the cattle roamed wild in the woods 
and rounding them all up was virtually impossible.
The value to the economy, however, can be much more 
accurately assessed. In some years when drought affected 
the numbers, or a bad sugar crop prevented Antiguan land- 
owners from making purchases, there was obviously a drop in 
sales, but in general cattle brought in a steady income, 
and also provided the Codrington sugar estates with draught 
cattle. During the first nine years of the Martin and Byam
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lease, 1745-66, £8,161 was made from the sales of cattle,
while horses, sheep, goats, and mules together only made
141 £5,386. General shortages of livestock during the
American War of Independence must be the reason for the 
large amounts made from cattle in two of the four years for 
which figures are available - £5,818. 7s. 4d. in 1780 and 
£2,791. 2s. Od. for nine months in 1781. 142 In the period 
1785-98, sheep usually did better than cattle in the ordin- 
ary sales, but many more cattle than sheep were sent to the 
Codrington sugar plantations and these usually more than 
made up the difference. In 1793, 99 working oxen were sent 
to the estates, valued at £3,485, and in nine of these years 
more than thirty were supplied. Between 1806 and 1814, in 
most years, profits from cattle exceeded those from other 
stock and reached a peak in 1810 when £4,646. 18s. lOd. was 
made from sales and cattle worth £1,645 were sent to the 
Codrington plantations. In the last period, 1825-1834,
sales of cattle continued to be normally higher than those
143 
of other livestock. These larger sales, of course, were
partly accounted for by the fact that cattle were useful 
both as food and as draught animals, while sheep and horses 
served only one purpose and were therefore not always easy 
to sell even when numbers were high; and mules, which were 
always popular purchases, were difficult to raise. Mules 
certainly fetched a higher individual price £40 compared
with £30 for working oxen at the end of the eighteenth
144century  but the numbers of mules sold was in no way com- 
parable to the number of working oxen.
Considering the contribution made by cattle to the 
economy of Barbuda, and the degree of interest shown by Sir
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William Codrington in the breeding of horses and mules, 
comparatively little attention was given by him to the 
rearing of cattle which, apart from a few tame animals, 
roamed wild in the woods. Admittedly, in view of the dif- 
ficulties, it would have been impossible to do anything else, 
but certain disadvantages followed, and these Sir William 
took much more lightly than one might have expected. One of 
the less serious effects was the rather peculiar flavour of
the meat from Barbudan cattle caused by the bushes they had
145 grazed on. Another, and far more serious disadvantage,
was that the animals were difficult to catch and the 
methods adopted to overcome this problem led to other bad 
effects. Usually the cattle could be caught at the drinking 
places, but in the wet season, which from the point of view 
of their fitness for sale was the best time, they could not 
be lured there because water was so readily available 
elsewhere. Bulldogs were used to hunt them on these occasions, 
and if a beast was seen that looked ready for market it had 
to be seized immediately otherwise 'we may not for a Month, 
if the Island is under Water see him again; for the heavy 
underwood and Prickly pears, which are all over the Island,
make it even with the best Dogs impossible almost to take
146 them 1 . In response to a request from Dennis Reynolds,
Sir William sent out dogs for catching the cattle, but he 
warned Reynolds that his method of hunting would make the
animals much more wild. They would be scared of men because
147 they were always being chased by them. Just as serious
though was the fact that the cattle were sometimes so badly
148 damaged by the dogs that they were unfit for sale. The
dogs he sent out seem to have been extremely fierce. He
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himself seems to have thought that true bulldogs, with their 
quality of persistent holding-on, were too ferocious and he
favoured a cross-breedj he pointed out, too, that these
149 dogs were likely to become sheep-killers.
These methods obviously did scare the animals. In 1785, 
in a letter to J.L. Walrond, he commented on the difficulty 
that had been found in getting the cattle into pens 'except 
when Much panickd for Want of Water 1 . He thought the pens 
must have been badly built or the cattle frightened when 
they first went in and suggested that tame animals should 
be fed there and used as a decoy. Sir William would have 
been very critical of the method used by John James. Appar- 
ently it was his custom to go bull-hunting as a form of 
sport and a vivid description of this was given by Captain 
Greville. Two slave selected and separated
a young but full-grown bull from a large herd . . . 
As soon as this was accomplished, the bull generally 
made, at a furious rate, for the thickest parts of 
the wood, followed by myself and motley companions. 
The huntsmen carried long ropes before them, and 
whenever they could get sufficiently near to the 
bull, they skilfully threw them over the animal's 
horns, and not unfrequently seized the creature by 
the tail, and by a sudden peculiar jerk, succeeded 
in turning the bull over. . . . The cattle, when 
wanted for exportation or consumption, are caught 
as above described, and lashed to the horns of 
tame oxen, who never fail, sooner or later, to ,c-, 
conduct them to head-quarters without any assistance.
Once the cattle were caught little seems to have been done 
to prepare them for sale. Sir William felt that the cattle 
should be broken and tamed before they were sent to market   he
had heard them spoken of badly because this had not been
152 done, and Dennis Reynolds himself pointed out how the
animals deteriorated once they had been caught: 'for when 
they are taken in the best Condition they are so exceeding
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wild that they fall away in a few Days attempting to break
153 them, that you would say they are mere Carion 1 . Barbudan
cattle, too, were criticized for lacking stamina and being 
stunted in growth. Sir William felt this was probably due 
to their being put to work before they were fully grown,
and in the case of the males being cut when they were too
154 young. Christopher (Bethell) Codrington calculated, in
1791, that a Barbudan ox could work for five years, when it 
would be fattened (presumably for slaughter) and sold for 
£18 or £19 currency, but in 1809 he doubted whether these 
animals could survive more than one crop season. The 
numbers of draught oxen being sent to the estates would tend 
to support this opinion.
The methods of rearing cattle seem always to have been 
crude but attempts were made to improve conditions. Colonel 
King described avenues which had been cut through the 
bushes, leading to watering places for the cattle. They 
were paved and pitched with stone so that they never became 
boggy. These avenues remained a feature of Barbuda. 
Henri de Ponthieu found them covered with grass and serving
ICO
as pasture for tame cattle by day and for the wild at night.
Providing sufficient watering places was a perennial problem.
159 Samuel Redhead apparently made improvements in this direction
but in times of drought there were always shortages of food. 
This made it very difficult to tame the cattle because if dry 
weather occurred they had to be turned loose to fend for 
themselves. Dennis Reynolds seems, as usual, to have made 
the most improvements. In particular he was responsible for 
making enclosures. Two of these   about 300 acres were reserved 
for making hay; one of about 160 acres was to be used for
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fattening cattle. In 1791, 100 head of wild cattle had been 
put there and 50 of them had been sold in the Antiguan 
market to a butcher. Apparently this made a 'wonderful 
Difference 1 to the flavour of the meat as in these enclosures 
their diet was entirely grass. Two other 'parks' were set 
aside for improving cattle; one was for working oxen and 
the other for breeding cows.
Sir William was clearly ready to supply animals for 
improving the strain of cattle as he was for other stock. 
In 1784 he sent out two bull calves and asked for details
of the sort necessary. He was willing to send out an annual
16? 
supply but was deterred by Reynolds who felt the breed
could be crossed sufficiently with bulls from other islands. 
He had already exchanged bulls with Antiguan stock. He said 
the cattle were very handsome, especially the bulls: and 
he observed that dark-coloured or red cattle did better than 
those with any white on them. In general, however, Sir 
William took much less interest in the breeding of these 
animals than in horses or mules, possible because they nearly 
always sold well. When John James became manager of Barbuda 
in 1805 he found a shortage of breeding stock, so he made a
point of building up these animals and selling off the old
164 
cattle. Judging by the sales this policy must have been
successful.
The actual selling of the cattle was not usually a 
problem until the 1820s although there were sometimes temp- 
orary difficulties, and the owners and managers were always 
eager to find new markets. The wars of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries clearly gave them good oppor- 
tunities for increased sales. During the American War of
110
Independence an arrangement was made to supply the naval 
hospital at English Harbour with meat on a regular basis. 
Six to eight animals a week were sent there   at Is. per 
pound. These cattle were transported live to Antigua and 
slaughtered at the Narrows or at Betty's Hope. The carcases 
were then taken by cart or wagon with a canvas cover to the 
hospital which they had to reach by 8 a.m. The French 
wars provided the opportunity of selling to the navy and 
more cattle were sold in this period than any other. They
were either sold directly to the captains who anchored off
166 
the island  the preferred way as payment was prompt   or
indirectly through a contractor on Antigua. This method 
often led to delays in payment and sometimes to complete 
defaulting and for this reason Sir Bethell insisted that no 
long credits should be given and no credit at all unless to
a man who was likely to be sound. He preferred lowering the
167 price to giving credit. This restriction meant that it
was sometimes difficult for James to find buyers. In 1809 
he told Codrington that at one time working oxen sold well 
'but the sales being now restricted to Cash only, none can 
be disposed of, Antigua is so circumstanced that no Dimin- 
ution of Price will command Money if the same Articles are
168 to be had on Credit'. In April 1813, James wrote that
there was plenty of stock on the island but he was not 
selling because people could not pay. Both James and 
Codrington hoped to make direct arrangements with the armed 
forces   James preferred the army because they would give an 
exact daily figure, Codrington hoped to make an arrangement
with the navy; in fact neither plan seems to have
170 
materialized.
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There were also, of course, the usual sales of cattle 
to local butchers. One of these, who was behind in his pay- 
ments for cattle, explained, in 1813, that ships frequently 
left harbour in a hurry without giving him a voucher for 
the meat he had supplied and this meant he himself could 
not get paid by the navy board. He suffered, too, from the 
low exchange, especially on Barbuda cattle. He described 
how on a typical transaction on a Barbudan bullock weighing 
300 pounds he only made a profit of £1.15s. Od. currency 
and this had to be put towards defraying heavy expenses   a 
large establishment of slaves, rent of his butchering house, 
offices, stores, and so on. Only on his first supply from 
Barbuda, when the exchange was 200 per cent did he not lose 
on the deal. After the war conditions varied. In 1817,
James wrote that he had sold 20 young oxen at £30 each and
172
thought they could sell as many in about a month. In
February 1817 he arranged to sell another 70 but this
success did not continue. In 1823 he described the demand
174 for cattle as 'extremely dull 1 . He hoped that there
would be a good sugar crop so that Antiguan landowners 
would be able to afford working oxen. Beef cattle he was 
having to sell at Is. per pound, where formerly they had 
fetched 2s. 3d. 175
In the years that followed, mismanagement took its toll. 
John James went to live at Clare Hall, Antigua, and after 
his death in 1826 Barbuda was without a manager at all for 
six months. In 1829, Robert Jarritt described the island 
as being generally neglected, with fences, gates, and buildings 
in a dilapidated condition. These years, too, were years 
of drought, when lack of foresight and effort on the part of
112
those in charge meant that fodder was not provided in suf- 
ficient quantities. In October 1829, Jarritt wrote that
178 Barbuda had had good rains and the stock were recovering,
but in April 1831, John Winter described Barbuda as being 
very dry again. He feared they would soon lose all the tame 
stock, if there was no rain, as the only food they had for
them (Guinea corn stalks) was nearly finished. The wild
179 
cattle were appearing to stand it better than the tame.
In July 1832, he reported that the drought was over but the 
stock had been badly affected; he hoped that now that the 
cattle were recovering there would be a good demand for 
working oxen from Antigua, where many had died. He noted 
that the Codrington estates lost fewer stock than any other 
Antiguan plantations 'which speaks a great deal in favor of
1 o r\
the Barbuda cattle 1 .
Sir Bethell Codrington was disappointed in another pro- 
ject which he had hoped might lead to increased sales of 
cattle. In 1811 he bought Guana Island, just off the north- 
east coast of Antigua and near his estates. He hoped that 
this could be used to rear cattle for use on his Antiguan
properties so that Barbudan cattle could be sold to other
181 landowners. Unfortunately it seems that Guana Island
in fact was of no real value. In March 1829 he wrote:
'Guana Island has never given me a guinea; It has I believe
been of much use to Mr. Osborn' (his attorney, but apparently
182 
not acting in the Codrington interests on this matter).
Barbuda certainly continued to supply the family estates with 
cattle throughout this period.
All those concerned with livestock were in agreement 
about the value of rearing cattle and there was usually a
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steady demand. What is noteworthy about their place in the 
economy is the fact that though there were fluctuations in 
sales, in most years they provided a regular income and some- 
times made a really substantial contribution to the profits 
of the island, and this in spite of the fact that rather less 
care was given to them than to the much less rewarding horses 
and mules.
Conclusion
These varieties of farm animals are the ones included in 
the term 'stock 1 in the accounts and for this reason other 
living creatures from which money was made (for example 
turtle) have not been considered in this chapter. Two points 
emerge from studying the livestock. The first is that 
while the Codringtons were absentee landowners they were 
nevertheless extremely active and concerned. Both men, but 
particularly Sir William Codrington, kept as close an eye as 
they could on what was going on. Instructions and suggestions 
were given at great length and tremendous efforts were made 
to send out the type of animals required whether stallions, 
mares, jackasses, sheep, or bulldogs. Neither effort nor 
expense seem to have been spared to supply what was needed. 
The second point of interest is that although Barbuda 
suffered from grave disadvantages as a stock-rearing island, 
profits were usually made, and when there was a knowledge- 
able manager there and the weather was favourable, the 
returns could be substantial. The aims of the landowners 
expressed throughout the period, however, that Barbuda should 
be able to supply all the neighbouring islands and possibly 
some further afield, were not realistic; and the criticisms
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they made of those on Barbuda on this score were sometimes 
unfair. Given the geographical conditions there and the 
frequent occurrence of long droughts the most that could be 
expected was that the needs of their own estates should be 
met and some additional profit made from sales outside. This 
was very largely achieved and the Codringtons were fortunate 
in that they benefited considerably from increased sales 
during the wars at the end of the eighteenth and beginning 
of the nineteenth centuries. Mules and horses provided little 
return in spite of considerable outlay, but sheep and cattle 
brought in a steady income throughout the period. The revenue 
from all livestock, however, exceeded that from all other 
sources except (occasionally) wrecks, as is shown in the 
tables at the end of Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
VARIOUS COMMODITIES
Barbuda's greatest profits came from livestock and wrecks 
but to get an accurate picture of life on the island it is 
necessary to examine also the other activities which pro- 
duced smaller financial benefits. Of these, two   turtle and 
wood are always given separate entries in the accounts and 
they always contributed in some measure to the economy. The 
rest form a miscellaneous collection of commodities which 
varied over the years but included at different times: corn, 
yams, coconuts, lime, leather, salt, and some manufactures 
such as harness-making and boat-building. None of these 
brought in a large income but they are worth study as they 
illustrate the way in which all the men involved were pre- 
pared to try anything which might be financially rewarding, 
providing that (as far as the men on the spot were concerned) 
it did not entail too much effort.
Turtle
It seems sensible to consider turtle first as following most 
naturally after stock. Turtle were valued mainly as a del- 
icacy for the table, and for Europeans in the West Indies 
provided one of their chief gastronomic pleasures. There 
were two varieties in the West Indies, both caught on 
Barbuda   the Green and the Hawksbill. Luffman, writing from
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the West Indies in 1787, commented that the Green was regarded 
as better to eat because it was milder-flavoured, though he 
himself thought that soup made from the Hawksbill was as
good. These were caught primarily for their shellj he
2 described that of the Green as 'useless 1 .
There seems always to have been a market for turtle in 
Antigua, and Benjamin King suggested in 1740 that more should 
be made of it. He thought turtling was being neglected on 
Barbuda as it brought in barely £40 per year and he advocated 
a much more vigorous policy. He suggested that the eggs of 
the turtle should be searched for and removed to the sand 
in Goat Island Flash where they would hatch and could be 
reared in the water there. This elementary idea of a 
turtle fishery was not carried any further, though it is
interesting to note that Sir Bethell Codrington, too, had
4
a similar idea some seventy years later. In fact, success- 
ful rearing of turtle is only today being developed and 
there is no sign that either Benjamin King or Sir Bethell 
Codrington had any idea of the curious life-cycle of the 
turtle which makes rearing them a difficult task. The 
normal practice in Barbuda was to catch the turtles as they 
came on shore to lay their eggs. Occasionally some effort 
was made to catch them at sea, with nets, but it was obviously 
easier to let them land and then overturn them. At some 
stage a crawl seems to have been made in which to pen them
until they were required, but by 1837 it was described by
7 Liggins as a disgrace, 'only a remnant of what it once was 1 .
The regular breeding habits of the turtle made them 
easy to catch but their bulk made handling difficult and 
may have been a reason why this source of profit was not
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developed more. A fully grown Green turtle might be four
o
feet in length and weigh 100 pounds or so. They were not 
easy to carry to the boats which would transport them to 
Antigua. In 1837 Liggins described the difficulties involved 
in moving six from the crawl to the shipping place. There 
was only one cart on the island and this had broken down. 
Liggins suggested that six men should carry them, but no 
labourers were available as it was 'the People's own Day 1 . 
A wheelbarrow was proposed but a suitable one could not be
found and eventually the turtles had to be put in two bags
9
and slung across the back of a horse. Even when due allow- 
ance is made for temporary misfortunes, the island does not 
seem to have been provided with a transport system which 
could cope with a large number of these bulky, heavy 
creatures -, and the accounts confirm the view that while a 
certain modest sum was made from their sale a larger amount 
might well have been obtained had a more vigorous policy 
been pursued.
The most profitable period seems to have been when the 
island was leased to Martin and Byam. Between 1746 and 1755 
over £2,300 was made from turtle, the best year being 1749 
when the total was £513. Under the various Codrington 
managements, however, sales at no time reached £300 and 
usually averaged much less: £120 a year in the period 
1785-98, £151 between 1806 and 1815, £62 between 1825 and 
1830, and £105 between 1830 and 1834. Il
These figures were regarded as disappointing. Henri 
de Ponthieu had led Sir William to believe that £1,000 a
year might be made from turtle alone and he implied that
12 profits were being made by managers for their own advantage.
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In 1787 Reynolds commented that sales were not as valuable 
as formerly. He attributed this to the interlopers from 
Antigua who frequently came in the turtling season and were 
'very troublesome 1 . Later, both Sir Bethell Codrington
and Liggins seem to have felt that the proprietor was receiv-
14 ing less than he ought to have done. It is indeed more
than possible that some turtle were sold from Barbuda and 
the profits pocketed by the manager or his assistants, or 
that they were given as presents to attorneys or friends in 
Antigua. No check could be kept on the actual number caught. 
It was doubtless true, too, that trespassers also depleted 
the supply: but such activities could not have been on a 
large scale or they would have attracted the notice of other 
acquaintances of the Codringtons in Antigua; and the facil- 
ities were not available for a big illegal trade. It is more 
probable that the manager of Barbuda was not prepared to give 
the time or attention to turtle-catching which would have 
been necessary for a larger profit to have been made.
In comparison with the comments Sir William made on 
perquisites in general he took comparatively little notice 
of suspected illegal deals in turtle. Sir Bethell was con- 
cerned, however, that he did not receive any credit for 
sales of shell. In January 1809 he wrote to James, asking 
why he was only paid ninepence per pound for the meat from 
a Hawksbill and nothing for the shell. Looking through old 
accounts he had found 'repeated Credit 1 for the sales of 
shells sent home. There is certainly a reference to turtle 
shell in 1762 when over £82 was made from it, but there is 
no further entry. Accounts, however, are only available 
intermittently between 1756 and 1785 and it may well be that
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Codrington was referring to years for which there is no 
record now. In February 1809 Codrington wrote that he had 
been making inquiries in London and had been told that shell 
could be sold for a guinea to a guinea and a half per pound. 
James replied, in April, that as few turtle yielded more 
than two to three pounds of shell he had not thought of it 
'as an article likely to increase the revenue of the Island 1 . 
As disposing of the meat and collecting the money was 'trouble- 
some 1 the shell had generally been considered the only profit 
and in some cases, he said, the butcher had been the loser.
He presumed that the shell previously mentioned in the
18 
accounts must have been from" those which died on the passage.
This seems a singularly feeble argument. If this were true 
it meant, as Codrington pointed out, that he got ninepence 
per pound for the meat while the butcher got considerably 
more for the shell. Moreover after this complaint James regu- 
larly sent the shell home. The amount realized for it is 
not given in the Barbudan accounts but it is occasionally 
mentioned in letters. In April 1810 he despatched 435 pieces 
of shell weighing about seventy pounds altogether and this 
realized £53. 5s. Od.  rather less than Codrington had hoped.
Nevertheless in 1811, 1814, and 1815 tortoise-shell was
19 
shipped to England and fetched, on average, £51 each time.
There are various references in the correspondence to this
commodity being sent home up to 1819, and sometimes after
., . 20 this.
This seems to be an instance where an energetic resident 
proprietor would have made more effort than a manager. Even
though Sir Bethell Codrington hoped to encourage James by
21 giving him a percentage of the sales this was probably not
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a sufficiently high incentive for work which was probably 
regarded as 'troublesome'-to use James 1 own word. Without 
too much effort a small regular income could be made from 
turtle and no manager seems to have felt it worth his while 
to develop this source of revenue any further.
Wood
^^^ ^^~  
Wood was another article listed annually in the accounts. 
Usually this heading meant firewood, sold in cords to Antiguan 
residents or to the navy and, less frequently, the army; but 
it did also sometimes include timbers. When sold for other 
purposes, and used for articles on the island, it was listed 
separately in the accounts. It was less productive than 
firewood but was a regular part of the Barbudan economy.
Firewood was obtained on Barbuda from two sources   from 
trees and bushes on the island, and from the wrecks which 
occurred only too frequently off the coasts. The island 
was covered with small trees described by King as not being
above twelve inches square and twelve feet long, most of
22them only suitable for burning. The other source   wrecks  
provided a constant supply only involving collection by the
23 
slaves. Sometimes they were paid for this and when the
island was being well managed wood from the shore and rocks
must have been gathered regularly. At the end of the period,
however, it was being neglected. Robert Jarritt, in 1829,
described the coasts as littered with wood from wrecks which
24 he valued at £1,000 sterling.
It did not, however, always find a ready market. 
Benjamin King was, in this as in other matters, over-optimistic 
about what could be made. He calculated that a thousand cords
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might be sold annually-at 28 shillings per cord. This
total, though, was rarely reached and then only in war-time. 
Between 1746 and 1755, under the management of Martin and
Byam, the annual sales of wood, rents, and sundry credits
2 6
averaged only £142; but of course, they may well have
cut down wood and used it on their estates in Antigua. 
Samuel Redhead, in 1764, complained that it was not selling
because of competition from the ceded islands acquired by
27 Britain in 1763, and Richard Clarke said he could not
always sell it to the navy because they 'wooded 1 to the
2 8 
south. Sales were boosted, however, when there was war in
the West Indies, and Barbuda did particularly well in this 
respect during the American War of Independence. In 1780 
sales from wood totalled £1,761. 13s. Od., in 1781
£1,567. 10s. Od. (with one quarter's accounts missing), and
29 in 1782 £4,039. Is. Od. Profits from this commodity never
again reached such a high figure. Between 1785 and 1798 
the annual average was £330, from 1806 to 1814 it was £238, 
from 1825 to 1830 £50, and from 1830 to 1834 £233. 3 ° Never- 
theless, considering the small outlay involved and the 
regularity of the income wood must be accounted a useful 
part of the economy.
In addition to firewood and timbers, Barbuda also sup- 
plied the Antiguan market and the Codrington estates with 
other forms of wood. Materials for house-building shingles, 
rafters, joists; for tools   ladle and skimmer handles, poles 
for harpoons, hoe-sticks; and for carts   fellies, spoke-wood, 
yokes, shafts, wheels were all supplied at different times. 
In addition Barbuda also supplied red oak staves, pitch-pine 
timbers, and wood for hoops, boats, and wheelbarrows. These
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articles never brought in a large income but their number 
and variety is surprising when one considers the lack of 
good trees on the island.
The small trees on Barbuda were mostly loblollies, not 
useful for much because of their spongy quality. Reynolds 
said that good timber trees were scarce because Colonel 
Martin had cut most of them down, but judging from the large 
amounts made from wood during the American War it seems
likely that others must have been felled while Reynolds him-
32
self was manager. There were still some useful trees,
though, in the late 1780s. White Cedars, Sweetwood, and 
Lignum Vitae were suitable for cart wheel fellies and spokes. 
White Cedars could also be used for boat timbers as could 
a type of Box found at Palmeto Point; and Cinnamon trees 
provided rafters for the houses of the slaves. Wrecks some- 
times provided timber which could be used for boat building. 
In considering the value of wood to the economy one has 
to bear in mind not only the money that was made but what 
was saved by the proprietors because they did not have to 
buy wood elsewhere. Boats made from salvaged timbers represent 
a considerable benefit. The Antiguan estates, too, were 
supplied with building materials and equipment, as well as 
firewood when necessary, and though for accounting purposes 
the estates were debited for these it meant in fact a val- 
uable saving of expense. It also meant that a source of
supply was available when others closed or became too costly
34 
as happened during the American war. Barbuda in this as in
other ways was an invaluable complement to a sugar estate.
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Crops
Most people who visited Barbuda were in agreement that it 
was not an easy island on which to grow crops. The soil 
was very shallow, providing no depth for roots, and because 
of the porous nature of the rocks underneath it could not 
retain moisture. Much of the land, too, which might have 
been used for cultivation was covered with brushwood and 
trees. This meant that successful growing of crops would 
be more than usually uncertain and would require consider- 
able effort.
Before 1779 there is little evidence of cultivation on 
any scale. The best land on Barbuda, with the greatest
depth of soil, was used for the slaves' own grounds where
36 they grew some of their provisions; but little seems to
have been done by the managers to produce crops for sale. 
In 1742, the manager, Punter, writing to Lady Codrington, 
said he had cut eighty acres out of the woods and planted
cotton and corn, but although the cotton crop had promised
37 
well it had been destroyed by worm. Martin and Byam
38 
appear to have concentrated almost entirely on stock-rearing.
In Samuel Redhead's time Guinea grass and hay were grown for 
the livestock and some Indian provisions were planted, but 
when the Governor of the Leeward Islands visited Barbuda in
1777 he described it as being 'almost in a State of Nature 1 ,
39 
very little of the island being cultivated.
The departure of Samuel Redhead for England in 1779 and 
the appointment of Dennis Reynolds made changes possible. 
There were various problems. Not only had crops to be dis- 
covered which would grow on Barbuda, but land had to be
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cleared and, if the crops were successful, markets for them 
had to be found. In 1780 Richard Clarke said the manager 
had been given orders to try out everything, and listed yams,
eddas, Guinea corn, Indian corn, Barbuda beans, pigeon peas,
40 
and cassada as provisions he would experiment with. Sir
William was very anxious for trials to be made and he encour- 
aged Henri de Ponthieu, an amateur botanist., to visit and 
inspect the island and make suggestions as to what might be 
grown there. This visit took place about 1783 and de
Ponthieu recommended that plants from which drugs were made
41 
should be tried. Attempts to follow his suggestions were
42 
not very successful and Sir William himself thought coffee
43 
might be worth a trial. Reynolds, however, concentrated
on growing food crops and cotton for which he cleared such 
a large area that in 1786 he was able to tell Sir William 
that he had five hundred acres 'of my clearing 1 under 
cultivation: of this, three hundred were enclosed pasture,
forty were planted with Guinea grass, ten with yams, eighty
44 
with Guinea corn, and seventy with cotton. By 1790, 138
45 
acres were given to cotton and 139 to provisions.
Cotton had not been easy to grow. In 1784 Sir William 
had commented to Lovell that cotton did not seem to be a 
suitable crop as in two successive years it had been badly
damaged by worms; but when he wrote to Reynolds he encour-
46 
aged him to go on trying. Subsequent years clearly
brought sufficient success for cotton to be continued though 
caterpillars remained a nuisance and cleaning the cotton for 
market was not easy. Reynolds was forced to employ the whole 
gang for a number of days on this using laborious hand-gins. 47 
The results, however, justified the experiment as the
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following figures show:
48 Amounts made from cotton
1786-7
1787-8
1788-9
1789-90
1790-1
1791-2
1794
1795
1796
£398
£215
£558
£384
£840
£588
£983
£1,021
£486
7s.
11s.
13s.
19s.
12s.
8s.
9s.
4s.
10s.
6d
Od
6d
6d
Od
Od
6d
Od
Od
Despite these results, however, Sir William was not entirely
satisfied. During these years surplus Guinea corn was sent
49 to the estates and to the market in Antigua and he wondered
whether more corn should be grown. In 1790, therefore, when 
Christopher (Bethell) Codrington was sent out to Antigua, he 
gave him specific instructions to find out whether corn or 
cotton or both should be grown on Barbuda. His view was 
unequivocal. He believed it would be better for Barbuda to 
concentrate on breeding cattle and growing provisions for 
slaves rather than cotton or any of the Indian spices sug- 
gested by Henri de Ponthieu. He outlined a plan he had 
formulated which would treat the Antiguan estates and Barbuda 
as one unit for feeding all the Codrington work force. 
According to this the estates would grow sufficient yams to 
feed the Barbudan as well as their own slaves for five months 
of the year, Barbuda would then grow another crop to supply 
all the estates for another five months and the final two 
months' supply would come from England (beans). He was 
also in favour of increasing the fodder crops on Barbuda   
Guinea grass and opuntia.
This plan, on paper, seems sensible, but in reality 
would not have been easy to put into effect. It would have 
been difficult for the sugar estates to grow sufficient yams,
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and conditions on Barbuda made all crop growing uncertain of 
success. Nevertheless there seems to have been some change 
of policy in this direction after Christopher (Bethell) 
Codrington inherited the estates from his uncle in 1792. 
Although cotton did well in 1794 and 1795 it ceased to appear 
in the accounts after 1796 (until it was re-introduced in 
1810), and some attempt seems to have been made to grow more 
guinea-corn. In 1794 a very large amount   worth 
£1,122. 16s. Od. - went to the estates, and in 1795 £762. 
13s. Od. was made in the same way. After that date, however, 
amounts made from guinea-corn dropped to a more normal level
  an average of about £290 was made between 1796 and 1798
. , . 54 inclusive.
John James, who was manager from 1804 to 1826, appar- 
ently thought that corn was the only crop that could be grown
with any prospect of success and in unfavourable years he
55
expected that would fail too. He seems to have had a dif- 
ficult time. In 1809, in a letter 'defending his policies 
to Sir Bethell, who was clearly dissatisfied with the results 
of his work, James said that he had concentrated on corn for 
two years and had made nothing because of lack of rain when 
it was needed. In 1808 he had planted three hundred acres 
but the weather became so dry that little came to ear. He 
did not reap more than seven hundred bushels and he had 
hoped for six times that amount. He had been busy clearing 
seventy acres of woodland for part of the next year's crop 
but clearly did not expect success.
The evidence suggests that in this case James was not 
simply making excuses. In the Codrington correspondence 
all the writers from the West Indies complain about the
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uncertainty of the weather and conditions on Barbuda itself 
must lend substance to their complaints. Those who knew 
Barbuda all spoke of the shallow soil which dried out quickly 
and made anything growing there particularly vulnerable 
during years of drought, which occurred only too frequently. 
Crops which looked promising were often spoilt through lack 
of rain. In addition the island was so flat it suffered 
particularly from the effects of gales: not only were crops 
levelled but they were sometimes ruined by flooding from the
r o
sea. These difficulties were vividly described by James
and are confirmed by others. John Winter, writing to Sir
v 
Bethell in 1831, said: 'Barbuda is a very uncertain Island
we cannot calculate on having more than one good year out of 
three 1 , 59
The accounts available do for the most part confirm 
their story. There is no consistency of result. In some 
years large amounts were made from crops and in others 
nothing at all, as in the first four years of James's 
administration. In 1810, however, corn worth £1,527 was sent 
to the estates, in 1812 sales realized £405, in 1813   
£1,074 7s. 6d. and in 1817-£497. 10s. Od. 60 The same vari- 
ability is shown for yam production. Very few seem to have 
been sold before 1810. The following table shows the amount 
made from yams between 1810 and 1816.
Open Market Estates
1810 - £420 Os. Od.
1811 £540 Os. Od.
1812 £9 Os. Od. £92 14s. Od.
1813 £32 16s. Od. £414 2s. Od. 
1814 and 1815
1816 £88 8s. 6d. 1816-17 £1,379 5s. Od.
The next period for which consecutive accounts are available   
1825-34-was less successful. Not only were no profits made
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6 2 
from sales of food crops between 1825 and 1830 but not
enough was produced to feed the slaves themselves, and
fi Q 
supplies had to be bought on several occasions. One of
the reasons for this failure was probably inefficient 
management, but the weather was also to blame. In 1827 
it was too wet for some crops and there were drought con- 
ditions in 1829. There were improvements in 1830, however. 
In 1830-1, £995. 19s. Id. was made from corn and potatoes,
and in 1832, £1,122. 18s. 5d. from corn. Smaller profits
66 
came from these crops and yams in the next two years.
There is no doubt that Sir Bethell Codrington approved
of growing food crops on Barbuda. He informed James in 1809
that those products 'which would insure Sustenance in such
times, as these, as well as lessen the Invoices from this
fi 7 
Country would be the most desirable kind of Profit. '
Nevertheless he was equally keen that other crops which 
might make a suitable financial return should be tried, and 
cotton was an obvious choice. Codrington told James in 1809
that in the past he had received two to three hundred bales
6 8 
of cotton but recently none at all. In February of that
year he made his point even more plainly. 'I have often 
mention*d Cotton to you, but I get no Cotton nor no answerj 
a great deal used to come from Barbuda, and a Bale of Cotton 
now is as valuable as a Hhd of Sugar.'
In response to these promptings, in 1810 James planted 
cotton in 150 acres. The weather affected its growth in 
some years but between 1812 and 1819 James was able to 
send reasonable quantities to England. In 1812, fifteen 
bales were shipped home and fetched £282. 4s. Od. In 1813 
twenty-two bales were despatched worth £540. 10s. Od. and in
137
721815 another twenty-two realized £409. 11s. Od. From
1816 to 1819 there is no record of the amounts made but
73 
cotton was still being sent to England. In 1826, Winter,
74 the new manager of Barbuda, was instructed to grow cotton
and thirty-two acres were planted in 1828, but there is 
no indication of what, if anything, was achieved.
From the point of view of cash returns, crop-growing 
was not entirely successful. The inadequacies of Barbudan 
soil and the problems presented by the weather created 
serious difficulties. Even so it was sensible to try. In 
many years the results were sufficiently good for Barbuda 
itself, and the family estates, to be supplied and in some 
years surplus stocks could be sold on the open market. Some- 
times cotton provided a useful additional sum. In general, 
however, crops did not provide a very regular or secure 
income. Obviously their success depended on the skill of 
the manager, but they were more adversely affected by the 
geography of the island and weather conditions than were 
other forms of revenue.
Miscellaneous
Into this category come a variety of commodities which either 
made small regular contributions to the economy or were tried 
for a few years and then abandoned, of these, salt, lime, 
and leather were the most important. Colonel King, as usual, 
had suggestions to make. He wrote, in 1740, that there were 
a great number of salt flashes on Barbuda from which 'great 
quantities of Salt might be annually made which sells here
from 12d to 3s p. Bushell, but this is absolutely neglected
7fi and never more produced than serves the Island. 1 There is
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no evidence to suggest that this idea was developed at all 
until the late eighteenth century and then not to any remark- 
able extent. In the accounts throughout the period 1785-1814, 
salt was sold frequently, but in small quantities to the 
estates, and less frequently on the general market. Occas- 
ionally more was made from it, for example between 1795 and 
1798 it realized over £334, in 1807 £55. 7s. Od., in 1809 
£61, and in 1814 £124. Is. 9d. 77
Lime was more consistently developed. Lime-burning 
seems to have been practised on Barbuda before 1740 and the
ever-optimistic Colonel King thought at least three thousand
7 8 hogsheads might be disposed of each year. It was certainly
developed by Martin and Byam who made over £2,846 from it
between 1746 and 1755, three years being particularly
79 profitable. Despite this, Samuel Redhead informed Sir
William Codrington in 1762 that Colonel Martin had tried
80 lime and found it yielded no profit. There is no sign
that lime-burning was developed until the departure of 
Redhead but after that it appears regularly in the accounts, 
usually sold in small amounts to the estates. In 1781, 8% 
hogsheads, worth £252, were sent to the Cotton New Work (one 
of the Codrington sugar estates), but in general the amounts 
were much smaller. It seems not to have been sold on the 
general market except between 1795 and 1798, again in 1819
(when it raised over £303), and then regularly between 1827
81 
and 1834. At that time the manager, Winter, developed it
as a useful way of employing the slaves when the weather was
82 
unfavourable for crops. The amounts were slight, the best
years being between 1827 and 1830 when lime worth over £360 
was sent to the estates and 1832 when £108 was made. 83 It
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seems to have been used for building rather than for tempering
in the Boiling House though Sir William queried whether it
84 
might not be suitable for this.
The third of these products, leather, comes regularly 
in the accounts after 1785, in a variety of forms. Hides of 
cattle, deer, and goats were tanned and sold usually in small 
amounts in Antigua and to their own estates. Richard Clarke 
sent home two dozen dried hides and three dozen salted ones 
in 1781 and informed Sir William that the salted ones 'are 
put up in proper manner, which I came at the knowledge of 
preparing lately 1 and he believed the price made the
o r
experiment worthwhile. Usually only small amounts were 
sold, but in 1811, 1815, and 1816 it raised between £110 
and £126 each year, the naval yard being one of the 
customers. Amounts dropped in the 1820s but picked up again 
in the last four years of the period when an annual average 
of £74 was made. At the end of the eighteenth century quite 
a lively trade was established in leather goods, particularly
saddles, harnesses, and other equipment for horses and mules>
8fi these activities, too, seem to have declined in the 1820s.
Apart from these three commodities, money was made at 
different times from a varied assortment of goods. In the
1780s, for example, coconuts were being sold, in the 1830s
87 
old copper and brass. The Codringtons themselves offered
endless ideas as to what might be attempted in addition to 
these. Sir Bethell suggested that salted fish, wildfowl,
deer, and the growing of cinquefoil and nopal bushes might
88be profitable. Whatever other faults they may have posses- 
sed as landowners neither Sir William nor his nephew can be 
accused of lack of interest in Barbuda, and their interest
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was not merely academic. Bags of seed were despatched for
89 
experiment together with copious instructions; and
acquaintances who had lived in the West Indies were questioned
90 for ideas. None of the articles in this chapter, taken
separately, could be regarded as particularly important to 
the economy, but together they represent a considerable 
contribution. In addition they made possible the development 
of a wide variety of skills among the slaves.
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Chapter 5
TRANSPORT, BOAT-BUILDING, AND SALVAGE
It was impossible for Barbuda to be useful to the Codrington 
sugar estates in Antigua or to produce goods and livestock 
for sale there unless regular transport was available between 
the two islands. When Benjamin King was attorney from 1740 
he seems himself to have provided this. He kept a separate 
Shallop Account in which he noted: I have not chd a third 
part of what was done for the Estates by my Shallop as I 
want no more than her wear and Tare. 1 In fact, however,
his charges to and from Barbuda were very high (£14 for a
2 journey to the island with a letter) and, when Barbuda came
under Codrington control again, after the lease to Martin 
and Byam had ended in 1761, a sloop was bought especially 
for the use of the island. From this time Barbuda was 
supplied with transport on a regular basis, usually two or 
three vessels, either sloops or schooners. Sometimes these 
were bought for the island, but quite often they were built 
by Barbudan slaves. Boat-building seems to have been started 
in the 1760s or 1770s 5 and from 1783 shipwrights or ships' 
carpenters were regularly included as a category in the 
slave lists.
The vessels were in such constant use that repairs and 
replacements were frequently needed. A typical situation 
was reported by James in 1809 when he described the two
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Barbudan craft then being used for carrying sugars from the 
Antiguan estates to the port for loading, as unseaworthy. 
The schooner had had to be hauled up at Barbuda and 'nearly 
new built'; the other had also needed a great many repairs 
which had, however, been less costly. In 1817 he had to 
report that two island vessels had been lost while he was 
in England and the third was very old and only kept going
o
through the repairs that had been effected.
His plans for building a new one are interesting because 
they indicate how it was done. A ship-builder from Antigua 
had offered to superintend the work   but he wanted £165 ster- 
ling for doing so. James instead offered him £100 currency
to lay the frame and was prepared to do it himself if his
9 proposal was turned down. By September 1818 the vessel was
in 'a great state of forwardness 1 , built of the very best 
materials. With the bolts obtained from wrecks he had been 
able to 'copper fasten her 1 entirely and he trusted Codrington 
would not object to her being 'bottom-coppered 1 . It was an 
extra expense at first, but worth it in the West Indies as 
otherwise a boat had to 'hove down 1 at least every six weeks. 
He needed canvas for the sails and hoped it would be sent 
out as quickly as possible as he wanted her to be ready for 
carrying sugars at the beginning of the next sugar crop. As 
she was about sixty tons he calculated she would be able to 
carry thirty-two hogsheads of sugar. The schooner was 
named Bethel and was in use until the late 1820s.
Another vessel, the sloop Lady Codrington was con- 
structed on Barbuda and in 1827 Daniel Beazor, one of the
slaves, was given a barrel of flour worth £4. 5s. 6d. for
12 building her. Unfortunately she was sunk off the west
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i 13 
coast of Barbuda in 1831 when unloading goods from a wreck.
Between 1827 and 1831, in fact, three vessels were lost,
valued altogether at about £2,500. Another, of fifty tons,
14 
was being built in 1833.
In addition to these sloops and schooners there were 
also smaller boats used to transport goods from one part of 
the island to another, or to take light loads to Antigua. 
These craft were able to enter the lagoon. James claimed 
to have started this practice and the first boat was built 
entirely from wreck materials in 1809. By 1833, there 
were eight such boats of varying sizes, the largest being 
able to carry about ten tons.
All these vessels were manned by Barbudan slaves who 
were provided with uniforms and paid a regular weekly 
allowance. All the expenses incurred are listed separately 
in the ledgers (though sometimes with petty cash) and the 
annual outlay averaged E150-E200 per year between 1785 and 
1798, and E350-E500 between 1806 to 1814. In the later
years expenses varied considerably from year to year but
18 the annual average was about £540.
If providing and maintaining these vessels was sometimes 
expensive, however, their value to the island cannot be 
over-estimated. They were used to transport all the supplies 
from Antigua, to carry all Barbudan produce (including live- 
stock) to the estates and to market, and to ferry passengers 
and mail to and from Barbuda. If a third party had had to 
be paid at the rate charged by Colonel King the island would 
have had to pay £728 per year for one journey per week by 
one boat. Not only did the boats save money for the island, 
though. They also earned money by transporting sugar, grown
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on the Codrington estates, from Parham harbour on the north 
coast of Antigua to the ocean-going vessels operating from 
St. John's. This work brought in a regular annual sum. The 
amount varied with the size of the crop   it might be as
little as £30 or as much as £500. The annual average was
19 about £200. In addition to all this regular work the
vessels played a vital part in the rescue of people and goods 
from the many wrecks which occurred off the Barbudan coasts. 
It is therefore hard to over-estimate the importance of all 
these small craft in the life and work of the people on 
Barbuda.
Salvage
One of the most controversial sources of revenue from Barbuda 
was the money made from salvage awards. There were not in 
fact more shipwrecks off Barbuda's coasts than elsewhere in 
the Caribbean. St. Kitts, for example, had a great many more 
Robert E. Marx, although he does not give a comprehensive 
list for Barbuda in his book on shipwrecks between 1492 and
1825,names thirty-five ships wrecked there, but over three
20 hundred and fifty for the same period off St. Kitts.
Nevertheless there is no doubt that a great many ships 
foundered near the island and the Codringtons benefited very 
considerably. Wrecks were caused by the fact that Barbuda 
was low-lying (described by Governor Burt in 1778 as being
scarcely visible at six leagues) and entirely surrounded by
21 
rocks and shoals, many submerged. The usual route to the
British West Indies and to Carolina and Virginia in the
? olate eighteenth century lay just to the north of Barbuda 
and in bad weather, particularly during the hurricane season
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it was only too possible for ships to be blown onto the
rocks surrounding the island. So many wrecks occurred that
23 
visitors commented on the timber scattered on the shore
and after H.M.S. Woolwich was wrecked on rocks to the north 
of Barbuda in 1813 the reef was nicknamed 'Sir Bethel 
Codrington's coppermine'. Robert Jarritt in one of his 
gloomy letters about the state of Barbuda dismissed a scheme 
for making access easier from the lagoon to the sea with a 
practical appreciation of Barbuda's hazards. 'Our only 
Security and profit 1 he said 'is the Rocks we want no safe 
Harbours or anchoring places. 1
Wrecks, in fact, were a useful source of income in a 
variety of ways. In the royal grant to the Codringtons in 
1684 the lessees were granted 'all fflotsam and Jetsam and
Wrecks which shall be found within the low water marke of
2 6the said Island'. Though this was not repeated in sub- 
sequent grants, it was not excluded either, and the manager 
of Barbuda acted as though he were entitled to collect the 
wood and other articles found on the beaches. Actually 
there was no-one on Barbuda who could have challenged the 
Codrington claim to these articles so that they had the 
right de facto if not de jure. This applied to wrecks as 
much as to flotsam and jetsam a point made by the Governor 
of the Leeward Islands when he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle 
about Barbuda in 1854. 'Although there is, I believe, no 
claim on the part of the Lessee to a chartered right to 
Wrecks   still, in as much as there can be no salvors offering 
but who are under his control, and all requisite appliances
are his property, the practical result is the same as if he
27 
shall be possessed of one. 1
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The money made from salvage contributed notably to the
economy. In the four periods considered in other chapters
2 8 the amount made from this source was:
1746-55 £4,944 18s. 6d. Antiguan currency*
1785-98 £4,092 15s. 2^d.
1806-14 £19,464 7s. Hd.
1825-34 £26,610 4s. 8|d.
* This is the figure given in the document, but individual 
wrecks when added came to a few pence more.
The very much larger sums made in the last two periods are 
due not so much to an increase in the number of wrecks, as 
to very much bigger awards made for individual vessels, 
which reflects the increase in the size and capacity of 
merchant ships at this time. From the brig William Park,
for example, the Codringtons were awarded salvage of 37^
99 per cent in 1829 which came to £11,704. 10s. Od. and
two others, the brig Ann and the brig Jean brought in together 
£10,613. 18s. 5^d. in 1834. 30 For the first period there is 
no account of individual wrecks, but in the second, 1785-98,
the largest amount awarded was £1,225. 19s. 8d. on the
31Jeannette in 1795. These awards did not, of course, pro- 
vide a regular income. In some years little might be made
from salvage, in others a great deal. On 1 May 1797, William
32 Collins wrote that there had been no wrecks since 1794;
in 1808 there was only one wreck which brought £293. 10s. Od. 
to the Codringtons, but in 1809 there were three awards 
totalling £5,143. 2s. 2^d. 33 The tables at the end of this 
chapter show the annual totals from this source.
These awards, though obviously satisfactory to the 
Codringtons, aroused hostility in others. Normally Barbuda 
was of no interest to the outside world, but when ships of 
foreign nationality were wrecked there, or when British
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naval vessels got into difficulties, the government's 
attention might be drawn to the island. Before 1780 there 
was good reason to query what happened on Barbuda when a 
wreck occurred.
Samuel Redhead's behaviour seems to have been exceed- 
ingly high-handed. According to testimonies taken in the 
case of the Sancta Rita, a Spanish ship wrecked on Barbuda
O A
in 1776, it was claimed by Redhead that he had 'an absol- 
ute right as Acting Attorney of the said Sir William 
Codrington and as the Manager and director of the said 
Island of Barbuda to settle the Salvage of all Goods Saved 
out of Wrecks without the Controul of any person or persons
or any Court or Courts of Admiralty or any other Court or
35 Courts of Law or Equity whatsoever 1 . Redhead's behaviour
on this occasion led to protests being made from Spain to 
Britain, and Lord Germain wrote to the Governor of the 
Leeward Islands (W.M. Burt) who promised the fullest inquiry. 
This was not, Burt noted, the first time that such complaints 
had been made.
The master of the Sancta Rita complained that Redhead 
had not brought the salvaged goods to Antigua and delivered 
them to the Custom House officers as he should have done 
according to law. Nor would Redhead allow that the Court 
of Vice-Admiralty at Antigua had jurisdiction over wrecks 
on Barbuda. The master and his supporters maintained that 
if the wrecked goods had been brought to Antigua the Court 
of Vice-Admiralty would have had such jurisdiction. If 
Redhead had behaved in either of these ways, his opponents 
said, a fair proportion of the salvage award would have been 
granted to the Codringtons. They claimed that Redhead was
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refusing to allow the goods to be brought to Antigua not 
only 'with a view to making himself the Arbitrary Judge of
the Salvage' but because he intended to sell the goods and
37 was in fact doing so.
Redhead defended himself vigorously. He blamed the 
master for not giving as much help at the wreck as he could 
and for not controlling his crew. He had heard that the 
master had deliberately lost the ship because it was fully 
insured. Redhead himself had certainly not prevented an 
inventory being made, as the master stated, and had in fact 
made an agreement with the master to take half the wrecked 
goods in return for the help that was given. Seventy slaves
had been used in the rescue, with four white men, and boats
38 and carts belonging to the island.
Redhead's arguments are not convincing. Even if he 
could prove that the Acts in question did not apply to 
Barbuda there was no doubt that the methods they prescribed
were, in his opponents' words 'so Just that any Reasonable
39 man would conform thereto* . If the goods had been taken
to Antigua in the first instance the efforts of the Barbudan 
people would have been taken into account when salvage was 
awarded, and a great deal of ill feeling would have been 
prevented. The Antiguan authorities and the Governor were 
doubtless irritated personally by Redhead's independent 
attitude, but they were also aware that such unreasonable 
behaviour did not help relations with other countries. There 
was also concern that customs dues which should have been 
paid were being avoided by Redhead's tactics. 40
The Governor was certainly intent on extending his 
authority over Barbuda after his visit to the island in
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November 1777. He noted that 'For want of white Inhabitants
a Wanton Arbitrary Salvage is Established; not Content with
41 
a Part, the Whole is frequently plundered by the Negroes'.
He recommended that an exact plan should be made of the
island by the official surveyor, and that in the meantime,
42 Barbuda should be brought under the jurisdiction of Antigua.
The Secretary of State was occupied with other weightier
43 
matters and made no decision about this, but another wreck
gave the Governor the opportunity to take action himself.
On 16 August 1779, a Dutch ship carrying a French cargo
44 from Bordeaux to St. Eustatius was wrecked off Barbuda.
On this occasion there was the additional problem for the 
authorities of deciding whether the ship was Dutch or French 
as treatment would differ accordingly. France was already 
at war with England in 1779, Holland not until 1780. The 
Governor decided to take immediate action. He asked the 
Solicitor-General whether it would not be proper to appoint 
a Collector of Customs to take the vessel and cargo into his 
custody (for the benefit of the owners if she were Dutch) 
and to tell His Majesty's Receiver of the Droits of Admiralty 
in case she should be French property 'to Secure that which 
belonged to His Majesty who has hitherto never received his 
Customs on any Goods there Stranded, nor has he received His 
Droits of Admiralty 1 . The Solicitor-General approved of 
these ideas and the Governor therefore issued a commission
to the Collector of St. John's appointing him Collector of
45 Customs in Barbuda.
This wreck was important, too, because it again brought
to public notice the custom on Barbuda for the manager to
insist on the captain of a ship agreeing to give half the
354
value of the wreck and cargo to the salvors, if help were
46 to be supplied. Usually a court awarded only a third
47 
unless a great deal of trouble had been taken. To this
48 
extent the criticism that 'a Wanton, Arbitrary Salvage 1
was established there is a valid one.
These two cases caused so much trouble, expense, and 
adverse publicity that suggestions for modifying the policy 
were put to Sir William by the town agent and two of the 
attorneys. In October 1780, the town agent, J. Lindsay wrote:
You will not I hope think me impertinent when I 
recommend to you to abolish that inhuman practice 
that is observ'd in Barbuda when Vessels are un- 
fortunately stranded there. ... A man in 
Distress will consent to anything for his Relief, 
particularly in an Island where the only person 
that can relieve him is the Man that offers him 
Terms. ... I would advise your giving peremp- 
tory Orders that, every Assistance and Relief should 
be afforded, and let your Salvage etc be determined 
by Magistrates. Depend upon it you will always 
receive an ample and satisfactory Salvage.49
Sir William apparently agreed that disputes about wrecks 
should be avoided and an arrangement was made by Langford 
Lovell for salvage awards to be determined by three Antiguan 
Justices of the Peace, the amount awarded to be based on 
the extent of the services rendered on Barbuda. This 
method, of course, did not apply to cases affecting English 
naval ships or ships of enemy countries which were dealt with 
by the Admiralty or the Courts of Vice-Admiralty.
On the whole the new arrangements seem to have worked 
reasonably well though in the period 1825-34 a return to 
more direct methods seems to have been tried. There must 
have been some objection to this because in 1826 the advice 
of Dr. Stephen Lushington was sought by John Osborn, one of 
the attorneys, on the question of the extent of the rights
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of the Codringtons in these matters. In March 1827 an 
American lumber vessel was wrecked on Barbuda: 'As soon 
as the Collector heard of the wreck he ordered over vessels 
to assist, which is much against your Interest   this was 
not the case formerly and I know not now why he should
%
interfere. I have not as yet received Mr. Lushington's
52 
opinion, when I do I shall act up to it. 1 Lushington's
opinion was that Osborn had been exceeding his legal rights 
in certain respects but there seems to have been no 
immediate return to a more moderate method of behaviour. 
In 1829 Robert Jarritt wrote that salvage had been awarded
without reference to the magistrates 'where it is not likely
54
we should have fared so well 1 . Despite these more high- 
handed methods, however, there were apparently no more legal
55 disputes about wrecks until after 1834.
It must be acknowledged that those who were wrecked on 
Barbuda were unfortunate in certain respects. As the whole 
island was owned by one man there could be no alternative 
form of aid and no independent witnesses. Another hazard, 
but one not necessarily peculiar to Barbuda, was the prob- 
able pilfering of the cargo. In the case of the Sancta Rita 
Redhead was accused of allowing the slaves to take goods 
so that he could reclaim them later. In his defence Redhead 
denied this, and said steps had been taken to prevent steal- 
ing, but he believed the crew had given things to the
56 
slaves. Clearly conditions on the island at the time of
a wreck would give opportunities of pilfering to all those 
there. It would have been impossible to check all the goods 
and the practice was probably, to a certain extent, ignored, 
in order to encourage the slaves to help. They usually got
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no other form of 'reward' however well they behaved, though
57 the manager received a percentage of the award. There is
no doubt either that, though those on Barbuda may be 
criticized for their behaviour, this did not mean that those 
wrecked were without blame. Though the evidence available 
mostly comes from Codrington sources, and is therefore 
prejudiced in favour of their efforts, it does seem to show 
that in a number of cases the captains had no control over 
their crews who also took their chance of pilfering whatever 
they could. The crew of the Sancta Rita were said to have
divided the goods they found on the shore amongst
5 8 themselves. When the sea-chests of the crew of the
Young David were examined they were all found to contain
59 stolen goods from the cargo.
Some captains, too, showed a considerable lack of 
seamanship. Redhead complained that the Sancta Rita lost 
her cargo because the captain and crew abandoned the ship 
and the main damage was done after that, when the brig 
parted her cable and drifted a further mile and a half west- 
wards onto rocks near Cocoa Point. If someone had remained
on board, he maintained, it might have been possible to
6 0 anchor her and the cargo could have been saved. John
James, in 1817, criticized the captain of a French brig 
wrecked on the south-east end of the island whose crew had 
immediately abandoned her, without taking in a single sail, 
which had led to much greater damage than was necessary.
More to the credit of those on Barbuda, however, was 
the effort actually put into the saving of lives and cargoes 
Wrecks usually occurred when the weather was bad and the sea 
dangerous, and frequently at considerable distances from the
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shore so that those involved in rescue put their lives at 
risk. On one occasion, in 1817, the island boats had to
be carried three miles overland and then rowed several miles
6 o
to the wreck. In 1821 James had to attend a wreck about
seven miles from the land and for a week they had had to
fi "3
sleep in the island boats. The best description of the 
typical difficulties they encountered was written by James 
in 1813:
and I must do the Men the justice to say they have 
behaved remarkably well at these Wrecks the last 
Vessel tho at the distance of a Mile and half from 
the shore and in a heavy Sea was discharged in three 
days two of which it was with difficulty we could 
keep the boats a long side, she was Nearly full of 
Water when we got to her, and is now gone to pieces. 
The Lumber Vessel was two Miles from the shore, and 
so surrounded with Rocks that whenever the Sea 
became rougher than usual we were obliged to quit 
her, we had ten Miles to Row Morning and Evening to 
and from them. If the Woolwich is abandoned tho it 
will be a very troublesome business from the size 
of the Cables etc as they must be carried about 4 
Miles in Boats yet one third of their Value will 
pay well. 64
Sometimes lives were lost. One slave was drowned at the
6 S Sancta Rita, four lost their lives when giving help to a
brig in 1805. Time spent on wrecks, too, meant that most
of the male work-force were diverted from their normal tasks
6 7 for days and sometimes weeks at a time.
Attendance on vessels in distress did not automatically 
lead to big salvage awards. Sometimes ships were refloated. 
It is difficult to determine how far help was offered under 
these circumstances, though in the case of H.M. Brig
Opossum the captain acknowledged the help he had received
6 8 from the overseer and thirty picked men. Sometimes, too,
the crews saved the cargo themselves and in these cases the 
only help needed was transport to Antigua. Ocasionally 
passengers and crews had to remain on Barbuda for some time.
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The crew of the Woolwich, for example, were there for 
several months from September to December 1813. These 
expenses were usually recouped later. The Admiralty 
paid for the food consumed by the crew of the Woolwich, 
and any other expenses involved in claiming salvage 
were normally more than adequately covered by the awards. 
To outsiders the wreck awards, particularly between 
1825 and 1834, look like easy money and the question whether 
deliberate wrecking from the shore was practised has to be 
considered. The Governor of the Leeward Islands in 1854 
certainly seemed to think that the 'remoteness of the Island,
and its character as a dangerous locality minister occasion-
72 ally ... to fraudulent purposes'. Professor Douglas Hall
suggests that this meant that vessels were lured onto the
73 coasts by those living on Barbuda. The Governor's actual
words must surely, however, be interpreted differently.
The 'fraudulent purposes' he referred to were directed
74 towards 'the intentional casting away of vessels'. This
could only mean that the wrecking was done not by those on 
Barbuda but by those on board the vessels who intended to 
claim insurance illegally. This fits in much more with the 
evidence. Although many complaints are made by those saved 
about their treatment, there are no suggestions of deliberate 
wrecking though there are hints that ships may have been 
deliberately wrecked by a captain. This was said to have
been suggested by the sailors from the Sancta Rita, for
75 instance. Moreover, deliberate wrecking by those on
Barbuda would not have been worth while unless there had 
been an easier outlet for the sale of goods than was provided 
by the neighbouring islands. As with other cases of malpractice
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on Barbuda what was done was usually small in scale because 
a large-scale illicit enterprise would have involved the 
expenditure of too much energy and might have upset the 
status quo which it suited everyone to preserve. It is 
interesting to note, too, that the complaints made against 
the Barbudans after Emancipation were the same as those 
made before  that they more or less forced a captain to 
accept help on their terms. Deliberate wrecking was never 
even suggested.
There is no evidence at all to suggest that the 
Codringtons themselves encouraged sharp practice of any sort 
though they made sure that they received full compensation
for any work done on Barbuda in connection with wrecked
77 
vessels. Both proprietors recognized the value to the
economy of the salvage awards, but Sir Bethell Codrington, 
in particular, saw that they were not to be relied on as
a regular source of income. In 1829 he described one as 'a
78 
windfall that has come very seasonably 1 . He also insisted
that his employees should regard them in the same way. 
Writing to Samuel Martin in 1810 he commented: 'Barbuda as 
you justly notice will shew a handsome Balance this year; 
But we must look at the Balance divested of the chance profits 
arising from Wrecks; Barbuda is I believe materially improv- 
ing, but Wrecks must be consider'd as Casualties and should 
be put out of view in looking at the annual Profits. 1 He
insisted that the profits from wrecks should be listed sep-
80 
arately and the amounts remitted to him and not used to
offset other debts. In this attitude he was undoubtedly 
right. Only in the period 1825-1834 did the total profits 
from wrecks exceed those from livestock though the view
160
expressed by the Governor of the Leewards in 1848 was that
'The Salvage on Wrecks is Supposed to have formerly constit-
81 
uted the chief source of profit 1 . There were three
exceptional years in the other periods (1749-50, 1809, and 
1813) when the amount made from wrecks exceeded that from 
stock but usually it was well below, as the table below show, 
However attractive wrecks might seem to outsiders, to the 
Codringtons the real value of Barbuda was to be assessed on 
its normal, not its chance, activities.
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I* 1? 1 ?. 5 ^^_sj^w_the_prof_its_rriade from Barbuda in the periods 1746-55, 1785-98, 1806-14, and 1&25-34
As far as possible these tables also include total income and total expenditure, and tne amounts
made from stock and wrecks. All figures are in Antiguan currency.
1746-55
No figures are available for expenditure in this period so it is not known whether or not the 
total represents a clear profit. The accounts cover twelve months beginning 1 June.
1746-7
1747-8
1748-9
1749-50
1750-1
1751-2
1752-3
1753-4
1754-5
Total annual amount 
made from Barbuda
£
717.
3,926.
2,862.
3,793.
2,295.
3,271.
3,088.
1,134.
s
7.
5.
2.
14.
5.
11.
4.
1.
d
n
4^
3
6*
6
3
0
1
3,864. 11. 9
Stock
I s d
380. 10. 7
1,797. 18.11
1,573. 9. 7
1,188. 11. 0
920. 10. 7
2,184. 11.10
2,191. 17. 9
715. 7. 0
2,612. 14. 5
Wrecks
1
1
£
24.
,529.
404.
,411.
46.
4.
537.
21.
s
10.
11.
4.
14.
9.
17.
12.
10.
d
0*
2*
8*
0
0
9
6
3
964. 9. 7
1785-98
Total Income Total Expenditure Total Profit
1785-6
1786-7
1787-8
1788-9
1789-90
1790-1
1791-2
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
£ s d
8,292. 8.11
7,565. 5. 8^
7,782. 5. 4
5,403. 4. 9\
4,748.12. 9^
4,462. 2. 3*
6,455.14. 4fc
8,247. 7.10
6,304.16. 2
10.220.13. 9i
5,480. 8. 8%
3,940. 7. 0
12,729. 2. 0^
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
£
,797.
,330.
,196.
,862.
,260.
,567.
,872.
,302.
,967.
,131.
,113.
,768.
,678.
s
3.
17-
14.
8.
13.
6.
0.
14.
6.
12.
11.
9.
6.
d
4*
8i
3*
2*
4*
a
0*
7*
iH
2|
7
5|
0
Income from 
Stock
6
6
5
3
3
2
3
6
4
9
3
2
10
£
,495.
,234.
,585.
,540.
,487.
,894.
,583.
.944.
,337.
,089.
,366.
,171.
,050.
s
5.
8.
11.
16.
19.
16.
14.
13.
9.
1.
17.
17.
16.
d
6*
0*
0*
7
5
2
3*
2*
2*
6^
1%
6i
0*5
5,
5,
5,
4,
2,
2,
5,
7,
3,
5,
3,
2,
10,
£
463.
718.
724.
079.
057.
596.
431.
315.
186.
558.
647.
686.
166'.
s
7.
6.
10.
9.
3.
0.
1.
13.
16.
9.
2.
14.
9.
d
0
0
8
6
9
1
5
10
3
7
9
9
6
Income from 
Wrecks
£ 
122.
846.
68.
88.
88.
108.
s d
0. 51
17. 9i
9. 2
18.10
8. 6
4. 0
1,861. 1. 1\
200. 3. 0
708. 11.10
1806-14
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
9,928. 3.
4,858.10.
6,037. 8.
9,222. 3. 
13,035. 9.
8,749.16.
6,635. 6. 
10,156. 0.
5,096. 5.
4
6
7
8
6
2k
5*
8
1,073.
1,202.
1,415.
1,045.
1,178.
1,488.
1,662.
1,672.
1,695.
2.
4.
11.
15.
0.
2.
6.
9.
3.
lh
3
9*
5
1\
\\\
1U
4|
3
8
3
4
8
11
7
4
8
3
,855
,656 ,
, 621.
,176
,857
,261
,973
,483
,401
.
.
.
.
.
.
0
6 .
8*
3
16. 9£
8
8
13
0
11
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
3
10^
3^
6
3i
5^
5,
3,
4,
3,
7,
6,
6,
3,
4,
441.
648.
300.
663.
860.
487.
367.
531.
542.
11.
2.
15.
11.
3.
19.
15.
15.
15.
8
0
4
9
10
1
5
6
1
4,128.
657.
293.
5,143.
2,624.
1,714.
6.
9. 
10.
2,
9, 
14,
1
3
0
2\
6
0
4,902. 16. 1
N.B. From 1785 to 1792 the accounts run from 1 July to 30 June, after that they cover a 
complete calendar year from 1 January.
1826-34
For this period it has not been possible to summarize the accounts in the same way as in the 
previous two because the accounting was altogether more erratic at this time. The figures, 
for example, are not necessarily done on a yearly basis and the goods sent to the estates 
are not always listed. For this reason the totals for the years 1826-30 have been added to- 
gether, and omitted for 1831. From 1832 to 1834 it is possible again to give annual totals.
Total Income Total Expenditure Total Profit
1 Aug.1826-
19 Oct.
1830 27,203. 18. 2\
1832 4,176. 5. 3
1833 '3,188. 8. 6fe
1834 12,661. 6. 5
12,092.
787.
1,026.
2,128.
5. 0
5. 1
5. 8
2.11
£ s d
15,111. 13. 2\
3,389. 0. 2
2,162. 2.10fc
10,533. 3. 6
Income from 
Stock
11,864. 3. 9
2,228. 18. 2
1,978. 15. 4
849. 1. 3
Income from 
Wrecks
15,658.
191.
10,761.
0. 5 
2. 5*
References (All GRO)
D1610 E16
D1610 A6/1-13
D1610 A56/4
D1610 A56/14-18
D1610 A56/20-22
Approximate rates of exchange
In the 1780s, £175 currency was worth £100 sterling. 
£200 currency was worth £100 sterling.
In the early 19th century (to 1834),
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SLAVERY ON BARBUDA
Slaves on Barbuda did not lead the life of plantation slaves 
They were not tied to the culture of a single crop and in 
many respects their lives were much less harsh and more -, 
varied than those of their contemporaries on sugar estates. 
It is interesting to discover the consequences of this less 
exhausting regime. The most obvious result was that the 
population lived longer and was more stable, and this in 
turn led to a natural increase. In the next chapter (6) 
the social background of the slaves on Barbuda will be des- 
cribed, and this will be followed by a more detailed look at 
the population and the reasons for its increase there, 
in contrast to most other islands in the Caribbean where 
numbers could only be maintained by extensive purchases 
(Chapter 7). The Codrington reaction to this growth in 
the population will be considered in Chapter 8.
Chapter 6
THE SLAVE SOCIETY ON BARBUDA
I General Social Background
Codrington Village, the only settlement of any size on 
Barbuda, is situated near the lagoon, on its eastern shore. 
The principal building was the castle which was erected by 
John Codrington before 1688 and rebuilt by Sir William
Codrington (I) after French attacks in the early eighteenth
2
century. Although intended primarily as a fortress it was
used principally for stores and as a residence for some of 
the managers and for less important visitors. It must have 
been very uncomfortable as the lower rooms where they lived,
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were damp. Henri de Ponthieu recommended that some better 
rooms should be built on the platform of the castle from which 
point they would have a good view of what was happening in 
the village. Not all the managers chose to live there. 
Redhead built himself a house elsewhere, and James lived for 
some of the time nearby in a 'large barn-like looking house 1 .
o
By 1813 the castle appeared 'dilapidated 1 and Liggins des-
9 
cribed it in 1837 as 'little better than a Ruin 1 . Near the
castle were the buildings associated with the work of the 
island   stables, tan house, coach-house, turtle-crawl, and 
the workshops of the various craftsmen.
Most of the slaves lived in the village. There is no 
detailed description of their houses, but they were built of 
local wood and thatched with sedge from the sandbank and 
Palmeto Point. Inside they must have been similar to one 
at Betty's Hope visited by Lady Georgiana Codrington in 1843. 
This was small, perhaps eight feet by six, with a floor of 
beaten earth and containing a bed, a chest of drawers, a 
sideboard with crockery and glass, a table, and two or three 
chairs. Most slave quarters seem to have been larger than
this, however, usually having two rooms, one used as a
12kitchen and living room, the other as a bedroom. A sug- 
gestion was made to Sir William that good behaviour by 
senior slaves might be rewarded, by building them better
houses, but he rejected this idea because they would have had
13 to be regularly maintained. Periodically hurricanes damaged
them but there was no shortage of building materials and the
occupants could be accommodated at the castle while repairs
14 
were being effected. Water came from a spring near their
houses and from another in the castle which they were allowed 
to use.
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The quality of the houses was not usually commented on 
by visitors, but in 1837 Liggins wrote about them very crit- 
ically noting that he found them inferior to the (former) slaves' 
dwellings on the Codrington estates in Antigua. Many of 
them were unthatched and out of the entire number he could 
only find two in a good condition and a third approaching 
completion. Liggins, however, was visiting Barbuda after 
a period of some disturbance and while his remarks may have 
been accurate for that time, one cannot conclude that the 
housing was always inferior. A few slaves lived in other 
parts of the island on the Highlands tending flocks, or on
the coast acting as watchmen, and their houses were built
18 
of wood and thatched, like those at the main settlement.
The houses, like those of most slaves, had gardens in
which poultry and pigs were reared and some foodstuffs
19grown but their main grounds were sited in different areas
of cleared woodland. One of these areas adjoined the vil- 
lage but two others were some distance away beyond the
enclosures which Reynolds said lay half a mile to the east
20
of the castle. He claimed that the grounds had been devel- 
oped there because the soil was the 'Richest and best' in
21 the island. It is not possible to be certain about the
exact extent of each man's holding but the acreage was not
22 limited. In 1824 James maintained that some Barbudans
had ten or eleven acres, others had much less. On these
grounds the slaves, as in other islands, were expected to
25 grow provisions for themselves, but while elsewhere it
was usual to give them time (for example, alternate Saturdays) 
to do this, on Barbuda this seems not to have been the prac- 
tice until the late eighteenth century. In 1779 Lindsay
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recommended to Sir William that the slaves should be allowed
one day a week for the cultivation of their own grounds and
2 6 
this suggestion was adopted. A schedule of work for the
slaves for three months in 1797 shows that all hands were
27 
employed in their own grounds on Sundays. In the 1820s,
Saturday afternoons were used for this purpose and apparently
Wednesday afternoons too, and Sunday must presumably have
2 8been a free day. There was, of course, no guarantee that
the slaves would work in their grounds on these days and there
29 
were complaints that in fact they often did not do so.
Although in theory the slaves were expected to grow 
sufficient to feed themselves, in fact they often had to be 
provided with food. The weather problems which affected 
the island's main crops also affected the growth of their 
ground provisions. In 1764 Samuel Redhead wrote that the 
weather had been so severe that the slaves could not raise 
any crops for themselves and food had to be bought for them. 
He noted that 'it has ever been the case there 1 and it 
continued to be the case throughout this period. Yams,
eddoes, and potatoes were usually grown and when these failed
32they were fed on American corn or beans from England.
This was the staple diet of slaves throughout the Caribbean,
with the addition of salted herrings which provided a little
33 protein.
On Barbuda, however, the slaves also had more fresh food 
and larger quantities of protein, because fish and meat were 
available to them. The fish were caught in the lagoon and 
the sea. By the 1820s it seems to have been established that 
all Barbudans could fish when they wanted to, but this had 
not always been the case. In the eighteenth century the
173
privilege seems to have been reserved for the head slaves 
until in 1779 Lindsay wrote to Sir William suggesting that 
this practice should be altered and any fish caught should 
be generally distributed. In addition they had fresh meat 
from their own pigs and poultry, and sometimes they were
allowed wild hog and goat meat. At Christmas they were
37 
often given mess pork and flour. These commodities were
all officially sanctioned: but slaves on Barbuda also had 
plenty of opportunity to poach sheep and cattle and this 
was their common practice at all times. If caught they were 
severely punished, but they seem never to have been deterred
and the authorities could find no effective means of stopping
 50 
them. In 1831 Jarritt wrote ruefully to Sir Bethell:
'Barbuda negroes are said not to answer in this island 
[Antigua]; and the reason is obvious, in Barbuda they ramble 
through the Woods, all hours of the Night, taking anything
that comes in their Way, either Deer, Sheep or Cattle, as
39 
required 1 . However much of a nuisance this was to those
in authority, the practice must have had a good effect on the 
physique of the slaves. Visitors to the island commented on 
their unusually healthy appearance and Jarritt noted: 
'They are the strongest, halest People you ever saw, and yet 
they would make you believe they were half starved 1 .
Clothing, of course, was provided of the same quantity 
and quality for the Barbudan slaves as for those on the family 
estates on Antigua. Supplies for all the Codrington plant- 
ations were sent from England and then despatched to the 
different concerns. By 1824 adults were receiving six 
yards of oznaburgs, four yards of blankets, and one cap. 
Boys, girls, and infants were given smaller amounts. These
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allowances were not always sent on time. In 1818, for
example, James complained that the slaves had had no clothing
44 
since 1815, and in 1821 none since 1818. The sailors had
45 
a special uniform and occasionally presents of clothes
46 
were made to the senior ones. Presumably Barbudan slaves
purchased extra clothing when they could, as other slaves 
did, with the money they made.
The usual way for slaves to acquire money to spend was 
by selling surplus crops and stock from their own grounds 
and gardens. Although there were years when insufficient 
food was grown to feed their families, there were other years 
when the crops were so good that some were available for 
sale. When this happened it was sent to market in Antigua in 
the island's boats, along with poultry, pigs, fish, guinea- 
fowl, and turkeys, either belonging to or caught by the
47 
slaves. The amounts that could be made by them in this
way were not inconsiderable. Winter informed Sir Bethell 
in January 1833 that since the previous April he himself had 
paid them £121. 15s. 3d. for poultry and hogs, and he could 
vouch for the fact that they had opportunities to sell double 
that amount in St. John's and to vessels that came to 
Barbuda for the purpose of buying stock. He believed that
were 'their stock to be valued from within it would amount
48 to upwards of three thousand dollars'. The sums that
could be made obviously varied according to the weather but 
the management did make it possible for any produce available 
to be sold. The island's boats went frequently to Antigua, 
usually two*or three times a week in the early 1830s, and 
room was made on them for the produce the slaves wanted to 
sell. 49
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There were other ways, too, in which slaves were able 
to earn money. The sailors, for working at night or on 
Sundays, were paid an extra allowance; and the grooms 
were treated in the same way when they accompanied animals 
to Antigua. Occasionally some special activity was
rewarded   as in the case of Old Benny who, in 1787, was
52 paid 8s 3d. for killing a hundred cats.
The fact that there were no shops on Barbuda did not 
make money valueless to the slaves but it is difficult to 
be certain how it was spent. At the end of the eighteenth 
century Reynolds was said to be dealing in rum with them 
and probably other managers did the same or sold them (with- 
out permission) stock which belonged to the island. Possibly 
when Barbudans visited Antigua to see the doctor or to buy
necessities for their trade they also made purchases on
54 behalf of family or friends.
There is little evidence from Barbuda of slaves pur- 
chasing their freedom. This was probably because there was 
no paid employment available and if they wished to remain on 
the island they had to stay as slaves. In 1833 one of the 
daughters of the slave doctor could have had her freedom 
purchased by a prospective husband, but both her parents 
pleaded with Winter not to let her be manumitted, as she
could be provided for better on Barbuda as a slave than as
55 
a free wife, presumably on Antigua. By the 1830s Sir Bethell
would probably have been glad to manumit any slaves who wanted 
to purchase their freedom, but the attitude of the proprietor 
was different in the eighteenth century. In 1773 it was sug- 
gested that Jack Punter, a Mulatto slave who worked as a 
shoe-maker, might be manumitted. Redhead advised against it,
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however, because 'he is a very good Fellow and very useful 
to you at present 1 . He felt that Punter, although ruptured, 
might live for some time if treated fairly and with some 
indulgence. He concluded: 'I am convinced it will be more 
for his Interest and Satisfaction to continue as he is than 
to have his Freedom 1 . Jack Punter is not listed in 1783 
but it seems likely that Joe Punter, aged ten in 1783, was
CO
his son and he became a collar and shoe-maker. There was
also a Harry Punter, an infant in 1766 and eventually one
59 
of the principal sailors, who may have been an elder son.
It seems likely therefore that Jack Punter remained on the 
island with them until his death.
It was easier for slaves on Antigua to consider pur- 
chasing their freedom than for those on Barbuda to do so as 
on Antigua there were opportunities of earning a living 
which were not available on Barbuda. There were other ways 
too in which Barbudans were less fortunate than their con- 
temporaries on other islands. The Codringtons made little 
effort either to educate them or to provide for their re- 
ligious instruction, though this had been done for some time 
by certain owners on other islands. The Codrington estates 
on Antigua, in fact, were remarked on as being the only 
estates to exclude the Wesleyan missionaries (though the 
slaves there had apparently been converted to Christianity 
by them) and to have neither chapels nor schools. That 
being the case in Antigua, it is not surprising that little 
was done in this way for Barbudan slaves. There was a 
chapel though. Apparently a large,thatched building had been 
fitted up as one (presumably at Codrington in the 1820s) 
and services were being held there in 1837. 62 Catechists
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had been sent to Barbuda in the 1820s, by the Bishop of 
Barbados, to instruct the children and teach the catechism 
to the slaves, but they were not allowed to remain on the 
island for long. By 1831 three catechists in turn had been 
dismissed, the third because he wanted to marry one of the 
slaves if her freedom could be procured. By the time 
Liggins visited the island in 1837 two more had been rejected,
apparently because it was felt they were encouraging rebel-
64 lious attitudes through their contacts in Antigua. Some
progress must have been made by these missionaries, however, 
because in 1837 Liggins noted that about 130 Barbudans
attended a service held in the chapel, conducted by the
65 
manager.
There is no record of any education being provided for 
the children, but some could read and write by the time of 
emancipation. In 1833 Winter wrote to Sir Bethell about 
the family of Cephas, the doctor. He had fourteen children
all of whom (except the youngest) could read, and two or
6 fi three could write. Possibly the catechists had taught some
children, but there seems to have been no formal schooling.
All the official social activities of the slaves were 
centred at Codrington Village, where the overseers and 
managers usually lived too. Members of the Codrington family 
who stayed on Barbuda, however, and their most distinguished 
guests were probably accommodated in a large house at the 
Highlands. This was less easy of access but the additional 
height made it healthier and provided views, so it was a 
likely site for a residence of better quality.
Highland House is marked on the sketch-maps of Barbuda 
from the 1780s but the actual date of its construction is
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uncertain. It seems most likely that it was built for Sir 
William Codrington (I). In 1720 he wrote of his desire to 
end his days at the Highlands and his instructions to plant
exotic fruits and an orange orchard at Barbuda must have
6 8 
referred to this site. Its construction in the 1720s or
1730s would fit in with Reynolds's statement in 1787 that
one of the outhouses adjoining Highland House had been put
69 
up by Mr. Byam as bedrooms. Byam, who died on Barbuda
70 in 1755, probably lived in this house.
Whatever the exact date of its construction it was 
clearly intended as a gentleman's residence. Dr. D. Watters, 
who has recently been conducting archaeological investigations 
there,has unearthed examples of porcelain and overglaze
handpainted creamware   which might be expected from a house
71 
occupied by wealthy persons. Sir Bethell certainly seems
72 to have stayed there as a young man in 1790-1 and possibly
73 friends like Mr. Woodley ('our Quondam Governor 1 ) would
have been accommodated there. At other times the outhouses
were used for sick slaves especially when there was an
74 
epidemic. Unfortunately by 1837 it had become little better
than a ruin causing Liggins to lament 'that Stone Walls, 
calculated to stand for Ages yet unborn, should be found in 
a most delightfully Healthy situation, and without a Window   
Door-or particle of a Roof.
II Work of the Slaves on Barbuda
The slaves on Barbuda were not tied to the rigorous discipline
7fi imposed by the sugar industry and although the work may have
been hard for some there seems to have been variety even for 
those labouring in the fields. Well over half the
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working population were employed in the fields. 
As on the sugar estates the agricultural labourers on 
Barbuda were divided into three gangs. Unfortunately the 
first two slave lists which give names of field workers, 
those for 1766 and 1783, do not say which slaves were in 
which gang, and only three of the later lists, those for 1805, 
1814, and 1817 give this information. In all three of the 
later lists the first gang had more members than the other 
two together, and in each of those years more than twice the 
number of women to men. The second gang was more evenly 
divided between the sexes and consisted of boys and girls 
aged 14 to 8 in 1805, and 18 to 12 in 1814 and 1817. The 
grass gang contained boys and girls aged 11 to 5 in 1805, 
14 to 8 in 1814, and 14 to 9 in 1817. Age does not seem to 
have been the only factor determining work in a particular 
group, as there were children of 12 in the second gangs when 
older children were still in the grass gangs. Similarly 
some children described as unfit in 1814 and 1817 were older 
than some of those working. The oldest person in the first 
gang in all three years was Hannah, aged 63 in 1805. In 
this year there must have been a shortage of labour, as much 
younger children were involved then than in the other two.
As there was a variety of crops and occupations on the 
island there was no fixed pattern of work for the labourers. 
Fortunately it is possible to reconstruct precisely the 
routine of the first two gangs in 1797 as a document of that
year lists the tasks performed by them in February, March,
78 
and April, and this must have been a reasonably typical
pattern.
In February, three quarters of the great gang's time
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was spent in the fields but the work was varied and included 
weeding, taking in and tying corn, threshing, making ricks, 
and preparing land for corn. In addition, on different days 
they went fishing, raised stones for the masons, drove sheep 
and took the sloop out of the lagoon. In March about half 
the working days were spent at tasks in the fields, the 
rest of the time in driving sheep, repairing and making 
fences, cutting wood, filling a lime kiln, fishing, cutting 
wattles, and raising stones. In April rather more than half 
the time was spent in the fields, mainly weeding (five con- 
secutive days) or making holes for planting corn or yams; 
the remainder was given to raising stones, repairing fences, 
and cutting and cording wood. The women did not always have 
the same work: for example, when the men were raising stones 
the women had lighter tasks.
The second gang usually had a less physically demanding 
programme. They helped the first gang to gather and tie corn, 
but at other times they worked separately. Husking and 
winnowing corn was one of their main field activities but they 
did a variety of other tasks for the island's craftsmen. In 
April only seven days went on field work. Another seven were 
spent attending the masons with sand, three days were given 
to helping at the tan pits, and another three to carrying 
lime from the kiln.
While the first two gangs did the hard physical work, 
the grass gang and old people performed a variety of easier 
tasks   drawing water for stock at the different pens, taking
care of the tame cattle, watching the provision plantations,
7 Q picking cotton and carrying grass for the stable.
Although the actual tasks must have varied from month
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to month and from one year to another, the pattern of many 
activities illustrated here must have been continuous through- 
out the year. Whenever there was a wreck, of course, all the 
adult men were expected to help; and in the turtle-catching
season certain men were drafted to help the regular
80 turtlers.
The work of the first gang must have been physically 
demanding because not only was it frequently hard in itself 
but it often involved a long walk to the site. In March 
1797, for example, they had work to do both at the Highlands
(the opposite side of the island from .their homes) and at Coco
81 Point, several miles to the south-east of Codrington.
Dennis Reynolds pointed out that when the slaves had to col- 
lect firewood for Antigua, they had first to travel to the
place where it was to be cut and then they had to cart the
82 
wood to the landing stage. Reynolds felt that the island
needed more workers to cope with the many different tasks 
and he stressed this in a letter to Sir William in 1786: 
'such an extensive Island as this is where there is so much
work to be done on difft parts must be very laborius to a
8 "3 
small Gang of Negroes such as I have here now 1 . Probably
this was true at that time and up to about 1810, but after
this date the rise in the population seems to have led to
84 there being too little work for the slaves. All the same,
even when there was a shortage of labour, the slaves involved 
in agricultural work on Barbuda probably had better con- 
ditions than their contemporaries on the sugar estates. They 
were also probably less effectively supervised: there were 
rarely more than three white men on the island who had many 
different groups to look after.
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The agricultural labourers on Barbuda, however, had few 
advantages. There was an elite among the slaves and at the 
top of the hierarchy were the drivers of the great gang   men 
who were responsible for keeping the labourers at work and 
maintaining discipline. There were usually two. In 1766 these
positions were held by Benny and Scipio, valued respectively
Q C
at £165 and £90 at the appraisement in 1761. The next list 
names the drivers as Dickson, a Mustee, and Phill Bear, a
black slave, both described as good men (though in Dickson's
8fi case, the trust put in him by Reynolds was misplaced).
These two men, along with two hunters, were allocated one 
slave woman to do their washing and another to prepare their 
food. In 1805 there were three drivers, Uness, Johnny 
Beazor, and Bernard all in their forties. After this date 
it is difficult to be sure whether they acted as drivers or 
as hunters. In 1814 they are listed with three others under 
the heading 'Drivers and Hunters' and in 1817 Johnny Beazor 
and Bernard come under the general category (with two others) 
'Head Men and Rangers'. In the subsequent uncategorized 
slave lists they continue at the top of the lists until their 
deaths-Bernard before 1828 and Johnny Beazor before 1832. 
Thus from at least 1805 there was considerable continuity at 
the top and these trusted slaves, like most of the others, 
were of Barbudan stock. Johnny Beazor was listed as an 
infant on the island in 1756 and was a sein-knitter before 
he became a driver. Uness may have been the Tom Uness listed 
as a boy in 1761; he certainly was a stable-boy in 1783, 
described then as a Negro aged about thirty, 'a remarkable 
Oliver man for breaking in wild horses'. Bernard seems to 
have been a member of the great gang in 1783.
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The hunters were, until 1817, at the same level in the 
hierarchy as the drivers. From 1766 to 1814 they were a 
clearly distinguished category; after that date they were 
listed first with the drivers and then in 1817 with the 
gunners. As Barbuda was mainly a stock-rearing island the 
hunters were important people and trustworthy slaves were 
needed. In 1766 there were five of them. Tom Beazor was 
first in the list. He was valued at £35 in 1746, but by 1761 
his value had increased to £180. In 1783 he was still a hun- 
ter but placed second to a younger man and Dennis Reynolds 
surprisingly noted of Beazor, 'little confidence to be put 
in him 1 . This list only shows two hunters and the senior was 
from another prominent Barbudan family John Bailey. Reynolds 
commented that he was 'a valuable good man 1 . Then aged 32, 
John Bailey remained in this senior position until his death 
in 1818 aged 66. He was listed under 'Head Men and Rangers' 
and was first in the whole list; the new category 'Hunters 
and Gunners' seems to have been of less importance. Three 
men were included in it of whom two were members of the Bailey 
family.
When Coleridge visited Barbuda in 1824 he described the 
huntsmen in some detail: 'they wear a leathern cap, a belt 
round their shoulders with a long clasp knife stuck in it, 
and a rude kind of half-boots. They generally possess a horse 
each, a duck gun and dogs, and I believe have little else to 
do except to maintain themselves and procure venison whenever
Q 'J
it is wanted.' This may have been all they had to do when 
visitors were on the island but it is likely that they were 
also responsible for rounding up the cattle and horses when they 
were needed for sale. Most of the stock were allowed to wander
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over the island and could only be caught by men of this sort.
Although Barbuda was principally a stock-rearing island 
few other men were specifically involved with the care of 
stock. From 1766 there were usually two to four grooms, and 
at least one turtler. Some other jobs appear occasionally 
in the lists. In some years, for example, there were one or 
two shepherds, feeders of dogs, keepers of wild cattle, or 
turkey-keepers. At different times there were also men 
appointed to watch the plantations (seven in 1783) and to 
draw water (four for the wild cattle in the same year). None 
of these jobs appeared regularly in the lists though, and 
these were regarded as menial tasks to be done by the elderly 
or the young.
The craftsmen must also be included among the elite. 
In 1766 there were nine classes of skilled workers   blacksmiths, 
tanners, carpenters, sein-knitters, shoemakers, collarmakers, 
ropemakers, coopers, and basketmakers  employing a total of 
19 men. The carpenters were the largest single group, with 
five members. In 1783 basketry had ceased to be a trade, 
the shoemakers were also saddlers, and the ropemakers also 
made sails. More important, however, was the fact that ship- 
wrights and wheelwrights had been introduced and by 1805 
masons had been added too. Owing to the development of these 
new crafts the total number of skilled workmen rose to 35 in 
1814 and 1817. Of these men, seven were shipwrights, the 
largest number in any group. By the 1820s boat-building was 
so well established that Coleridge remarked that on Barbuda 
'the labor consists in raising provisions and building 
droghers' , 88
As far as one can tell, the men employed in these crafts
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were properly trained. In 1762, Samuel Redhead informed Sir 
William that he had brought two sensible mulatto boys from 
Barbuda (to Antigua) and placed one with a shoemaker and 
the other with a saddler, so that they could learn their 
respective trades. The following year he told Sir William 
that there was no need for him to send out a shoemaker
for Barbuda as the mulatto boy could already make a good
89 
shoe, and the other was a saddler and harness-maker.
Where the crafts were established the head craftsman taught 
the trade to apprentices who were frequently members of his 
own family.
The most striking fact to emerge from a study of the 
names of craftsmen in the slave lists is the strong family 
connections within the crafts. It was not unusual for sons 
to be apprenticed to their fathers and for three generations 
to be involved in one trade. The Mopps family is one example, 
Joe Mopps was listed as a carpenter in 1766, 1783, and 1805. 
His son, Johnny, is named as his apprentice in 1783 and
father and son were still working together in 1805, along
90 
with Little Joe Mopps, Johnny's son. Old Joe seems to have
retired by 1814 but Johnny and Little Joe were still working 
together in 1817. Old Joe Mopps continued to live on Barbuda 
and was 88 in 1828, but he had died before the next slave 
list in 1832.
The Baileys were a similar family. Will Bailey was a 
shoemaker in 1766 (possibly the boy sent for training by 
S. Redhead) and was still working as a saddler and shoemaker, 
or collarmaker and shoemaker until 1817. He had died before 
the 1821 list. In 1805 Little Will Bailey, presumably his 
son, aged 32, was working with his father and did so until
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1817 when he joined the hunters and gunners.
The Beazors were, amongst other occupations, shipwrights, 
Daniel valued at £8 in 1746, became a carpenter. In 1783 he 
was a shipwright and glowingly described by Dennis Reynolds 
as 'one of the best slaves in the West Indies'. His son, 
Daniel (aged 14) was apprenticed to him. He is listed as a 
ship's carpenter in 1805, 1814, and 1817 and was still on the 
island at the time of emancipation, presumably still working 
at the same trade. Another shipwright was Abraham Webber 
who remained in the job from 1783 to 1817 and so probably 
until his death, listed in 1821. He also had a son working 
under him from 1814.
All these families were coloured but there were black 
craftsmen too. Will Tanner was a black slave working as a 
tanner in 1766. In 1783 he had one son, Quaw, working with 
him and in 1805, when he was 82, he had two sons, Little 
Will and Quaw. In 1814 Quaw and Little Will were still 
working together and in 1817 were joined by Will Tanner 
Junior. There is family continuity also (though not neces- 
sarily to three generations) among the blacksmiths, knitters, 
shoemakers, saddlers and collarmakers, rope and sail-makers, 
and wheelrights.
This strong family tradition is an important feature of 
life on Barbuda and is very unusual amongst slaves in the 
West Indies in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
where in general there was little chance of a stable family 
structure developing. It has been possible to discover this 
amongst the craftsmen because these men often had surnames, 
and relationships are specifically mentioned in the list of 
1783. There is every reason to suppose that the other slaves
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had similar families but this cannot be proved as the field 
workers were usually without surnames. The effects of this 
family tradition will be discussed more fully in Chapter 7, 
but besides the benefit of being allowed to have their sons
working with them, the craftsmen had other advantages too.
91 They did not, for example, have too strenuous a life and
they were not under constant supervision. They were also
allowed, when necessary, to go over to Antigua for materials
92for their work. In addition, the principal craftsmen were
given special marks of favour   extra bonuses at Christmas,
and gifts when a particular job was completed or when they
93 
were ill. These leading slaves were known by name and
reputation to the Codringtons. In 1812, S. Martin wrote 
to Sir Bethell asking if J. Bailey could purchase the free- 
dom of his grand-daughter (one Alice Cook). Codrington 
replied that the Baileys were 'tried and faithful Servants' 
and should not be allowed to pay. He gave his full concur- 
rence to Alice Cook's manumission 'free of any Expence
94 
whatever'.
The strong family tradition within these crafts suggests, 
however, that there may have been something of a caste struc- 
ture among the slaves on Barbuda. For boys born into these 
families there was a chance of being engaged in an interesting 
trade   though not all of them had this chance and there were 
members of these families among the agricultural labourers. 
For the workers in the gangs, however, or their children, 
there was little chance of transfer to a trade.
There were not many opportunities for women to do work 
other than labouring in the fields, but there were some. A 
few were needed to act as cooks, housemaids, and laundresses
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for the white men. In 1766 only one was employed in this way, 
but by 1783 the number had increased to seven, there were 
nine in 1805, and ten in 1817. In 1783 two were chosen to 
look after the hunters and drivers, but this did not occur 
again. There were sempstresses in 1766 and 1783, but not 
subsequently. The women chosen for these tasks were usually  
but not always  mulattoes. Women also were the drivers of 
the second and grass gangs and two were sometimes deputed to 
look after the young children in the fields   presumably those 
children too young to be included in one of the gangs. 
Another occupation for women was that of nurse and midwife, 
but there were never more than two of each and there were no
midwives listed in 1783 or 1805. There were slaves who
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acted as doctors but this will be treated fully elsewhere.
The last group of skilled slaves on Barbuda were the 
sailors. None were listed in 1766 though there must have 
been some regular communication between Barbuda and Antigua. 
In 1783 only two were included by Reynolds. This seems likely
to have been a mistake. The leader of the sailors, Humanity,
9 6 is mentioned in this position in 1782, but is not included
in the 1783 list though he remained the chief sailor until
97 his death in 1818. By 1805 fifteen men were listed in this
occupation, there were eleven in 1814, and twelve in 1817.
These men were treated somewhat differently from other slaves.
They seem to have been based on Barbuda but they were paid a
regular weekly wage (4s. l^d. for the ordinary sailors and 8s. 3d
98 for those in charge) instead of having grounds to work on.
The members of the other crafts all seem to have been Barbudan
born (with the exception of a ship's carpenter purchased in
99 1799) but several new recruits for the sailors were specially
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purchased. In July 1788 two men, Simon and Will, were 
bought for the shallops, in 1796 four more sailors were 
purchased, and three years later another was bought.
The sailors were men in a very responsible position as 
Barbuda depended entirely on them for the necessary provis- 
ions and for the transport of crops, livestock, and other 
commodities to Antigua. Although based on Barbuda, however, 
some of them seem to have been used very largely in Antigua 
when the sugar crop had to be transported to the ocean-going 
vessels. As a group they do not seem to have been treated 
in a specially favoured way, but Humanity is mentioned more 
times in the records than any other individual slave and 
received more privileges than anyone else.
There are several important features to be noticed 
about the work of the slaves on Barbuda. One is the variety 
of occupation available. Even amongst the field workers 
there was a regular change of routine; and a large number 
of the island's working population were engaged in other 
activities. This was not only beneficial in itself but must 
have led to a gentler atmosphere on the island than was pos- 
sible to slaves on an estate organized for the production of 
a single crop. Although special effort might be needed to 
sow or gather a particular crop on Barbuda there never seems 
to have been the harrassment of workers which was experienced 
by slaves on sugar estates, where the estate's very existence 
might depend on efficiency at particular times. Secondly, 
the fact that their work took so many of the slaves to dif- 
ferent parts of the island must have given them a much 
stronger sense of freedom than they could possibly have had 
on a sugar estate. Thirdly, an examination of the crafts
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practised on Barbuda reveals a strong family tradition which 
was unusual in the Caribbean at this time. This in turn 
helped to create a strong tie of affection for the island 
which manifested itself particularly when the Codringtons 
attempted to transfer slaves from Barbuda to Antigua.
Ill Law and Order
Although conditions in general were better for slaves on 
Barbuda than in most other places in the Caribbean there 
were times when they suffered from cruel behaviour by over- 
seers; there were also occasions when they acted rebelliously 
For the most part the more violent behaviour occurred at the 
beginning and end of the period the years between 1761 and 
1821 were free from the threat of really dangerous uprisings. 
During those years the managers, though varying in the degree 
and type of authority they exercised, were reasonably humane 
in their attitude to wrong-doing and were usually supported 
in this by the Antiguan attorneys and by the Codringtons 
themselves.
The beginning of the period is, however, marked by viol- 
ence and cruelty. A series of depositions in 1741 against a 
former manager of Barbuda, Thomas Beech, show that the slaves
had not been fed properly and several individuals had been
103 treated with barbaric severity, apparently without cause.
Then in 1745 a serious revolt took place which led to the 
murder of another manager (Mr. McNish) on 22 December. 
It is not clear what the grievances against McNish really 
were. Colonel King, who supported him, described him as a 
'Noisey Ratling fellow in his Business, but still humain 1 .
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Nevertheless he had apparently ordered the mutilation of two 
slaves for sheep and cattle stealing and his conduct towards 
the slaves seems to have been overbearing. Colonel King 
believed Sir William's brother was to blame. This young man 
had been on Barbuda from 5 September to 21 December and, King 
maintained, by showing sympathy with the slaves and antipathy 
towards the manager had encouraged them to revolt. The rebel- 
lion took place the day after Codrington left the island, 
though, it was said, with his connivance. With the manager 
murdered, the slaves occupying the castle and in possession 
of all the arms and ammunition, King feared he might not 
regain control. There was the additional danger that the 
slaves might seek the support of the French, with whom the 
British were then at war. A show of force by troops from 
Antigua, however, was sufficient to restore order, and the 
ringleaders were subsequently burned alive in front of the 
castle gate.
This incident and its frightening consequences occurred 
immediately before the lease of the island to Martin and Byam 
and during this period law and order must have been re- 
established and maintained. The returns from Barbuda showed a 
general improvement in profits and Samuel Martin's reputation 
as an unusually beneficent slave-owner leads one to assume 
that the methods used must have been humane.
Between 1761 and 1820 there was no serious rebellion, 
though there were disturbances and the maintenance of order 
worried those in authority. This is hardly surprising. In 
1761 there were 196 slaves on the island, but by 1821 there 
were 411, and usually there were only three or four white 
men to control them. Another difficulty lay in the fact that
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though some white overseers spent some years on the island
108 there were also frequent changes of personnel, while the
slaves were Barbudan born and knew each other and the island 
well. Several overseers referred to the difficult character
of the Barbudan slaves. Samuel Redhead described them as
109 
'very acute 1 , soon able to find out the weak side of a
manager. His son, George, in 1779, considered them an 
'artful set 1 , probably more difficult for Clarke to manage 
than those in Antigua. Dennis Reynolds referred to them as 
'crafty', noting that their aim was to have frequent changes 
of white men 'for very devious reasons'.
The Codringtons, as interested property owners, obviously 
wanted law and order maintained, but in general they were not 
in favour of severe methods provided other treatment worked. 
Sir William believed in firm, prompt action: 'Though I con- 
demn Cruelty yet I am an Advocate for proper Punishment for 
Crimes committed to be immediately inflicted in a judicious 
and reasonable way, devoid of Passion and violence but suited 
to the offence; and I am sure that a steady Conduct upon
those Principles will ensure both Obedience and respect to
112the Governor.' Normally, Barbudan slaves were most effec- 
tively punished for felony or something equally serious by
being sent to work on the Antiguan estates which they much
113 disliked  but if the crime had been of a very serious
114 
nature the ringleaders might be sent for sale, and corporal
punishment seems also to have been inflicted then. John 
James was against whipping as a normal penalty; he found 
'a little solitary confinement 1 was more effective.
All the managers of Barbuda had, in fact, to rely very 
heavily on the leading slaves for support in keeping order,
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not only because of the small number of white men on the 
island (there were usually only two or three in addition to 
the manager), but because the white men could not detect
misbehaviour on the part of the Barbudans as effectively as
117 one of their own kind. Various privileges were extended
to the head men to encourage their loyalty. As in Antigua,
they were given extra allowances of food and clothing, and
118 additional bonuses at Christmas. They were also rewarded
for particularly helpful services; for example, Humanity was
paid £10 in 1782 for apprehending a runaway slave in St.
119John's, Antigua, and in 1794 Tom Beazor and Jno Beazor
(dec'd) were paid £6. 3s. 9d. for detecting those who were 
killing sheep. In general this policy of trusting the
leading slaves must have been successful. There are various
121 references in the correspondence to their loyalty and the
evidence points to a fairly well-ordered society.
Nevertheless there was one crime which the slaves com- 
mitted throughout the period. This was their habit of killing 
sheep and sometimes cattle too. All the managers in turn com- 
plained about it. Dennis Reynolds noted in 1783 above his
list of field workers 'are very good Negroes if they will
122 leave of killing sheep 1 . Occasionally the trouble was
more serious than simply poaching. In 1779 R. Clarke wrote
to say that some Barbuda men 'in a combination 1 were detected
destroying thirty sheep, and other carcasses had been found.
They were not caught immediately, but when they were they 'all
123 behaved very riotous and daringly insolent'. In 1787
another similar incident occurred on Barbuda which involved
one of the drivers of the great gang, Dickson, a mulatto in
124 whom Reynolds had placed a good deal of confidence.
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Neither the managers nor the Codringtons were able to 
find an effective method of permanently preventing this habit. 
Sir William, in particular, was most concerned that the 
practice should be stopped. 'The Barbuda negroes', he wrote,
'are overfed and underwork'd which makes them riotous and
125 gives them opportunity of doing mischief. He urged his
attorney to encourage Reynolds to fill up their time, have
a roll-call morning and evening, and appoint guards to look
1 2 fi 
after the flocks. Although not normally advocating harsh
measures, in connection with sheep stealing, which he thought 
threatened to put an end to the advantage of owning Barbuda,
he believed a few acts of severity would not be sufficient 
127 
'the terror of punishment 1 had to be kept up. To prevent
the slaves relapsing into the habit of sheep killing he said
that no attention was too great 'nor any correction too
128 
severe to intimidate them'. Corporal punishment was not
normally used but a comment by Sir William in a letter to
Walrond, in 1787, suggests that Dickson and his colleagues
129 
were flogged and when Christopher (Bethell) Codrington
visited the island in 1791 he implied that this punishment 
was still being used for sheep stealers, though without good 
effect. In addition, Sir William was prepared to sanction
the sale of the ringleaders and Dickson was sent to Jamaica
131 for this purpose.
Sir William's views, however, that sheep stealing was 
a danger to the economy, cannot be taken seriously. By 
1783, when he made that remark, the number of sheep on 
Barbuda had already increased to 4,000 (from 356 in 1779) and 
by 1786, when stiff punishments were being used, to 8,000. 
At this date he was even expressing anxiety about the island
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being over-stocked with sheep and in 1788 he actually told 
Langford Lovell that it was better that sheep should be 'given
to the Negroes upon my Concerns for food rather than be
134 
suffer'd to increase to a Nuisance 1 . It must surely be
the case that what really worried him about this offence, 
and made him sanction harsh punishments, was not that his 
profits were being threatened but that his property was being, 
in effect, stolen. This is the attitude of many farmers who 
may be prepared to give away a surplus but will take legal 
action against people who take it without asking permission. 
Harsh treatment did not stop the practice, however. When 
Sir Bethell was the owner, both James and Jarritt complained
about it and took appropriate action against the offenders,
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sending them and their families to Antigua. Sir Bethell
does not seem to have been so concerned about the problem 
as his uncle, probably because at this time the over-population 
of Barbuda and the movement towards emancipation gave him 
greater cause for concern.
It is really not surprising that the methods employed 
to prevent sheep stealing were not effective as the propriet- 
ors and their agents failed to understand the motives behind 
it. To the Codringtons sheep stealing on Barbuda indicated 
that the slaves were thieves and they should be punished as 
thieves. The slaves did not view this activity in the same 
light. Professor Genovese has pointed out that in slave 
societies everywhere a subtle distinction was made between 
taking and stealing  'they stole from each other but merely 
took from their masters'. When they took and ate property 
which belonged to their master they 'had only transformed his 
property from one form into another'> and the taking of
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food in this way they still further justified by claiming 
they were underfed, or given a monotonous diet.
Barbudan slaves were not short of food, but without the 
meat they took their diet would have lacked variety. Sheep 
stealing, however, was more than a mere taking of food. It 
represented also a defiance of authority, a relatively mild 
expression of discontent with their situation. That sheep 
stealing was the Barbudan slaves' most serious crime between 
1761 and 1821 is an indication of their comparative content- 
ment with the regime. There are no records of attempted
arson, of wanton destruction of stock or property, or of
»
attacks on overseers, which tended to occur in slave societies
where conditions were less congenial: nor were there many
1
attempts to run away .
Apart from this particular habit the behaviour of the 
slaves was good. Doubtless a wise overseer or manager oc- 
casionally turned a blind eye to minor misdemeanours and 
they were rewarded with loyalty in times of emergency. During
the French wars, at the turn of the century, for example,
139there was no unrest. The slaves, too, willingly accompan-
ied the white men into dangerous conditions when a wrecked
140 
ship needed aid. John James, in 1824, described the ways
in which he could depend on them:
There are a good many Negroes on the Property who 
would do anything I ordered, and would run into any 
danger with me, which I have often experienced in 
saving lives and property from Wrecks .... The 
Negroes generally speaking, if left to themselves, 
I could depend on; many a Night have I, surrounded 
by from 100 to 150, slept by the side of my Horse, 
in the Woods; - There are but two white Men with 
myself on the Island, and Frequently leave my Wife 
and Daughters there without a fastening to the 
House, there are some good head men on whom I can 
depend, with these I have only to give an order 
which is never disobeyed,
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After this date, however, the behaviour of the slaves 
gave cause for concern. Jarritt, in particular, laid great 
emphasis on their lack of discipline: 'The Barbuda negroes
are a bad lot 1 , he wrote, 'insolent, ungovernable and almost
142 
outlawed'. Sir Bethell did not agree with a statement
that they were bordering on rebellion, but he did concede
that 'they have relapsed from that state of obedience which
143 
was formerly their so well deserved Character 1 . He felt
that this was partly due to the fact that there had been no 
resident manager on the island since James took up residence 
at Clare Hall (Antigua) in 1822, and after his death in 1826
there was no manager at all until Winter's appointment in
144 1827. Restlessness was caused by other factors, however.
One major problem was that the large increase in the island's
population meant that there were increasing numbers of young
145 
slaves for whom there was insufficient work. They were
encouraged in acts of insubordination by news of emancipation
146 
spread from Antigua. Throughout the 1820s the managers
constantly wrote that though workers were needed on the
Antiguan estates, Barbudan slaves could not be persuaded to
147 
move there, unless force was used. In 1829, R, Jarritt
wrote, 'To talk of removing any of the Negroes now from
Barbuda, they would laugh at us. They set us at defiance.
148 And nothing but a Strong Military force could remove them 1 .
If there was no threat of forced removals, however, the
149 slaves were more amenable than those in Antigua, and in
1831 Winter was able to report that they had behaved better 
at a recent wreck than at any other since his taking over 
the island. 150
Unfortunately, in 1832 an incident occurred which led to
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trouble. The food allowance for the slaves had been distrib- 
uted as usual on Friday, 24 August, but the next morning at 
roll-call, one of the gang said he had not received his and 
would not work without it. Winter assured him that a member 
of his family had been given it, but the slave concerned 
worked himself up into a rage and encouraged the whole gang 
to mutiny. This disturbance was not put down until soldiers 
arrived from Antigua. The ringleaders were sent with their 
families to the Antiguan estates and the island returned to 
normality, the slaves on Barbuda even promising to work on 
the Antiguan properties if required.
The deterioration in the normally good relations bet- 
ween slaves and overseers in the 1820s and 1830s was in part 
due to external circumstances over which no-one had control. 
It says a good deal for the Codringtons, their employees and 
their slaves that for the greater part of this period a few 
white men were able to control an increasing number of slaves 
without undue severity, and were able to live among them 
without fear of harm.
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Chapter 7
THE POPULATION
Although the population of Barbuda was small it does never­ 
theless provide interesting material for the historian of 
the Caribbean. In recent years some historians have been 
studying the life of particular plantations in depth and 
have been able to suggest from these studies general prin­ 
ciples which may have governed population growth in the 
slave population as a whole. Barbuda makes a useful 
addition to these studies. Unlike most islands in the West 
Indies at this time, the population of Barbuda increasd 
without bulk purchases of slaves, but on the other hand it 
did not increase as fast as the population of the Rolle
estates on Great Exuma, in the Bahamas, studied by Michael
2Craton. Nor was the increase steady. This erratic qual­ 
ity is particularly useful because it points to events which, 
in an environment favourable to growth, nevertheless acted 
as a deterrent, and therefore helps to establish the 
essential factors for increase in a slave population.
In 1746, the date of the first relevant Barbudan slave list, 
there were 172 slaves on Barbuda. Numbers had increased to 
190 in 1756, and 196 in 1761, 3 but this was the period of 
the lease to Martin and Byam and one cannot be sure that 
any increase was not due simply to the transfer of slaves 
from their Antiguan estates. Certainly in 1761 the
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Codrington attorney purchased 18 slaves who had belonged to
4 the lessees. After 1761, however, there are no recorded
bulk purchases of slaves for Barbuda and there appear to 
have been only eight individuals bought for the island up 
to 1833— four being the largest number purchased at one 
time. There were transfers of slaves from Antigua to 
Barbuda and from Barbuda to Antigua but these are separately 
listed so that one can be fairly certain that the increases 
after 1761 were by births to slaves on the island. Between 
1761 and 1831 —a period of seventy years — the population 
increased from 196 to 503:
1761 196
1766 238
1783 250 (This is a misleading 
figure. In 1780-1, 41 young slaves were sent from 
Barbuda to Antigua so the increase must have been
higher than the figures suggest between 1766 and
1783, and lower between 1783 and 1805).
1805 312
1814 367
1817 392
1821 411
1824 423
1828 467
1831 5036
In contrast the populations of the sugar islands were 
only maintained by constant large imports of new African 
slaves. Between 1690 and 1820, 800,000 were imported into
Jamaica, but in 1820 the slave population was still only
7about 340,000. In Jamaica, in fact, throughout the eight­ 
eenth century there was a natural decrease of about 20 per 
1,000 and in the registration period (1817-29 in Jamaica)
o
there was still a decrease of 5 per 1,000. Even in islands 
such as Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, Nevis, and Montserrat 
which had been settled for a longer time and where sugar cul­ 
tivation had reached its height slaves were still imported
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g 'merely to keep up their Stock 1 . There were a very few
individual estates where conditions were so favourable that 
numbers were kept up without recourse to more purchases. 
Such an estate was the one owned by Colonel Samuel Martin 
in Antigua, but in general on the sugar estates slave 
deaths always exceeded births. On estates in Barbados given 
to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel by Chris­ 
topher Codrington in 1710 it was calculated that between 
1712 and 1748, in an average year, six deaths and one birth 
were usual per 100 of the population. Although improve­ 
ments were made by the Society during the eighteenth century
it was not until after 1793 that an increase in the population
12 was the general rule and then it was only slight.
The reasons for the high death rate on the sugar estates 
are well known. A major cause was the vulnerability of 
slaves newly arrived from Africa who died during their 
three-year seasoning period. It was generally recognized 
that up to a third of the freshly imported slaves would not 
survive their first three years in Jamaica, and that a major­ 
ity of all slave deaths would be among the newly arrived. 
Even with care the losses were high. From 1712 to 1761 the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had purchased about 
450 slaves for their estates in Barbados. After five decades, 
however, the population was smaller by one third. At 
Worthy Park, a sugar estate on Jamaica, in 1792-3 the owner 
invested £13,472 in 225 slaves. By the end of 1794 the 
number of deaths had risen to ten per cent of the whole 
population, whereas in the period 1783-91 it had been as 
low as three per cent.
Another major cause of early deaths was the nature of
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the work on a sugar plantation. During crop time, which in 
a good year would be from January to June, the factory never 
stopped production so the field hands, who were cutting the 
cane (one of the hardest jobs on a sugar estate) were working 
seven days a week throughout the hours of daylight, however 
hot the days might be. When the crop had been gathered the
gangs returned to their usual tasks in the fields, labouring
17 twelve to thirteen hours a day for six days of the week.
This physically exhausting work was performed on a diet of
18 root vegetables and salt fish. The combination of hard
labour and an inadequate diet led to susceptibility to
•
disease, and epidemics of smallpox, fevers, dysentery, and 
other illnesses contributed to high mortality rates. 
Slaves were particularly likely to sicken after periods of
drought or intense activity, and those who did not catch any
20 infection had to make up for those who did. On the Worthy
Park estate twice as many men as women suffered, which sug-
21 gests that their more arduous tasks affected their health.
Infant mortality was also high. On the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel's estates in Barbados it was cal­ 
culated that infants had a fifty per cent chance of living
22to be five. On Worthy Park in 1794-5 the owner undertook
a survey of the infant mortality on his estates over a period 
of years. Of the 240 resident female slaves 89 had had 
children—but only 19 of the 89 had managed to keep alive 
all the children born to them, and 15 of these 19 women had 
only one child.
Lockjaw, apparently caused by inadequate treatment at
childbirth, seems to have caused the deaths of many slave
24 babies within two weeks of birth. Charles Spooner, a
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resident in the Leeward Islands in 1788, maintained that this
25 
disease caused the death of nearly half the slave children.
Where proper medical treatment was provided, or conditions 
were less unhygienic, mortality among new-born babies seems
to have been greatly reduced, as at Worthy Park under Dr.
26 Quier.
Some medical facilities were provided for sick slaves. 
Most estates had arrangements for a qualified doctor to
attend on a regular basis, and some estates, like Worthy
27 Park, had their own. There was usually a sick-house or
hospital, and slaves were sometimes trained as medical
2 8 assistants. Slave women acted as midwives and nurses.
The real difficulty, however, was that there were no drugs 
which effectively combated these diseases and white soldiers
and sailors (as well as estate owners and managers) were as
29 likely to die from them as were the slaves. If the work
of the slaves had been less injurious to health, however, 
and their diet had been more nourishing, the slave force would 
have been less susceptible to disease. This is supported 
by what happened after 1807 when the slave trade ended. The 
amelioration policy laid down by the individual island gov­ 
ernments, together with the decline in sugar production, 
improved conditions so that more children were born and 
there were fewer deaths.
Barbuda seems never to have suffered from high mortality. 
Unfortunately causes of deaths are not given in the slave 
lists and between 1761 and 1817, when registration began, the 
most that one can say is that deaths must have been fewer than 
births because the population increased throughout the period, 
and only eight slaves were purchased. In the registration
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period (1817-32) numbers of deaths showed no great fluctuations; 
the range was only from 9.7 per 1,000 per year (between 1821 
and 1824) to 10.84 per 1,000 per year (between 1817 and 1821). 
Many of those dying must have been elderly. Winter, in 1831, 
commented on the age many of the slaves reached and said 
that some believed they were older than the age given in the 
lists. He described one man who had seventy children and 
grandchildren and 'who is more healthy than I am and takes a 
great deal of exercise, he is reputed to be ninty [sic] years 
old.' Infant mortality rates are impossible to determine
because still-births and deaths of children under three are
32 not recorded even in the registration period; but the
rate of survival must have been reasonably good for the popu­ 
lation to have increased so steadily.
The most obvious reason for the much lower death-rate 
on Barbuda was the fact that there were probably no new 
African slaves introduced to the island after 1761. Of the
eight slaves bought in the late eighteenth century, seven
33 were sailors and one a ship's carpenter, so it seems likely
that these were either Creoles bred to a trade, or Africans 
already seasoned and working. This meant Barbuda was not 
subject to the very heavy mortality rate caused by large 
imports of newly arrived Africans.
The second reason for the lower mortality was the type 
of activity on which the slaves were engaged. The gangs of 
field labourers may sometimes have worked very hard but they 
did not have any task so gruelling as the cutting of cane. 
There was variety of work, too, on Barbuda and it was not 
always physically demanding. Furthermore, as the population 
increased the gangs tended to become under-employed and by the
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1820s it was difficult to find sufficient work for them. In 
1815 Sir Bethell commented: 'if they increase as I have a
fair ground to hope they will, they soon will not earn their
34 keep unless some new Mode is struck out 1 . Fourteen years
later Jarritt wrote that '150 Negroes is full as many as 
the Island requires, and it would be ten times as productive 
with that Number, as it is now with 470. You would be a 
great gainer in getting rid of 300 Negroes from there, even 
if you was to give them away, they are only an expence'.
The importance of work in determining growth or decline 
of the population is made by Michael Craton in his study of 
slaves on Great Exuma. As in Barbuda the slaves on the Rolle 
estates on Great Exuma increased in number. In comparing 
these estates with those at Worthy Park, Jamaica, Craton 
says: 'The essential difference between the two populations 
clearly lay in the nature of the economic system in which 
each was employed. Worthy Park's system was the "factory-in- 
a-field" of sugar production, while Exuma's was an almost
decayed open plantation system with a negligible "industrial"
*3fi component.' Work on Barbuda may have been more highly
organized than on the Rolle estates but in type it was like 
that on Great Exuma and not at all like that at Worthy Park.
Whatever the work on Barbuda, however, all the slaves 
enjoyed a much better diet (see Chapter 6), and the effect 
on their physique was marked. In 1790, when Christopher 
(Bethell) Codrington visited Barbuda he noted: 'nothing 
struck me more upon my first going to Barbuda than the great 
difference between the Embonpoint of the Negroes there and of
those anywhere in Antigua: the former look better fed,
37 stronger and more healthy 1 . Although there are references
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38in the records to the slaves being ill, there is no evid­ 
ence that they were subject to serious epidemics and it seems 
therefore that the better physical conditions they enjoyed 
did lead to improved health.
Infant mortality on the island is difficult to estimate 
because there are no records, as stated already. Nevertheless 
the fact that the population increased is proof in itself 
that live births must have exceeded still-births. John Winter,
manager in 1830, wrote: 'We do not lose one infant in twenty
39 births', and the next year he wrote: 'our number is above
Five hundred, their increase is almost incredible. We have
one hundred and four young children born since my first
40 residing in Barbuda, say Jany 1827 and all healthy. 1 . The
slave lists between 1817 and 1832 also show a healthy pro-
41 gression of children from one list to the next.
The reputation of Barbuda as a healthy place for the
rearing of children led Christopher (Bethell) Codrington to
42 suggest that it would make a 'fine Nursery for Negroes'.
He suggested buying children aged twelve to fourteen who 
should be brought to Barbuda where they would be able to
perform the comparatively light tasks connected with growing
43 corn and cotton. He would have transferred these children
later to his sugar plantations as Barbuda could not have
provided work for many more adults, but whatever his inten-
44 tions, the plan seems not to have been adopted.
The lower mortality rate on Barbuda seems to have been 
due more to good social conditions than to markedly efficient 
medical provision. There was no qualified doctor though 
there were slaves who specifically looked after those who 
were ill. in 1783 Charles and Old Sue come in this category.
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Charles was described as 'a Negro man about 40 years of Age,
45 not to be trusted 1 . This does not accord with the view of
Henri de Ponthieu who described the slave responsible for 
medical matters on Barbuda about this time as 'a very care­ 
ful humane negro Doctor an intelligent man of the sort: but
46 he can neither write nor read 1 . The estate doctor on
Antigua had given him instructions for dealing with fevers
and disorders requiring immediate attention and he prescribed
47 numbered medicines to his patients! Old Sue, the other
slave involved in caring for the sick, was described as about 
sixty and 'very carefull 1 . In 1805 two coloured men, Cephas, 
aged twenty-six, and Tom Charles, nineteen (possibly the son 
of Charles, the former doctor) are named as doctors and they 
seem to have been working in this capacity until the end of 
the period. In 1832 they came second and third in the whole 
list of Barbudan slaves and they must, therefore, have been 
highly regarded.
These slave doctors were clearly competent to cope with 
routine disorders. Some medicines were sent from England,
and in 1791 a consignment was despatched to Barbuda costing
48 49 £32. 15s. 6d. There was a hospital of sorts at Codrington
and in addition the sick were sometimes sent to the Highlands 
to recuperate. Some specially favoured slaves were given 
particular care when they were ill, but any Barbudan whose
condition required skilled medical attention had to be taken
59 
to Antigua. In an emergency the Codrington estate doctor
53 went over to Barbuda.
The favourable social conditions on Barbuda clearly 
accounted for the smaller mortality rate there. Of possibly 
greater interest to the historian, however, is the fact that
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there were also more births, even during the eighteenth 
century when the general pattern of life on Caribbean 
estates militated against slave-breeding. This had not 
always been the case. In the seventeenth century, estate 
owners had been in favour of slaves having families and
bought sufficient women to achieve a balance between the
54 sexes in order to encourage this. In the eighteenth
century, however, this attitude changed. More labour was 
needed quickly to expand the estates and to supply the 
increasing demand for sugar, and owners decided it was in 
their best interests to buy more slaves direct from Africa 
than to encourage slave-breeding. Slave children had to be 
supported until they were old enough to work and pregnant 
and nursing women were less useful in the field. To this 
end planters bought more men than women. A proportion of
three to one woman was usual but sometimes the imbalance
55 was even greater. This was intended to — and did — discourage
breeding.
The planters were nevertheless puzzled that there were 
so few births on their estates. They blamed the slaves them­ 
selves for this. Promiscuous relations, venereal disease, 
and the encouragement of abortions were the reasons they put 
forward. Such factors did indeed play their part, for they 
were directly caused by the pattern of slave society. Prom­ 
iscuity was encouraged by the forced movement of slaves from 
one estate to another and the larger numbers of men to women, 
and this in turn led to disease. Those women who were infec­ 
ted were more likely to have abortions and there was little 
point in bringing a child to birth who only had a one in 
two chance of survival. The heavy work and poor diet must
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also have had an adverse effect on fertility. It was noted, 
too, by contemporary landowners, as well as by modern his­ 
torians, that the slaves brought from Africa were less 
likely to have families than the Creoles. The Africans were 
prone to be despondent, moody, and pessimistic; the Creoles,
in contrast, had come to accept their position and were
57 prepared to have families.
The natural increase in population on Barbuda, against 
the general background of low birthrates on the majority of 
other islands is a matter worth attention. With one slight
r o
exception — between 1783 and 1793 —there was always an 
increase of births over deaths, though the rate of increase 
varied, as the following table shows.
1761-6 average annual increase was 42.9 per 1,000
1766-83 " " " " 13.1 "
1783-1805 " " " "9.7 "
1805-14 " " " " 19.6 "
1814-17 " " " " 22.8 "
From 1817 to 1831 it is possible to work out a crude birth-rate
Crude birth- Death rate Average
rate per per 1,000 increase per
1,000 per yr. per yr. 1,000 per yr.
1817-21
1821-4
1824-8
1828-31
27.4
44.6
29.6
37.8
10.8
9.7
10.6
10.7
16.6
34.9
18.9
27.1
The most obvious reason for the large number of births on 
Barbuda must be the fact that Barbudan slaves were probably 
largely Creole even by the mid-eighteenth century and were 
therefore not disinclined to breed as were African slaves. 
Many of the slaves listed in 1761 were on the island in 1746 
and may have been born on Barbuda themselves. By the 1780s 
all the slaves of child-rearing age (except the eight 
newcomers) were probably Barbudan born. This, together with 
the fact that adult slaves were not transferred for any
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length of time to the Antiguan estates (see the next chapter 
for a discussion of this) had an additional advantage in 
that it encouraged the slaves on Barbuda to form stable 
relationships. In 1787 Dennis Reynolds informed Sir William 
that 'the Men here in general are most commonly attached to
particular Women which is not the case in the other Islands
59 where the Men and Women have more connexions than one'.
In 1792 Walrond commented on the same fact (though he drew 
a different conclusion from it) in a letter to Christopher
(Bethell) Codrington: 'A part of the ill conduct of the
6 0 Barbuda negroes must be owing to long family connections'.
Recent research by Barry Higman and Michael Craton sug­ 
gests that there is a definite link between nuclear slave 
families and high fertility. Unfortunately the slave lists
on Barbuda do not place the slaves in households, as do the
6 2 lists for the Rolle estates, so it is not possible to
determine which men and women were living together. It is 
not possible either to give accurate figures as to the size 
of individual families, nor to say how many stable unions 
there were. The norm for the island seems to have been a 
relationship between one man and one woman and the increase 
in the population supports the view that stable relationships 
increased fertility.
Another factor encouraging fertility was the more fav­ 
ourable proportion of women to men than was common on a sugar 
plantation. In 1766 and 1805 numbers were almost equal, 
otherwise in the years up to 1821 there were more men than 
women, but not many more.
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Men Women
1761 66 59
1766 87 85
1783 98 79
1805 113 114
1814 129 102
1817 130 113
1821 135 157
1824 130 164
1828 140 178
1831 150 194
These figures (with the exception of 1761 where the old and 
infirm are not separately listed) include all those working 
on the island; that is not infants or the old and infirm 
but not necessarily only those of child-bearing age. In the 
eighteenth century lists, the ages of all slaves are not given 
so it is not possible to be more accurate, but from 1817 all
slaves are listed with their ages. Taking the ages 20 to 44
6 3 as the best ages for reproduction, as Craton does, the
following statistics emerge:
Men Women
1817 46 52
1821 51 63
1824 43 55
1828 50 67
1831 57 85
It is perhaps interesting to notice that in 1817 when the 
total number of men exceeded the total number of women by 17, 
in the age range most favourable to reproduction there were 
six more women than men. This might also apply to earlier 
lists if one were able to treat them in the same way.
These favourable factors not unnaturally help to explain 
the rather unusual fertility of the slaves on Barbuda and 
they fit in with the findings of Michael Craton's research 
on Great Exuma. The slaves there, however, were all black 
and Craton maintains that the absence of miscegenation was
220
64 a reason for increased fertility. This does not appear to
have been so on Barbuda. No categorization of colour is 
given in the slave lists before 1783 when 20 slaves were des­ 
cribed as coloured out of a total population of 250. By 
1817, however, slightly over one third were coloured and 
this proportion remained true to the end of the period.
Some mulatto families were amongst the oldest on Barbuda. 
The Beazors, for example, seem to have been descended from 
the John Bezor described in the depositions against Thomas 
Beech in 1741 as 'a Servant on the Island of Barbuda above 
20 years and is now Employed as Driver of the Negroes 1 . 
According to the evidence, John Bezor must have been on the 
island since 1720 and presumably all the male Bezors mentioned 
in the 1746 list were his sons (Will valued at £60, Johnny 
£50, Tom £35, Robert £20, and Daniel £8). By 1832 there 
were 29 members of the family still on Barbuda, some coloured 
and some black. There is no proof that John Bezor had only 
one 'wife* but he remained on the island for many years so 
there is proof of some stability. Another white man, 
Abraham Webber, described as a turtler in the accounts, also 
settled on the island and established a family. In the 
1766 slave list two children, Mary Webber and Abraham Webber 
are listed as infants. In 1783 young Abraham is described 
as a mustee aged about twenty. Abraham Webber senior seems 
to have stayed on the island until his death in November 1785 
when the wages due to him were paid to his daughter Mary. 
In 1832 there were 15 with this surname, all coloured, on Barbuda 
The Baileys were another prominent mulatto family. Two boys, 
John and Will, were listed as infants in 1756> John was des­ 
cribed as a mustee in 1783 and Will as a mulatto. In 1832 
there were 17 Baileys, all coloured, ranging in age from 57
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to 2. Of course all mulatto families were not equally pro­ 
lific but the evidence from Barbuda seems to show that 
coloured families could be as fertile as black or white 
families.
The increase in the population of Barbuda was not 
steady and the fluctuations indicate that there must have 
been factors which sometimes inhibited growth. It is import­ 
ant to try to determine what these were. Between 1783 and 
1793 the population actually declined — from 250 in 1783 to
fi Q
249 in 1793, though in the overall period between the slave 
list of 1783 and the next one in 1805 there was an increase 
of 9.6 per 1,000, smaller than at any other time but still 
an increase.
Sir William Codrington was certainly worried about this. 
Writing to Langford Lovell in February 1785 he said he could 
not understand why the increase generally was so small 'and 
more why at Barbuda they have not increas'd greatly, where
food, Climate, and Labour are more favourable to increase
69than at Antigua 1 . Dennis Reynolds, over the years, sug­ 
gested a number of reasons for this. Venereal disease was 
one. He had tried to eradicate it, but without success.
He felt that hard work was a possible factor. This was
72denied by Sir William and in general the evidence points
to work being easy on Barbuda, but for the years of Reynolds's 
management this may not have been true. Whatever faults he
may have had Reynolds did work hard and the gang was smaller
73 in his time than later. Reynolds also believed that there
were not enough men. In 1787 he wrote that there were 'only 
12 or 15 Men that Breed, there have been a few more but they 
are now grown old and there are a few young fellows from 20
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to 30 years of age that never got any children to my
74 knowledge 1 . He thought that the attachment of the men to
one woman inhibited an increase and he recommended the pur­ 
chase of more men to reduce in-breeding.
Whatever the truth of these statements, however, it 
seems unlikely that any one of these causes was responsible 
for the marked drop in the increase between 1783 and 1805. 
The slaves were infected with venereal disease before 1783, 
and the population increased after this time without the 
purchase of new slaves. Reynolds's management may have been 
a factor in limiting growth but there is no sign that work 
then was so hard that it was the sole cause. It seems much 
more likely that the population was suffering from the effects 
of an unusual transaction effected in 1780-1.
In 1780 Richard Clarke — one of the Codrington attorneys
in Antigua — arranged for the transfer of 18 young slaves
77 (aged 8 to 15) from Barbuda to Betty's Hope. Subsequently
78 another twelve were sent to Betty's Hope and a further
79 eleven to the Cotton New Work. The Barbudan accounts were
credited with £1,000 for the 30 sent to Betty's Hope and
80 £360 for those sent to the Cotton New Work. Clarke said
he had induced the parents to part with their children entirely 
by persuasion 'and fair promises, such as a little gratuity to 
themselves and clothing their children as soon as they come 
over here, with a promise of indulging them of spending the
O -I
three holidays at Xmas with their parents'. The accounts 
show that £33 was distributed to the parents of children
sent to Betty's Hope; a slave woman, Cranky, was given
8? £2. 9s. 6d. for her children brought to Betty's Hope (where
she herself seems to have been working); and £19.16s. Od. was
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distributed among the parents of the eleven children sent
O -5
to the Cotton New Work.
Although Clarke implied that the parents had been per­ 
suaded to part with their children willingly it is difficult 
to believe they really had any choice in the matter. 
Barbudan slaves when asked later if they would be prepared
to work on the Antiguan estates refused resolutely to do so
84 and only went there under compulsion. John James, years
later, seems to have been referring to this incident when he 
mentioned that Barbudan slaves had pined after being sent
o c
to Antigua. There is no record of any earlier transaction 
of this sort so that Barbudan slaves must have been totally 
unprepared for such an event. It must have reminded the 
slaves forcibly that though they might sometimes feel free 
on Barbuda they were still actually slaves with no final con­ 
trol over the fate of their children. A shock of this sort 
may well have been the cause of the decline in the birthrate 
in the following decade. It meant also of course that the 
island was deprived of children and adolescents, the eldest
of whom might have become parents themselves from about 1783—
86 
a point touched on by Reynolds in that year.
Favourable social conditions on Barbuda undoubtedly 
played a part in the growth of the island's population at this 
time but were not sufficient on their own. For the birth­ 
rate to rise it seems to have been essential for the slaves 
to have a measure of security about their future, some cer­ 
tainty perhaps that they would have at least a moderate degree 
of control over the welfare of their children. Until 1780-1, 
slaves on Barbuda had had this limited security; this was 
removed then but as no further transfers occurred the birthrate
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rose again after 1792 so that by 1805 it was possible for an 
overall increase to be recorded.
If it is difficult to be sure why the population remained 
static at the end of the century it is even more difficult to 
explain the extraordinary rate of increase in the period 
1761-6 when there was an overall rise of 42.8 per 1,000 per 
year, higher than at any time until 1821-4. It might have 
been a manifestation of delight by the slaves after their 
return to Codrington rule, but it seems more likely that it 
was due to favourable conditions created by Colonel Samuel 
Martin when he rented the island between 1746 and 1761, the 
main effects of which were felt after 1761. Dennis Reynolds 
certainly believed that there had been an exceptional number 
of births then which he thought was due to there being at 
that time more or less equal numbers of men and women,'and 
from thence it must be that at the end of his lease . . .
there were 90 Children alive Born of 60 Women (young and
87 old) 1 . Reynolds's figures are not entirely accurate as
the slave list of 1761 shows there were 71 children and 59 
women, but they are a useful indication of Martin's policy 
on Barbuda.
Samuel Martin certainly seems to have tried to improve 
the quality of the slaves on Barbuda. He claimed in 1756 
that their value had been increased in general since 1756 
'and yet more by being garbled of all notorious Rogues,
o o
Runaways, distemper'd or old people'. Presumably he 
replaced them with younger and more vigorous slaves. Some 
may even have been children. This perhaps explains the fact 
that though one third of the island's population were 
classed as children in 1761 there was only an increase of
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6 in the population between 1756 and 1761. Reynolds was 
right in thinking there were more or less equal numbers of 
men and women (there were, in fact, 66 men and 59 women) 
and if these were mostly young adults it is not surprising 
that, conditions being otherwise favourable, there should 
have been a big increase in births in the following years. 
If slave lists were available for years between 1766 and 
1783 they might well have shown continued high numbers of 
births for a while. The 41 young slaves sent to Antigua in 
1780-1 would have been born in the years 1765-8. These 
increases, although explicable in this way, may have been 
sufficiently noteworthy for them to be the cause of the myth 
that Barbuda was used as a stud farm for the breeding of 
slaves in the mid-eighteenth century. It is a view held by 
serious scholars as well as by less reliable writers, but 
there seems to be no evidence for this in the records. It 
will be more generally considered in the next chapter.
This study of the slave population of Barbuda supports 
the conclusion reached by Michael Craton 'that slaves were 
contented in reverse correlation to the intensity of the 
labor system, and in positive correlation to the degree to
which even as slaves, they were able to make a life for
89 themselves. 1 On Barbuda conditions were in many respects
as favourable for slaves as could be found anywhere in the 
West Indies, but even under such circumstances it seems that 
the slave population ceased to increase when the security of 
their offspring was threatened. For slaves to have families 
it seems to have been essential for them not only to have 
reasonable working and living conditions but also some cer­ 
tainty that they would have a measure of control over their
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children's lives and thus some dignity and control over their 
own lives too.
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Chapter 8
THE EXTENT TO WHICH BARBUDA WAS USED AS A SOURCE 
OF SLAVES FOR THE CODRINGTON ESTATES ON ANTIGUA
The economy of Barbuda, as has been shown in previous chap­ 
ters, was closely linked with the Antiguan estates owned by 
the Codrington family. Livestock, crops, and estate supplies 
were sent from Barbuda to Antigua and it is not unreasonable 
to suppose that the labour force on the sugar estates might 
also have been augmented from Barbuda. Some scholars have, 
in fact, written of Barbuda not only as a source of labour 
but as a stud farm for the provision of slaves as well as
livestock; and Christopher (Bethell) Codrington himself
2described the island as a suitable 'nursery for Negroes'.
The stud farm theory has been shown by Professor David 
Lowenthal and Dr. Colin Clarke to be a myth, but as it is 
one of the most often repeated ideas associated with 
Barbuda, some comment on it must be included in this chapter. 
It is also necessary to see how far Christopher (Bethell) 
Codrington's suggestion that Barbuda should be used as a 
'nursery for Negroes' was acted upon and then to determine 
to what extent the island contributed to the labour needs 
of the Codrington sugar estates.
It is perhaps not surprising that Barbuda has been sug­ 
gested as a stud farm for slave-breeding. An island owned 
by one family, who made a policy of discouraging visitors,
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and where the population was known to increase, is a likely 
subject of such a rumour. In fact Barbudans themselves
take pride in this myth which seems to have become part of
4the folk-lore of the Caribbean. The facts available, how­ 
ever, do not support the theory and the scholars who make 
the charge have not given references.
The most important fact which might substantiate their 
claim is the increase in the population of Barbuda, without 
purchases, at a time when sugar islands could only maintain 
their population with fresh imports of African slaves. As 
has been shown in the previous chapter, however, this was a 
natural increase made possible by the easier social con­ 
ditions of an island not geared to sugar production. Other 
islands of similar type also showed similar increases in the 
population. In Barbuda's history there is only one short 
period, 1761-6, when the increase was so sudden as to suggest 
the possibility of deliberately contrived slave-breeding, 
but this is not confirmed by any other evidence. It seems 
more likely that the unusual rise in numbers was the result 
of improvements by Martin and Byam between 1746 and 1761 
which would have encouraged a natural increase.
There is, admittedly, a shortage of documents for some 
periods of Barbuda's history, but within the context of the 
records at present available there is no sign of deliberate 
slave-breeding. There is also much evidence to support a 
theory that there was no such policy. The most obvious is 
the fact that experienced slave-owners knew that if slaves 
were moved from one island to another it was essential 
that they should have a period of seasoning as when slaves
0
arrived in the West Indies from Africa. Deliberate breeding
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of slaves on one island for transfer to another was not 
necessarily, therefore, a practicable proposition. Slaves 
moved from Barbuda, a non sugar-growing island, to sugar 
estates on Antigua might not have survived such a change. 
Sir William Codrington was well aware of this. In a post­ 
script on this subject in a letter to Samuel Redhead he 
wrote:
Upon reading over my Letter, a Doubt occurs whether 
to take the Barbuda Negroes almost upon any Terms; 
for living so long there and having their fill of 
fresh Provisions and but little Labour, they wou'd 
not methinks be able to endure hard Labour and sorry 
Food, this with ye change of Country might throw 
them into disorders and possibly Occasion the Loss 
of some.9
Both Redhead and Crump, another attorney, advised him to 
stock his Antiguan estates with new seasoned slaves, when 
possible. In 1831, Jarritt made the same point in a letter 
to Sir Bethell Codrington. He wrote: 'Barbuda negroes are 
said not to answer in this island [Antigua]; and the reason 
is obvious 1 . On Barbuda they could 'ramble through the 
Woods, all the hours of the Night taking anything that comes 
in their Way 1 . In Antigua they could not get used to stay­ 
ing in their houses at night, nor could they adapt to the
12 damp, chilly air, very different from that on Barbuda.
The transfer of children in 1780-1 from Barbuda to 
Antigua (described in the previous chapter) looks at first 
like corroborative evidence of stud farming, especially as 
it was treated as a sale in the accounts. Actually, though, 
this seems to have been a sudden decision as the parents had 
to be 'induced 1 to part with their children and the children 
themselves bribed in some measure. The results, so far 
as they can be ascertained, confirmed the fears of Sir William 
In 1793 the List for Betty's Hope gives only eleven slaves
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with the surname Barbuda, although thirty had been sent
14there, and in 1810 James, referring to an incident (pres­ 
umably that of 1780-1) when some young Barbudans were drafted 
to the Antiguan estates, wrote: 'I have heard that many of 
them died, some Girls were sent back, not being able to stand 
the work in Antigua 1 . About 20 seem to have returned to 
Barbuda but in March 1810, in accordance with a demand by 
Hodge (an Antiguan attorney) these slaves were sent back to 
Antigua with their families. James commented: 'I am sorry 
to find that the best of them, a young Man about 22 years 
Old, is already dead, they left with the greatest reluctance. 1
The idea of Barbuda as a stud farm runs totally counter 
to the actual pattern of society on the island. Unlike most 
slave societies in the Caribbean at this time, the slaves on 
Barbuda had formed stable sexual relationships and were 
organized in families. The sudden removal of the children
in 1780-1 seems to have had an immediate adverse effect on
17 the population, and numbers of births dropped. This reaction
to the events of 1780-1 leads to the conclusion that stud 
farming could not have been practised on such a community 
where family life mattered.
The unusually healthy appearance of the slaves on Barbuda, 
however, made such an impression on Christopher (Bethell) 
Codrington on his visit in 1790 that he suggested to Sir 
William that Barbuda 'would be a fine Nursery for Negroes,
who, bought young would come at an easy expense, and who
18 might be fed here, also at little expense 1 . Unaware then
of the problems presented by transfers of slaves he commented 
in 1790: 'nor do I doubt Children thriving better there 
[Barbuda] than here [Antigua], who might annually be drafted
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when of a proper age and strength into your different 
Regiments here; they might begin their Career as Field
Negroes at the commencement of the crop, which is the time
19when numbers are most wanted 1 . He went on to outline
another scheme: 'if I bought negroes, I would buy them at 
the age of 10 or 12 and send them to Barbuda; they would
at that age come cheap, would live better and at little ex-
20 pense there, and I doubt not would do well 1 . Sir William
apparently approved of Barbuda being used as a 'nursery for
21Negroes' but he died soon after the suggestion was made.
The idea was mooted again in 1792 for different reasons. 
Walrond, believing that bad behaviour on the part of the 
Barbudans might be due to their 'long family connections', 
suggested that 'Their families should be broke by sending the 
Young occasionally here [Antigua]; and they might be replaced 
by purchases of the Smallest New Ones for which the Island 
would be an excellent nursery from its plenty and Healthiness.
There would be no Cruelty in this, as when young they come
22here, and are parted from their parents very chearfully*.
Despite these suggestions there is no actual evidence 
that Barbuda was used in this way. Although Christopher 
(Bethell) Codrington had made the suggestion he had done so 
as a young, inexperienced visitor who knew next to nothing 
of conditions in the West Indies. As an owner, however, he 
seems to have been conscious of the effect of transfers on
the slaves and to have avoided taking any action which would
23harm them. The problems caused by the French Wars may
24 also have prevented such transfers. The French were active
in the area at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the 
nineteenth centuries and communication between Caribbean
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islands was more hazardous than usual. Also schemes involv­ 
ing purchases of slaves were not sensible undertakings when 
the abolition of the slave trade was being considered.
Nevertheless there was always an irregular interchange 
of slaves between the two islands. Barbudan craftsmen were
sometimes sent to Antigua, and there are references to young
25 Barbudan slaves being sent there to learn a trade. It
seems also to have been usual for Antiguan craftsmen to work
2 6 
on Barbuda occasionally. It is possible that Antiguan
27 slaves who had been ill were sent to Barbuda to recover and
certainly some superannuated Antiguan slaves settled on
2 Q 
Barbuda. These elderly slaves seem to have had earlier
links with the island. Guyam Barbuda, for example, was
listed as the driver of a field gang at Betty's Hope in 1793
29 30when he was 35. In 1808 he is described as a watchman.
By 1817 he is listed—still at Betty's Hope — under the title
31 'Aged 1 but from 1818 to 1827 he is noted as being at Barbuda.
His surname suggests he was one of those drafted to Antigua 
in 1780-1. Another slave, Lamba Barbuda, illustrates the
same point. In 1805 she is on the Barbuda list under the
32 heading 'Belonging to Antigua . . .' She seems to have
remained in Barbuda until 1818 when she returned to Betty's 
Hope. Unfortunately there is no evidence to show whether 
she volunteered to return or whether she was simply drafted 
back when transfers were sanctioned by Codrington in 1817. 
It is interesting to observe that although she had previously 
been listed under 'Old People 1 or even 'Very old and diseased 
People 1 , when she returned to Betty's Hope (though still
under the same general title) she is described as a gardener
34 in 1819 and 1820, and as the overseers' cook in 1826.
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There is no evidence that those slaves who lived on 
Antigua regarded Barbuda as a haven for their old age, rather 
the reverse. If given a choice most Antiguan slaves were 
no more anxious to go Barbuda than Barbudan slaves were to 
go to Antigua. Christopher (Bethell) Codrington explained 
this graphically to his uncle: 'Manumitting them is confer­ 
ring happiness upon them, but, sending them to Barbuda as 
you mention (tho 1 it would be something less expensive to
you perhaps than keeping of them here) would be sending them
35 to Botany Bay*. Transfers in either direction seem to
have been unpopular with the slaves and, as has already been 
explained, transfer to the Antiguan estates was the most 
effective method of punishing slaves on Barbuda. There 
is no evidence, in the eighteenth century, of regular drafting 
of slaves from Barbuda to work on the Antiguan estates.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the question 
of transfers of slaves from Barbuda to work on Antigua was 
re-opened by the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 which 
made it much more difficult to purchase slaves. At the same 
time the Barbudan population was increasing fast. The 
Antiguan estates were short of labour, while on Barbuda 
there was too little work for the increasing number of 
inhabitants. It was clearly in the interests of the pro­ 
prietor to be able to transfer slaves from Barbuda to 
Antigua and from the early 1800s the Codrington attorneys in 
Antigua encouraged Sir Bethell to move his surplus slaves
•DO
from Barbuda to Antigua. For many years he was reluctant 
to do so because he did not want to harm them. In a letter 
to Hodge in June 1809, he wrote: 'In a former letter you 
threw out an Idea of taking the Negroes from Barbuda with a
238
view of fixing them on the Plantation in Antigua; But this 
would be attended with so much hardship towards the Barbuda
Negroes that I would sooner lose the Income than resort to
39 it 1 . He expressed the same view in a letter to James:
'My Antigua Profits would undoubtedly be increased, and I 
think it probable that those from Barbuda might not be 
decreased. But what wd be the effect on the Minds of the
Negroes? Twere better to forego the Profit than to act with
40 Cruelty. 1 The slaves themselves were very much against any
removal from Barbuda, whether permanent or temporary, and 
made it clear to James that they would not go to Antigua of 
their own free-will.
The reluctance of the slaves to leave Barbuda must have 
had considerable influence on Sir Bethell because there is 
no evidence of permanent transfers at this stage. He 
remained concerned, however, about the large numbers on 
Barbuda who could not be usefully employed there. In January 
1809 he wrote:
I have given much of my Attention latterly to this 
Subject with a view to ascertaining why the Profits 
from Barbuda have not been in any degree proportion­ 
ate to the number of Negroes or the quantity of 
Stock on the Island and whether some plan cannot be 
hit upon to produce something like an adequate 
return; for the fact is indisputable that if the 
Negroes were sent over to Antigua to be employed as 
Task Gangs they alone would earn considerably more 
than the whole Profits now arising from the Island,
their Earnings there and the Sale of Stock etcT . 4?^ inclusive. **•
He suggested that they might be persuaded to leave Barbuda 
temporarily to help on the Antiguan estates at times of
special need— at crop time or when new cane land was being
43 prepared. 'It strikes me, 1 he wrote, 'that it might be
possible even to make a Pleasure of it by sending them over 
for a few Weeks, at times when they would be most serviceable. 1
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There were disadvantages in a plan of this kind. In 
war-time the slaves might be captured by enemy vessels, and
there was always the danger of disease being transmitted to
45 Barbuda when they returned. James objected to the scheme,
too, on the grounds that he would never know how many men
46 he might have on Barbuda. Despite these difficulties,
though, Sir Bethell remained convinced that this was the best 
way to make the slaves useful while taking their feelings 
into account.
Even so no action seems to have been taken until 1817. 
In that year he obtained exemption from a clause in an
Antiguan Act which would have prevented him from moving
48 slaves between Barbuda and Antigua ; and from then he seems
to have decided that slaves should be transferred to Antigua
49 on a temporary basis when they were needed there. James,
knowing that they would object very strongly to this, 
requested that a positive order should be sent 'for a certain 
number to be removed, in which case your orders must and 
shall be put into execution 1 . In a letter to James in 1818 
Codrington made his wishes plain:
I do not wish you to send what are profitable and of 
use in Barbuda but I beg that any number beyond that, 
and in all cases where it can be done without apparent 
hardship, may be made somehow profitable which they 
will be if sent to my Plantation in Antigua. They 
may return occasionally to see their Friends or their 
Friends to see them and I see no hardship whatever 
in their Removal.^1
Between 1817 and 1834 ninety slaves were sent from Barbuda
to work on the Antiguan estates. Of these twelve returned
52 after a few years so that a total of seventy-eight were
long-stay transfers and most of them—fifty-one — were sent
•>
after 1828. There is no indication of the composition of
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the last two groups as they were transferred to Antigua after 
the compilation of the 1832 list, but it seems likely that 
they would have followed the pattern of most of the previous 
groups consisting mainly of young adult men with some women
and children. The following table shows the composition of
53 the groups given in the slave lists from 1817 to 1832.
1817-21
1821-4
1824-8
1828-32
Totals
Men
7
(6 aged 12-19 
1 no age given)
7
(1 aged 48 
1 aged 34 
4 aged 20-5 
1 aged 17
6
(5 aged 22-7 
1 aged 18)
1
(aged 22)
6
( 1 aged 46 
5 aged 20-7)
27
Women
—
5
(1 aged 43 
3 aged 24-6 
1 aged 16)
5
(4 aged 22-4 
1 no age given)
—
1
(aged 29)
11
Children
_
3
(aged 13, 9, 7)
5
(aged 13,11, 9, 
and 2 infants)
—
6
(5 under 11 
1 no age given)
14
Total
7
15
(to B. Hope)
16
(to C. Hall)
1
13
52
These transfers were not effected in the way envisaged 
by Sir Bethell Codrington. Firstly, of the ninety slaves 
sent to Antigua, only twelve seem to have returned, so these 
were in the nature of permanent, not temporary removals. 
Secondly, the slaves who were transferred did not go willingly
In 1818 James described them as 'very loath 1 to leave 
54Barbuda. As the slaves seemed to think that he had the
power to keep them in Barbuda he had written to Osborn to 
come and take them off himself 'for altho I do not expect any 
great opposition, yet I think it but fair as he is to receive
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the benefit of their removal that he should also take a share
55 of the trouble should any occur 1 . It was impossible to
persuade the slaves to volunteer and James was reduced to 
looking out for slaves who were misbehaving in some way so 
that he could transfer them to Antigua as a punishment.
c C
This was the way the first seven sere selected (1817-21) 
and most of those sent to Clare Hall in the second group
(1821-4). Some had been found killing sheep, others had
57 been caught stealing material intended for clothing. They
seem to have been accompanied to Antigua by their wives and 
families. It seems likely that the fifteen sent to Betty's 
Hope between 1821 and 1824 had also been found committing 
some misdemeanour.
In the mid-l820s the attorneys still seem to have hoped 
that the Barbudans could be persuaded to settle in Antigua 
but the reaction of the slaves to their suggestions made them 
realize that they would only leave if forced to do so. In 
1826 James and Osborn both went over to Barbuda in order to 
persuade some of them to settle on the Antiguan estates. 
James had ordered the slaves to be mustered and everything 
went quite well until 'we got Nearly through the Women when 
they all declared they would not leave the Island unless
CO
compelled by force 1 . Eventually James persuaded the trades­ 
men, such as masons and carpenters, to assist him in Antigua 
but on the understanding that they should be allowed to 
return when their work was done. He hoped some of the young
people would join them and would settle when they had made
59 connections. He was disappointed in these hopes as only
one male slave was transferred between 1824 and 1828, presum­ 
ably for some misdemeanour. By 1829 Jarritt was advising
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Sir Bethell that 'to talk of removing any of the Negroes now 
from Barbuda they would laugh at us. They set us at 
defiance. And nothing but a Strong Military force could 
remove them 1 . In March 1834 slaves were needed on the 
Antiguan estates but they were not sent and Jarritt expres­ 
sed himself as afraid to take them 'thinking they will be 
more trouble and plague than profit and that if they should 
come they will be unmanageable 1 . Those who were sent at 
this time seem again to have been those caught in some act
of disobedience. In 1830 seven were sent to Antigua after
6 p being detected killing cattle, and the next year a man and
wife with their five children were transferred having been
fi T
discovered four times at night in the woods with a gun. 
Nineteen slaves who were sent to the Windward estates in 
September 1832 were the ringleaders (with their families)
in the uprising of 1832 when the manager, Winter, had to
64 send for troops from Antigua to restore order. Another
nineteen seem to have been sent to Antigua before this, 
presumably for some other misdemeanour.
The removal of these slaves from Barbuda between 1817 
and 1832 did not significantly affect labour on the island. 
In 1809 Hodge had calculated that eighty to a hundred could 
be moved from Barbuda to Antigua and in 1820 James thought
Barbuda would do much better with only half the number of
6 7 
slaves then on the island. There were 411 slaves there
in 1821 so he presumably thought that up to two hundred men, 
women, and children could be moved without detriment. Ten 
years later it was suggested that three hundred slaves from 
Barbuda should be sold: 'supposing it possible to obtain 
for them £50 Sterling each you would by such a proceeding
243
become possessed of £15,000 and at the same time be released 
from the heavy expence of maintaining so large a number of
useless beings, as well as the Security of your Property
fi ft 
being less doubtful 1 .
The slaves who were transferred to Antigua were not all 
of one sex and age, so that the loss was spread over the 
whole community up to forty-five years old. A study of the 
numbers in each age range, however, does reveal a decline in 
the most useful members of the society — those aged between 
twenty and forty — as the chart below shows: 
Chart to show the degree of correlation in numbers of slaves in each^
age-group between:
1817
0-10 years
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
1821
(1) 1817 and 1828
(2) 1821 and 1831
126 slaves
97
41
47
35
27
11
11-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
1828
years 111 slaves
77
27
44
27
13
7
1831
0-10 years 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61-70
125 slaves 
101
57
28
50
25
14
11-20 years
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
61-70
71-80
115 slaves 
78 
43 
30 
36 
17 
7 "
The population pyramids in the article by Professor Lowenthal
69and Dr. Clarke also make this clear. Despite these trans­
fers, however, there still seem to have been sufficient 
slaves to do the work on Barbuda.
It is not easy to ascertain the effect of the transfers 
on the slaves themselves. Some were obviously eager to 
return if given the chance. Of the sixteen listed as sent to 
Clare Hall in the 1824 list, twelve had returned by 1828.
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There is no record of what happened to most of the others, 
but Elias Webber, aged sixteen in 1817 and sent to Betty's 
Hope by 1821, was described by Jarritt in 1829 as 'a Notor­ 
ious bad Character ... a native of Barbuda, who has 
persevered to the last 1 . All the other slaves on Betty's 
Hope were described as behaving well.
The transfers must have caused some distress to the
slaves concerned as illustrated in the case of Guy. This
72 slave lived on Barbuda but was apparently transferred to
Antigua — Betty's Hope — along with another slave, Hall, between 
1814 and 1817. In the Betty's Hope lists for 1817 and 1818 
he is described as a field worker and boiler. In the list
for 1826 he was Chief Boiler—the most important slave on a
74sugar estate, but the next year a tragic series of incid­ 
ents happened to him. On 5 March he was publicly accused by 
the slaves of poisoning the cattle on the estate. He was 
kept closely confined and the cattle which were sick before, 
died. On 21 April he was freed after being flogged on the 
orders of four magistrates. Then, curiously, he was again 
appointed as a cattle-keeper. In eleven days one of the 
bulls under his care died. Sand and bits of wire were found
in its stomach. Guy was again imprisoned, and flogged on
75 2 June, after which he was kept in confinement. It is
difficult to guess the cause of this strange sequence of 
events. Had Guy, an outsider from Barbuda, become so con­ 
ceited by his quick promotion to Chief Boiler that he had 
alienated the other slaves who plotted against him? Or was 
he simply an innocent victim of the envy of less successful 
slaves? Or did he still resent his transfer to Antigua?
Whatever the reasons the incident illustrates the human
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tensions which affected the lives of slaves particularly 
when removed to new surroundings.
It is to Sir Bethell Codrington's credit that throughout 
this period he did take the feelings of the slaves into account. 
Before 1817 he resisted the idea of transferring slaves to 
Antigua because of their attachment to Barbuda; after 1817 
he neither used force to move them against their will, nor 
sold them when he could have made a profit. He was anxious, 
however, to receive as much compensation as possible for the 
Barbudan slaves at the time of emancipation. This led him 
to develop again the idea of Barbuda's fitness as a 'Nursery 
for Negroes'. Writing to the Colonial Secretary he observed 
that the value of Barbuda lay 'chiefly in its extreme fitness 
for a nursery for negroes — and that in this respect it was 
not only a Source of much profit to your Memorialist and his 
Ancestors, but also (in so far as its supply went) a prevent­ 
ive to the inhumanity of the African Slave Trade'. He went 
on to say
That, if your Memorialist has not, of late years, 
transported negroes from Barbuda to his other estates 
it has been solely on account of their excessive 
attachment to their native soil, and to the mode 
of treatment adopted by your Memorialist and his 
ancestors to them and theirs — an attachment so strong 
as to make it painful for your memorialist to use the 
means which would be necessary for their removal.^6
It is clear that he himself did not actually consider this fac­ 
tor to be the most important attribute of Barbuda as in another 
statement to the Colonial Secretary (after the passing of the 
Emancipation Act) he explained that 'the chief Profit has arisen 
from raising provisions for the neighbouring Isles, supplying 
them with working Cattle which run wild over the Island 1 . 
At the time of emancipation, however, his aim was to obtain
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as much compensation as he could. Though he had not actually 
profited as he would have liked from the high population of 
Barbuda, which had in fact been a liability rather than an 
asset, yet he hoped that he might secure special benefit at 
emancipation from the peculiar advantages Barbuda possessed.
Unfortunately for the Codringtons, Barbuda did not 
provide the Antiguan estates with the labour they needed. 
In the eighteenth century when African slaves were easy to 
obtain this was not a problem and in any case experienced 
slave-owners and their attorneys recognized that the purchase 
of new and seasoned Africans was proably easier than trans­ 
ferring slaves from one island to another with a different 
life-style. This attitude was proved to be right in 1780-1 
when the experiment of transferring slaves from Barbuda to 
Antigua was tried and failed. When it was impossible to 
obtain Africans, however, the desirability of using surplus 
slaves from Barbuda was clear to all those in charge of the 
Codrington properties. Sir Bethell was, however, reluctant 
to take any measure which might be harmful to the slaves but 
the rapid increase in the island's population and his anxiety 
to make Barbuda pay eventually led him to sanction their 
transfer from Barbuda to Antigua for limited periods. In 
this he was for the most part thwarted by the Barbudans 
themselves.
Not surprisingly the slaves preferred to remain on 
Barbuda. Work on the Antiguan sugar estates held no attrac­ 
tion for slaves used to a much easier discipline and no 
inducement was offered which was likely to make them want 
to leave their homes and friends on Barbuda. Nor was the use 
of force a solution to the problem. Faced with the united
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opposition of the slaves the management would have had to 
call on a considerable contingent of troops from Antigua, 
and loss of life would not have been in anyone's interest. 
Thus it seems the only slaves who were transferred to the 
sugar estates were those who had been found committing some 
crime. Even then the slaves seem to have been treated fairly 
Crimes do not seem to have been invented, and the slaves who 
were punished were accompanied by their wives and families. 
Their conditions were not to be compared with those of con­ 
temporary English labourers who, found guilty of breaking 
the law, were transported, without their families, to other 
continents.
The facts then relating to the transfer of slaves from 
Barbuda to Antigua bear no relationship to the myth of 
slave-breeding. There was no deliberately contrived breeding 
of slaves nor was the island used as a 'nursery for Negroes' 
in the sense suggested by Sir Bethel! Codrington. For many 
years in fact the owner was prepared to recognize and comply 
with the wishes of his slaves even though by so doing his 
own best interests were not being served. In later years 
he was forced to recognize that in the face of the united 
opposition of the slaves he was powerless to carry out an 
unpopular policy.
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CONCLUSION
The history of Barbuda between 1738 and 1833 divides roughly 
into two distinct periods. The first, from 1738 to 1779, 
illustrates what can happen to the property of an absentee 
landowner when those to whom he has delegated authority do 
not exercise it fairly or efficiently. In the first eight 
years the lack of effective leadership led to low profits, 
discontent among the slaves and eventually to outright rebel­ 
lion and the murder of the manager. Nothing so dramatic 
occurred between 1761 and 1779 under Redhead's administration/ 
but little was done to improve the island as was clearly 
noted by the Governor of the Leewards in 1779 when he described 
Barbuda as still in a state of nature. Increases in the 
population of the slaves seem to suggest that they were not 
unhappy under this regime, but the proprietor was dissatis­ 
fied with his poor returns.
In 1779 changes were made in the administration which 
gave the manager more authority, and in Dennis Reynolds Sir 
William had someone who was prepared to work hard. Improve­ 
ments in stock-breeding and in the cultivation of crops met 
with considerable success despite the island's natural 
disadvantages, and in these years Barbuda always made a profit 
even though not necessarily large enough to satisfy the 
proprietor. This progress continued, though with changes in 
the administration, until the early 1820s when John James, 
the second notable manager of Barbuda, made his home on 
Antigua instead of Barbuda. The economy at that time suffered
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from disrupting outside influences and internal unrest, and 
it was unfortunate that this coincided with slack 
administration. Nevertheless there was no serious rebellion 
on Barbuda in the years before emancipation.
Both Sir William and Sir Bethell Codrington recognized 
that Barbuda's value to them was as a complement to their 
sugar estates on Antigua: thus the management of Barbuda 
was never separated from the administration of the Antiguan 
plantations. Both proprietors recognized that as absentees 
they could be cheated by lazy or unscrupulous employees and 
they were unremitting in their efforts to overcome this 
disadvantage. Long letters full of advice, instructions, 
and criticism (rarely praise!) were despatched, and full 
reports were expected in reply. Nor were they unprepared to 
finance developments in Barbuda: Sir William in particular 
spared neither time, energy, nor money in his efforts to 
supply the island with the livestock, seed, or equipment that 
were required. It is a tribute to the energy and conscien­ 
tiousness of these two men that though Barbuda was a remote 
island and communications were slow and uncertain, their 
wishes were often made effective.
For both men, however, the crucial question was whether 
Barbuda made a profit. After 1779, until the early 1820s, 
this was usually achieved through sales of livestock, crops, 
and other commodities; and the estates were regularly sent 
stock, ground provisions, wood, lime, and other supplies 
which were credited to the Barbudan account. In addition, 
the proprietors received handsome, if irregular, amounts from 
salvage.
Despite these apparent successes, however, the
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Codringtons rarely expressed satisfaction with their returns 
from Barbuda. This was in part because they expected an 
amount in proportion to the capital invested in stock and 
slaves, which was rarely achieved. They both tended to 
blame the managers and attorneys for this. Sir William 
thought that money was being diverted into the pockets of 
his employees, Sir Bethell was inclined to think that his 
instructions were just being ignored. While there may have 
been some truth in both these views, more substantial reasons 
for disappointing results were the problems caused by thin, 
infertile soil and frequent droughts. These difficulties 
only too often destroyed the hopes of the men working there. 
The Codringtons were liable to ignore these, while conversely 
placing confidence in the too sanguine accounts of Barbuda's 
potential given by men who had no experience of living there. 
In spite of their protests, when the income from wrecks is 
taken into account, in addition to the regular supplies sent 
to the estates and the profits made from outside sales, one 
is forced to conclude that the Codringtons did better from 
Barbuda than they were prepared to admit. It is perhaps 
significant that despite their complaints they did not wish 
to surrender their lease of the island.
As owners of slaves the Codringtons differed somewhat 
in attitude. Sir William believed in firm discipline and 
did not take their feelings into account as his nephew did. 
Sir Bethell gave much thought to their reactions. He did 
not force those who were well-behaved to work on the Antiguan 
estates, nor did he consider selling surplus slaves, though 
this was suggested to him. He believed in their loyalty even 
when his attorneys wrote disparagingly about them.
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Nevertheless he did not provide a qualified doctor, priest, 
or teacher for the island, and in these and some other, less 
important, respects Barbudan slaves were worse off than their 
contemporaries on Antigua.
For the slaves, however, these were minor matters com­ 
pared with the positive advantages they possessed on Barbuda. 
They were not tied to the rigorous discipline of the sugar 
estates, their work was varied and it often provided oppor­ 
tunities for initiative and sometimes for adventure. They 
were free to wander over the island and they could add 
variety to their diet. More important, they were able to 
develop stable relationships and have children, with some 
certainty that they would be able to bring them up. Apart 
from the experiment of 1780-1, they could be confident that 
their children would remain with them on the island unless 
they were law-breakers, and some slaves even lived to see 
their children and grandchildren working alongside them.
The historian cannot be indifferent to the evils of 
slavery, but on Barbuda it is possible to discern a slave 
society which was not without dignity. Their conditions were 
not degrading and the fact that there were so few white over­ 
seers meant that the slaves had to be trusted. It is a pity, 
though, that the records available, while copious, do not 
provide more information about how the slaves felt. There 
is no description of festivities, amusements or customs, 
which could indicate attitudes.
The feelings of the slaves, however, are revealed in 
two ways. First, there was a natural increase in the popu­ 
lation which shows not only a willingness to bear children 
but a surprising lack of infant mortality: this is surely
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evidence of psychological and physical well-being. Secondly, 
the slaves showed a remarkable attachment to Barbuda itself. 
The island provided a way of life which suited them and in 
the 1820s, when the will of the management was clearly to 
encourage transfers to Antigua, they showed a strong and 
united desire to remain on the island. This they regarded 
as the homeland which they would soon inherit.
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Appendix II
HUMANITY, A WEST INDIAN SLAVE, 1758-1818
One of the most frustrating problems for the historian con­ 
cerned with slavery is the lack of evidence about individual 
slaves. As with the deprived in any community, slaves were 
unable to provide written information about themselves, and 
their owners or overseers only recorded facts which would be 
useful for their own purposes, giving the minimum of detail. 
Slave lists were not compiled with any regularity in the 
eighteenth century and as the individuals listed usually 
only had one name — and that often a common one — it is dif­ 
ficult to identify them from list to list. The historian 
can, therefore, often find useful information about slaves in 
general, but cannot usually discover sufficient facts about 
a single individual to write anything of value. In the 
records relating to Barbuda, however, there are frequent ref­ 
erences to one with an unusual name and a responsible job, 
which makes it possible to identify him reliably. It is an 
interesting exercise to see how far these references allow 
an accurate biography of an individual slave to be constructed
The slave concerned was called Humanity and, from the 
date when he was first mentioned, in 1782, to the time of his 
death in 1818 he seems to have been one of the regular sailors 
on the island, usually captain of the principal sloop. He is 
first noted in 1782 as the captain of the Forager, and
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responsible for apprehending a runaway slave called Jetway 
in St. John's, Antigua. He was rewarded with the sum of 
£10. Unfortunately he is not mentioned in the slave list
for Barbuda compiled in 1783, when only two sailors are
2named. Possibly only the slaves actually present on the
island were recorded and Humanity and his crew may have been 
at sea or based on Antigua at the time. This omission is 
the more unfortunate as this particular list is especially 
informative, giving interesting comments on the slaves' 
characters and showing some family relationships. However,
in the accounts after this — and in subsequent slave lists —
3Humanity is regularly mentioned.
The work of the sailors was of paramount importance. 
Barbuda relied entirely on Antigua for supplies and contacts 
with the outside world, and it was therefore essential that 
the sailors, and particularly the captains, should be trust­ 
worthy men. Not only did they have to be competent mariners 
and navigators but they had to be honest and reliable men, 
able to be trusted with valuable cargoes and mail.
There seem usually to have been two sloops used for 
communication with Antigua, with a total of up to fifteen 
sailors. Humanity was the first in the list and had a crew 
of six to eight slaves. When the sloops were working, all 
the sailors were paid a regular weekly allowance of 4s. l^d. 
and Humanity and the captain of the other vessel were paid 
8s. 3d. In addition they were paid if they worked on a 
Sunday or at night. Medical care was provided and so was 
some sort of uniform. The accounts show purchases at some­ 
what irregular intervals but they seem to have been provided 
with shirts, blue jackets and trousers, and at times these 
were made on the island.
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Humanity himself seems throughout the period — though not 
always regularly—to have been given special favours. He 
was given a great coat costing £2. 9s. 6d. in February 1795, 
and in November, two check shirts costing 14s. 3d. each, and
Q
two pairs of duck trousers. He was well looked after when 
he was unable to work for medical reasons. He was paid his
regular sum of 8s. 3d. a week when he was ill for six weeks
9 in 1798, and in 1805 was given special care when he seems
to have been seriously ill. On 2 August 1805, four yards 
of flannel costing £1. 12s. Od. were provided for him and on 
17 November there is an entry of £8. 2s. Od. for 'three 
dozen wine given to Humanity when sick 1 . He seems, too, 
to have been given his weekly allowance when the crew was 
not paid for some reason, presumably because the sloop was 
laid up. Slaves were usually given special provisions at 
Christmas and the accounts for Barbuda show this to have been
usual and for special gifts to be given to the principal
12slaves. Humanity seems to have been given such presents
and to have received them more frequently than other slaves 
of similar standing on the island. Half a barrel of pork,
costing between three and four pounds, was the most normal
13 gift but there were others. In June 1796 a whole barrel
of pork costing £8. 5s. Od. was provided for Humanity and 
'the new negroes', in December 1805 he was given a barrel 
of flour (which cost £4.10s.Od.), 1 and in February 1808 
another barrel of flour was bought for the captain of the 
Barbuda, presumably Humanity. There are occasional money 
payments in lieu of the pork1 or for some other specific
reason. On 12 November 1795, for example, he was paid
1 8 £1. 13s. Od. for 'a parcell of old rope picked up at sea 1 .
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The sailors' usual work consisted of frequent journeys 
between Barbuda and Antigua but they must also have been 
involved with the rescue of passengers, crew, and cargoes 
from ships wrecked off the Barbudan coasts. They were also 
used in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
for transporting sugar from the Codrington estates to the
19ocean shipping. In the first quarter of 1813 the prin­ 
cipal sloop was so fully engaged in this way that she only 
visited Barbuda once.
Humanity's work must, therefore, have been full of 
variety and sometimes of adventure, most of it unknown. 
One incident, however, is recorded. In 1796, on a journey 
from Barbuda to Antigua in the Kennet, Humanity mistook a 
schooner privateer for the ship of an English naval officer 
who was due to visit Barbuda for health reaons. He realized 
his mistake too late. The Kennet was captured and her crew 
might have been taken to the French island of Guadeloupe. 
Fortunately, however, the privateer was intercepted by an
English ship, H.M.S. L 'Aimable, and Humanity and five other
21 slaves were removed and taken on board. A record of
28 September 1796 shows the amount — £800 — paid for the sal-
22
vage of Humanity, Will, Primus, Jacob, Othello, and Simon.
There is little further direct evidence about Humanity's 
activities. He continued to be listed as the first sailor 
up to the time of his death which is recorded in the list 
of 1817. There he is described as 'Male, Black, Sixty Years', 
and in the margin in red ink was noted, 'Died the 28th. April 
1818. 23 There is no record of his funeral in the accounts 
although in a previous year a sailor's funeral was listed in 
the expenses. He may have had one son on Barbuda as a
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child under one year, bearing his name, is included in the
O C
1805 and subsequent slave lists, but the name need not 
imply that Humanity was the father. There is no record of 
other children, but he could have had a large family, on 
Antigua or Barbuda. Among the slaves, Humanity must have 
been regarded as a wealthy man. Not only did he receive 
the money noted in the accounts, but probably he was also
given commission by white overseers, and other slaves, for
2 c 
the transport of their goods to Antigua for sale. He
might well have been able to afford to purchase his freedom 
if he had thought it worth his while.
These records do provide some facts about the life of 
a highly valued slave. His job gave him responsibility 
over other men's lives and over valuable cargoes, and a 
chance to exercise considerable maritime skills in varied 
and sometimes dangerous situations. That he continued so 
long in this position is an indication that he was both com­ 
petent and trustworthy. As captain of a sloop, even though 
a slave, he was in a highly privileged position with oppor­ 
tunities for disloyal activities. The records, however, 
show no sign of his ever having taken advantage of his 
position in this way: on the contrary they show he was 
highly thought of by his owners and their employees. It is 
impossible to find out, however, how he was regarded by the 
other slaves and there is no indication of how he himself 
thought about his life. It is a curious fact that slaves 
are rarely mentioned by name in the correspondence even 
though the owners must have known something about them from 
the lists. Humanity was the principal sailor when Christopher 
(Bethell) Codrington visited the West Indies in 1790-1 so he
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must have met him, but no inquiry was ever made about him 
and there is no reference to his death in the correspondence 
available. 27
Accepting the limitations, it is still possible to 
learn sufficient about particular slaves to make the exer­ 
cise worthwhile. At least it shows the variety of life 
possible within the slave system and indicates that there 
was some scope for the development of individual initiative. 
It has to be acknowledged, however, that even when reliable 
identification is possible and there are sufficient refer­ 
ences to a particular slave, one is still frustrated by the 
gaps in the record. There is almost no reference in these 
documents to show how individual slaves felt. Only when 
someone rebelled is there a clue—but for the vast majority 
who accepted the system there is no way of assessing their 
attitude to their lives and situation.
Notes to Appendix II
1 GRO, D1610 A54 9 Dec. 1782.
2 GRO, D1610 E17 Slave List for Barbuda 1783.
3 i.e. in 1805, 1814, 1817. All GRO, D1610 E17.
4 See the series of accounts, GRO, D1610 A6/1-15 and A56/4.
5 e.g. GRO, D1610 A6/5, 11 Dec. 1789, A6/6, 5 July 1790; 
A6/6, 11 Jan. 1791.
6 e.g. GRO, D1610 A6/8.
7 See accounts generally. In the early nineteenth century 
the provision of uniform seems to have been more regular for 
a time—between 1807 and 1814 they received at least new 
jackets each year; GRO, D1610 A56/4. In 1807 and 1812 
thread was purchased for making sailors' jackets; A56/4.
8 GRO, D1610 A6/10.
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9 GRO, D1610 A6/13.
10 GRO, D1610 A56/4.
e.g. GRO,D1610 A6/9. In the Accounts for the 4th quarter, 
Humanity was paid each week but not the crew.
12
See, for example, GRO, D1610 A6/3.
13 e.g., GRO, D1610 A6/4, A6/5, A6/6, A6/7.
14 GRO, D1610 A6/11.
15 GRO, D1610 A56/4.
16 Ibid.
17 e.g. GRO, D1610 A6/12.
1 8
GRO, D1610 A6/10.
19 GRO, D1610 C16 Athill to C.B.C., 7 June 1799; D161O 
C24 James to C.B.C., Apr. 1809.
20
GRO, D1610 C24 James to C.B.C., 30 Apr.1813.
21 GRO, D1610 C16, Athill to C.B.C., 20 Sept. 1796.
22 GRO, D1610 A6/11, 28 Sept. 1796.
23 GRO, D1610 E17 Slave List 1817.
24
GRO, D1610 A56/4, 1812. The funeral expenses came to
£9. 3s. Od.
25 Slave Lists 1805-32. For full details see Chaper, 6,
n. 85.
26 GRO, D1610 C30 Winter to C.B.C., 10 Apr. 1833, also 
James to C.B.C., 7 Sept. 1824, formerly at Dodington. These 
letters show the amount of produce the slaves had for sale. 
There are many references in the correspondence implying 
that the overseers were making money on the side — presumably 
selling goods or stock from the island on their own behalf, 
e.g. see Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 46 and 51-2.
27 Humanity is occasionally mentioned by name by S. Athill
(especially in the account of his capture by privateers, 
GRO, D1610 C16) but there are no interesting comments about 
him.
Appendix III
LIST OF THE MANAGERS OF BARBUDA AND ANTIGUAN ATTORNEYS 
MENTIONED IN THE TEXT 1738-1833
Managers (Governors) of Barbuda
Thomas Beech Dates uncertain but he had left the
island by August 1741.
Simon Punter Dates uncertain but he was manager in
1742 and 1743.
? McNish Murdered on Barbuda by the slaves in
December 1745.
Between 1761 and 1779 there was a 
series of managers all supervised by 
Samuel Redhead who sometimes lived 
on the island himself (with Sally Bullock, 
a Barbudan slave).
Dennis Reynolds Principal overseer 1779-82.
Manager 1782-93 (?).
William Collins Succeeded Reynolds, dismissed 1801.
John James Manager 1804-26
Attorney (for Barbuda) 1805-26. 
(Also manager and attorney for Clare 
Hall, Antigua 1822-6) .
John Winter Manager 1827-36 (in Englandc. 1828-30).
Attorney for Barbuda 1830-6.
Attorneys principally mentioned in this thesis 
(apart from those who were also Managers of Barbuda)
Colonel King Attorney for Antigua and Barbuda
1740-51 (for Barbuda only until the 
start of the lease to Martin and Byam 
1746).
Samuel Redhead Manager of Betty's Hope and attorney
for Antigua 1751-79, and for Barbuda 
from the end of the lease in 1761 to 
1779.
Richard Oliver Assistant attorney 1779-81.
Attorney 1781-3, for Antigua and Barbuda. 
He was an ancestor of V.L. Oliver, 
author of the History of Antigua.
Richard Clarke Manager of Betty's Hope and attorney
for Antigua and Barbuda, 1779-82.
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Langford Lovell
J.L. Walrond
Samuel Athill
Samuel Martin
Attorney specially responsible for 
Barbuda, 1783-92.
Manager of Betty's Hope, 1783-97. 
Attorney responsible for Barbuda, 
1792-7.
Attorney 1794-1805, specially res­ 
ponsible for Barbuda from 1797 to 
1805. Also Manager of Betty's Hope 
from 1797.
Attorney, asked by C.B.C. to advise 
on Barbuda, 1809 to c. 1811.
Langford Lovell Hodge Attorney 1805-16.
J. Osborn Attorney for Antigua 1816-28.
R. Jarritt Attorney for Antigua 1828-35, and 
for Barbuda 1828-30.
N.B. Attorney for Antigua means for the Codrington estates 
on Antigua.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
The most important source is the large collection of manu­ 
scripts relating to the West Indian estates of the Codrington 
family, until October 1980 deposited at the Gloucestershire 
Record Office, catalogued under the prefix D1610. These 
consist of title deeds, maps and plans, estate papers, 
accounts, legal and business documents, and correspondence. 
In December 1980 they were autioned at Sotheby's on the 
instructions of Sir Simon Codrington, but the new owner has 
still not revealed his name (March 1981). The Record Office 
at Gloucester has a micro-film of the correspondence and 
accounts.
II
Some of the correspondence (more than 500 letters) was sold 
to Robson Lowe in the 1950s and these are on the micro-film 
375, at the Gloucestershire Record Office.
III
A few documents, notably a map of Barbuda in the late 18th 
Century, and a letter from John James to Sir Bethell 
Codrington in 1824 were formerly kept at Dodington. Presum­ 
ably they were also sold in December 1980.
IV
Documents at the Public Record Office.
Those referred to include:
268
CO 700 MP/8 Antigua, Map of Barbuda 1813
CO 152/30-35, 152/47-106
CO 7/1-37, 7/38, 7/40, 7/89, 7/100
Slave Returns for Antigua, especially 1821 and 1824,
T71 246, T71 248
V
Reference has also been made to the Library of the U.S.P.G., 
Tufton Street, London, where there is some information 
about Barbuda in the early 18th century.
VI
The Gloucester Journal for the early 1830s
VII
Admiralty Charts No. 1997 Barbuda Island, surveyed by 
Captain E. Barnett, 1848, published at 
the Hydrographic Office of the Admiralty, 
1850
No. 2600 Mona Passage to Dominica 
(chiefly from Admiralty surveys and 
United States Government Charts), with 
additions and corrections to 1974, 
published at the Admiralty 1858
Secondary Sources
Anstey, Roger
Augier, F.R., 
Gordon, S-C., 
Hall, D.G., 
Reckord, M.
Baker, B.C.
Baugh, Daniel A.
Bennett, J. Harry
The Atlantic Slave Trade and British 
Abolition 1760-1810, London, 1975
The Making of the West Indies, 
Trinidad, Jamaica, and London, 1960
A Guide to Records in the Leeward 
Islands, Oxford, 1965
Naval Administration 1715-1750, 
Naval Records Society, 1977
Bondsmen and Bishops. Slavery and 
Apprenticeship on the Codrington 
Plantations of Barbados, 1710-1838, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958
269
Berriedale Keith, A 
Burn, W.L.
Burns, Sir Alan
Coleridge, Henry
Craton, Michael
The First British Empire, Oxford,
1930
Emancipation and Apprenticeship in
the British West Indies, London,
1937
History of the British West Indies, 
London 1954, revised edition 1965
Six Months in the West Indies in 
1825, London, 1826
Searching for the Invisible Man. 
Slaves and Plantation Life in 
Jamaica, Massachusetts, 1978
A Jamaican Plantation, The History 
of Worthy Park, 1670-1970, London 
and New York, 1970
The Atlantic Slave Trade. A Census, 
Madison, Milwaukee and London, 1969
The History of Sugar, 2 Vols., 
London, 1949
Sugar and Slaves? The Rise of 
the Planter Class in the English 
West Indies, 1624-1713, London, 1973
The History, Civil and Commercial, 
of the British West Indies, 5 vols., 
5th edition, London, 1819
Roll,Jordan, Roll: the World the 
Slaves Made, New York, 1974
The Tropical World; Its Social and 
Economic Conditions and its Future 
Status, London, 1958
A Study on the Historiography of 
the British West Indies to the end 
of the 19th Century, Mexico, 1956
Slave Society in the British Leeward 
Islands at the end of the 18th 
Century, Yale, 1965
Five of the Leewards 1834-1870; 
The Major Problems of the Post- 
Emancipation Period in Antigua, 
Barbuda, Montserrat, Nevis and 
St. Kitts, Barbados, 1971
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XXXV, Snipping and
Navigation, 3rd edition, London, 1961
Craton, Michael and 
Walvin, James
Curtin, Philip D,
Deerr, Noel
Dunn, Richard S.
Edwards, Bryan
Genovese, Eugene D
Gourou, Pierre,
Goveia, Elsa
Hall, Douglas
Hamshere, Cyril The British in the Caribbean, 
London, 1972
270
Harlow, Vincent T
Harris, David R.
Higham, C.S.S.
Hunte, George
James, Preston E.
Jennings, W.I., and 
Young, C.M.
Jordan, Winthrop D.
Klingberg, Frank J. 
(ed.)
Long, Edward
Lowe, Robson
Lowenthal, David 
Lucas, C.P.
Luffman , John
Macpherson, J. 
Marx, Robert F.
Newton, A.P.
Christopher Codrington 1668-1710, 
Oxford 1928
Plants, Animals and Man in the 
Outer Leeward Islands, West Indies; 
An Ecological Study of Antigua, 
Barbuda, and Anguilla, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, 1965
The Leeward Islands 1660-1688, 
Cambridge, 1921
The West Indian Islands, London, 
1972
Latin America, London, 1941
Constitutional Laws of the British 
Empire, Oxford, 1938
White over Black: American Attitudes 
Toward the Negro, 1550-1812, Chapel 
Hill 1968, reprinted Baltimore 1971
Codrington Chronicle; An Experiment 
in Anglican Altruism on a Barbados 
Plantation 1710-1834, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1949
The History of Jamaica, 1st edition, 
London 1774: new edition with 
Introduction by George Metcalf, 
London, 1970
The Codrington Correspondence, 
1743-1851, 2nd impression, London, 
1968
West Indian Societies, Oxford 1972
A Historical Geography of the British 
Colonies, Vol. II West Indies, 2nd 
edition, Oxford 1905
Brief Account of the Island of 
Antigua in Letters to a Friend,1789 
(in Oliver, History of Antigua, I, 
see below)
Caribbean Lands, a Geography of 
the West Indies, London, 1963
Shipwrecks of the Western Hemisphere 
1492-1825, New York, first published 
1971, 2nd edition 1975
The European Nations in the West 
Indies, 1493-1688, London, 1933
271
Oliver, V.L.
Pares, Richard
Parry, J.H. and 
Sherlock, P.M.
Penson, Lilian
Pitman, Frank W
Pope-Hennessy, James
Ragatz, Lowell J.
Roberts, George W,
Schaw, Janet
Sheridan, R.B.
Sherlock, P.M. 
Simpson, A.W.B
Slater, Mary 
Southey, T.
History of Antigua, 3 Vols, London, 
1899
Caribbeana, London, 1910-19
A West India Fortune, London, 1950
War and Trade in the West Indies 
1739-1763, 1st edition, London 
1936, new impression, London, 1963
Merchants and Planters, The Economic 
History Review Supplements, 
Cambridge, 1970
A Short History of the West Indies, 
London and New York, 1963
The Colonial Agents of the British 
West Indies, London, 1924
The Development of the British West 
Indies 1700-1763, New Haven, 1917, 
reprinted London, 1967
Sins of the Fathers; A Study of 
the Atlantic Slave Traders 1441- 
1807, London, 1967
The Fall of the Planter Class in 
the British Caribbean 1763-1833; 
A Study in Social and Economic 
History, New York, 1971
The Population of Jamaica, 
Cambridge, 1957
Journey of a Lady of Quality; 
Being the Narrative of a Journey 
from Scotland to the West Indies, 
North Carolina, and Portugal, in 
the years 1774-1776, ed. Evangeline 
Walker Andrews in collaboration with 
Charles McLean Andrews, 1st edition 
1921, 2nd edition, New Haven 1939
Sugar and Slavery, an Economic 
History of the British West Indies, 
1623-1775, Baltimore, 1974
West Indian Nations: A New History, 
Kingston, Jamaica, 1973
An Introduction to the History of 
the Land Law, London, 1961
The Caribbean Islands, London, 1968
Chronological History of the West 
Indies, 3 Vols., London 1827.
272
Thornton, A.P.
West, Robert C. and 
Augelli, John P.
West Indies Pilot, 
Williams, Eric
Williamson, J.A. 
Woodward, E.L.
West India Policy under the 
Restoration, Oxford, 1956
Middle America; Its Lands and 
Peoples, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, 1966
Vol. II, 10th edition, London, 1955
Capitalism and Slavery, first pub­ 
lished 1964, 4th impression, London, 
1975
Caribbee Islands under the 
Proprietary Patents, Oxford, 1926
The Age of Reform 1815-1870, 
Oxford, 2nd edtion, 1962
Pamphlets and Articles
Berleant-Schiller, Riva
Craton, Michael
Hall, Douglas
Higman, B.W
Lowenthal, David and 
Clarke, Colin G.
'The Social and Edonomic Role of 
Cattle in Barbuda 1 , Geographical 
Review, July 1977
'The failure of agricultural devel­ 
opment in post-emancipation Barbuda: 
a study of social and economic 
continuity in a West Indian community 1 , 
A Journal of Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies, No. 25, Dec. 1978
'Hobbesian or Panglossian? The 
Two Extremes of Slave Conditions in 
the British Caribbean, 1783 to 1834', 
William and Mary Quarterly, third 
series, Vol. XXXV, April 1978
'Absentee-Proprietorship in the 
British West Indies to about 1850', 
Jamaican Historical Review, Vol. 
IV, 1964
'Slaves and Slavery in the British 
West Indies', Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol. II, 1962
'Household Structure and Fertility 
on Jamaican Slave Plantations: 
A Nineteenth-century Example', 
Population Studies, Vol. XXVII, 1973
'Slave-Breeding in Barbuda: The 
Past of a Negro Myth 1 , Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, 
Vol. CCXCII, June 1977
273
Pares, Richard
Parish, Peter J
Pitman, Frank W
Roberts, G-W.
Sheridan, R.B.
Thorns, D.W.
Watters, D.
'Island Orphans: Barbuda and the 
Rest 1 , The Journal of Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics, Vol. 
xviii, No. 3, November 1980
'A London West India Merchant House, 
1740-69', Essays Presented to Sir 
Lewis Namier, ed. R. Pares and 
A.J.P. Taylor, London, 1956
'Slavery/the many faces of a Southern 
institution 1 , BAAS Pamphlets in 
American Studies, Durham, 1979
'Slavery on British West India 
Plantations in the Eighteenth 
Century 1 , Journal of Negro History, 
XI, 1926
'A Life Table for a West Indian 
Slave Population', Population 
Studies, V (1951-2)
'Securing Demographic Data from 
Limited Historical Material', 
International Population Conference, 
Ottowa, 1963
'The Rise of a Colonial Gentry: 
A Case Study of Antigua, 1730-1775', 
Economic History Review, Vol. XIII, 
No. 3, April 1961
'Planter and Merchants: The Oliver 
Family of Antigua and London 
1716-1784', Business History, July 
1971
'Samuel Martin, Innovating Sugar 
Planter of Antigua 1750-1776', 
Agricultural History, July 1960
"Slavery in the Leeward Islands in 
the Mid Eighteenth Century: a 
Reappraisal', Bulletin of Institute 
of Historical Research, May 1969
'Observations on the Historic Sites 
and Archaeology of Barbuda', 
unpublished article, November 1980
